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5Price Barriers in the Stock Market and Their Effect on the 
Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model
By Nathan Blyler
Abstract:  
The predicted price of an American option by the Black-Scholes (B-S) Option 
Pricing Model is known to differ from the market price of that option systematically 
with respect to time to expiration, distance in- or out-of-the-money, and liquidity 
of the option.  We examine the possibility of price barriers in the stock market 
causing further systemic pricing differences between the market price and B-S 
predicted price.  These differences occur when an option’s strike price is near 
a price barrier and differ in effect and significance depending on the position of 
the barrier relative to the underlying stocks’ price.  We find round number price 
barriers in the stock market are beginning to be internalized into the option market. 
Additionally, Bollinger bands and Gann levels appear to receive special attention 
from investors, but do not act as price barriers.  
Keywords: Black-Scholes, Price Barriers, Systematic Errors, Option Market
I. Introduction
A. Financial Background
 The option market is closely related to the stock market in many ways, 
but differs in trading practices and uses.  Similar to the stock market, the options 
market relies on speculation of stock price movement over time, but unlike a 
stock the derivative is only valuable over a set period of time.  In this paper we 
will focus on call options.  A call is simply the right to buy a security at a specified 
price called a strike price.  The writer of a call is agreeing to sell the security at 
the strike price when the buyer exercises the call before a set date.  The buyer 
can choose to let the call expire without ever exercising it, which would normally 
be done if the price of the security falls below the strike price.  Thus, the buyer 
could simply buy the stock at market price for less than the strike price.  In the 
6case where the strike price is above market price, the call is said to be out-of-
the-money, and when the strike price is below the market price, the call is in-the-
money.  Since an option can move into the money at any time, the price of the 
option must not only be the difference between the strike price and the current 
security price to account for immediate exercising (if the call is in-the-money and 
zero otherwise) but also include a time premium for the chance a call moves to 
being in-the-money.  
 Options are appealing to investors for numerous reasons.  They are 
substantially cheaper than buying a security, and are normally settled in cash 
rather than trading the underlying security at the specified price.  This allows 
investors to speculate on a security’s price movement with less initial capital and 
realize larger percentage returns on their investments.  Furthermore, the options 
market allows for speculation on the volatility of a security’s price rather than the 
direction of its movement.  The final use of the options market is to hedge risky 
positions taken in the stock market.  Consider someone who has sold a stock short 
without owning the stock and has unlimited loss potential. However, if she buys a 
call option giving her the right to buy the stock at a given price, she can only lose 
the premium she paid and the difference between the strike price and the price at 
which she short sold the stock.  The use of call options as in this manner led to the 
most well known option pricing method called the Black-Scholes Model.
 In their ground-breaking paper on corporate liabilities, Black and 
Scholes created a model for pricing call options based on hedging to form a 
riskless portfolio of stocks and options (Black and Scholes 1973).  One of their 
assumptions was no arbitrage in the market, so any risk-free portfolio should 
provide a return at the risk free rate, allowing them to find a price for call options 
given the following inputs: security price, strike price, risk free rate, time to 
expiration, and volatility of the underlying security’s returns.  Their predicted 
7price of a call option is found by the following system of equations, which can be 
thought of as the risk adjusted probability an option finishes in the money:
      
     
  
    
where
C0 = Current call option value
S0 = Current stock price
Φ(d) = The probability a random draw from a standard normal distribution will 
be less than d.
X = Exercise price
r = Annualized risk-free interest rate
T = Time to expiration in years
 = Volatility of the underlying stock 
Part of the reason for the widespread use of this model is the ease with 
which most of these inputs can be found, as all are easily observable except for 
volatility.  Therefore, pricing an option becomes a question of how much the 
underlying stock’s price will change during the life of the option.  The higher the 
volatility, or movement in price, the higher the probability the stock’s price will 
end above the strike price.  
The model is built on other assumptions besides no arbitrage, such as 
stock prices follow a Brownian motion, disallowing jumps and predictability. 
Furthermore, the underlying stock is assumed to pay no dividends and the option 
is assumed to not be exercised until expiration.  Additionally, the model assumes 
there are no transaction costs in the option market. The most important assumption 
is the variance of the rate of return of the security is constant.  While most of these 
assumptions obviously do not hold in any market, it is important to note that these 
assumptions only need to hold over the life of an option, not forever, to make the 
model prediction valid.  
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8One can easily see, based both on the use of options and the derivation 
of call pricing, there is a close tie between stock markets and options market. 
Because of this close relationship, we would expect anomalies in security prices to 
result in option pricing anomalies.  A recent finding in behavioral finance involves 
the existence of price barriers, such as whole number values, in the stock market 
(Sonnemans 2003, Dorfleitner et. al. 2009, etc.).  These price barriers, or levels of 
support and resistance, are not unbreakable, but have an effect on the movement of 
stock prices.  As a rising stock price approaches a barrier from below, making that 
barrier a level of resistance, the volatility of the price usually lessens.  If a barrier is 
approached from above, making it a level of support, the stock price’s rate of change 
is again likely to slow (Donaldson and Kim 1993).  
B. Paper Outline
The stock market is one of the last strong holds for purely rational actors, 
with many believers in the efficient market hypothesis even while game theory 
and psychological microeconomics continue to find flaws in the neoclassical 
assumption of rationality.  The efficient market hypothesis does not allow for price 
barriers to exist in the stock market; therefore, rational investors should not treat 
options with strikes near the barriers any different than other options.  An anomaly 
around the barriers would indicate that investors who stand to lose substantial 
amounts of money do not completely believe the efficient market hypothesis.  
Comparing option prices to each other does not allow for analysis as 
they vary in important ways such as distance from the money, time to expiration, 
and underlying stock.  In order to hold these important factors constant and make 
meaningful comparisons, we use the ‘correct’ B-S predicted price of the option, 
found by regression techniques.  Given the existence of price barriers, the B-S 
model should misprice options that have a barrier between the stock and strike 
9price because it does not account for the presence of these barriers. In this paper 
we will examine errors in the B-S model to detect systematic errors around price 
barriers.  
Our findings show round number price barriers found by other studies 
have begun to be internalized into the options market.  This is strong evidence 
against the efficient market hypothesis from the actors that are said to be completely 
rational.  Our other proposed price barriers, Bollinger bands and Gann levels, do 
not act as we hypothesize, but also show investors pay particular attention to 
specific price levels.  Thus, the assumptions made by the B-S model result in other 
systematic errors not yet discussed in the literature.  By combining the behavioral 
finance literature on price barriers and the literature on errors in the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model, this paper is the first to look at price barriers’ effect on 
the options market.  This paper strengthens the argument against efficient stock 
markets by using an efficient option market.  Moreover, it adds to the sizable 
literature on the accuracy of the B-S and how the market price differs from the 
predicted price in systematic ways.
In the next section, a detailed background of other literature on errors 
in the B-S option pricing model caused by the model assumptions is given.  This 
is followed by a brief introduction to the discovery of price barriers in stock 
markets.  The following section describes our methodology of finding the correct 
B-S price and controlling for known systematic errors.  Section four justifies the 
proposed price barriers and the expected findings.  Section five gives a summary 
of the data used, while section six shows the findings.  Finally, section seven 
makes conclusions given the findings and offers alternative hypotheses to explain 
the unexpected results.  
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II. Literature Review
A.  Black-Scholes Systematic Errors
As with all mathematical models, the assumptions of the B-S model have faced 
scrutiny from academics since its introduction in 1973.  Problems with the 
assumptions have emerged in varying degrees from unimportant to creating 
systematic errors in pricing.  To avoid misspecification, known systematic errors 
must be controlled for when examining the difference between the market and 
B-S price.  Theoretically, an American1 option is always worth more in the 
market than exercised, causing many studies to ignore the possibility of early 
exercising as this violation does not appear to cause systematic errors (Merton 
1973, Macbeth and Merville 1979, ect.).  Additionally, investors commonly 
witness jumps in the price of a security from the revealing of new information, 
violating the assumption of Brownian motion and causing the B-S model to 
predict prices under the market price (Merton 1976).  
 The assumption of constant variance in a security’s return throughout 
the life of an option causes significant disparities between observed prices 
and predicted prices.  A common adaptation has been to model variance as an 
unpredictable stochastic process (Chesney and Scott 1989, Hull and White 1987, 
Scott 1987, ect.).  The results of modeling stock return variance in this way 
are inconclusive and make predicting the price of an option considerably more 
difficult.  Hull and White include a volatility of volatility term in their model and 
find the B-S model to over price at- and in-the-money options; however, they 
note the over pricing is caused by a positive correlation between the price of 
the underlying stock and volatility.  This is a problem, because the correlation 
between the two is not constant and has been positive some years and negative 
others (Rubinstein 1978, Schmalensee and Trippe 1978).  Others have tried to 
1  An American option can be exercised any time between its sale and date of expiration.
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model volatility as a function of asset price and time, but failed to achieve better 
results than attempts to smooth out implied volatility over strike price and time 
(Dumas et. al. 2002).  These failures to create a superior model have allowed the 
flawed B-S model to remain the standard in option pricing, and as such be using 
in our analysis of the option market.  
 Ignoring evidence that stock returns do not have a constant variance 
over time, simply estimating the expected variance still causes problems as it is 
the only input not observable in the B-S model.  Weighted historical volatility, 
the simplest of estimators, with recent volatility given the most weight, does not 
include important factors such as: market volatility, price and volatility correlation, 
mergers or other large events, and the volatility implied by the options market 
(Black 1975).  In an efficient market, the relevant information would be entirely 
included in the current market price.  Along these lines, multiple authors have 
found the options market is better at estimating the future volatility of securities 
returns than historical averages (Black and Scholes 1972, Ncube 1996, Blyler 
2012). These studies support our approach to estimating the correct volatility of a 
stock through the options market.  
 The largest differences in market and predicted prices occur when an 
option is far in- or out-of-the-money; however, the direction of these differences 
is debated.  Black finds that far in-the-money options have a market price below 
the B-S predicted price and far out-of-the-money options have a market price 
above it (Black 1975).  Alternatively, Macbeth and Merville find, on average, 
in-the-money options are overpriced by the market and out-of-the-money 
options are underpriced by the market relative to the B-S model (Macbeth and 
Merville 1979).  In partial agreement with the aforementioned authors, Merton 
finds the market price to exceed the B-S predicted price when the option is both 
far in- or out-of-the-money and when the option is close to expiration (Merton 
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1976).  Additionally an option’s time to expiration has been found to generate 
discrepancies between the B-S and market prices.  Options with a short time to 
expiration, three months or less, tend to have a market price greater than predicted 
by the B-S model (Black 1975).  Nevertheless, the extent for which in-the-money 
and out-of-the-money options are mispriced decreases as time to expiration 
decreases (Macbeth and Merville 1979).  Possible explanations for the systematic 
error accompany each finding; however, no paper we are aware of mentions the 
possibility of price barriers in the stock market as a reason for systematic error in 
the B-S option pricing model.  
B. Price Barriers
 The study of humans’ psychological ties to specific numbers and the 
subsequent relation to the stock market is a somewhat recent development. 
Academic papers focus mostly on the human affinity for round numbers, with 
many finding significant price barriers at round numbers (Donaldson and Harold 
1993, Sonnemans 2003, Koedijk and Stork 1994, ect.).  Price barriers have been 
found by observing the frequency of specific stock prices and the rate of change 
in a stock’s price around those levels (Donaldson and Harold 1993, Sonnemans 
2003).  Humans seeing a change in the largest nonzero place holder (e.g. 19.9 
changing to 20.0) as a larger jump than an equivalent monetary jump that leaves 
that number unchanged could be a psychological cause for price barriers in the 
stock market (Sonnemans 2003).  The resistance of breaking a round number is 
found when a stock closes ending in a 9, as those stocks experience significantly 
higher levels of selling off than other stocks (Bagnoli et. al. 2006).  There is also 
evidence of price barriers becoming levels of support as trading volume increases 
after a significant price level is broken (Donaldson and Harold 1993, Huddart 
2005).  The importance of price barriers in the stock market has been known to 
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traders for much longer than its discovery in academia.  From the early works of 
W.D. Gann, and possibly before, some traders have attributed their profits to the 
knowledge of the proportionality of the stock market (Gann 1935).  
 Not all literature is as supportive of the importance of price barriers in the 
stock market, although most have found evidence of it to some extent.  Emerging 
markets, possibly because of more rapid growth, do not exhibit strong support for 
the hypothesis of price barriers (Bahng 2003).  Recently, even in more developed 
markets, such as some in Europe, price barriers were not found to be constant over 
time.  Once the anomalies were recognized, they tended to disappear in accordance 
with the efficient market hypothesis (Dorfleitner and Klein 2009).  Some find that 
while price barriers exist they are of no use to investors because knowledge of the 
barriers does not allow investors to predict a stock’s return (Koedijk and Stork 
1994).  Furthermore, automated investing could result in the formation of price 
barriers because limit orders are usually placed at round numbers, which would 
account for the clustering of prices and increase in trading volume when a stock 
price reaches a round number (Chiao and Wang 2009).  
 This paper examines the effect of price barriers in the stock market 
on the options market and attempts to identify price barriers in stock prices by 
anomalies in option pricing.  If option prices take all market information into 
account, including price barriers, then the difference between the market price 
and the B-S predicted price would vary more near a barrier price.  Examining 
price barriers’ effect on the B-S model extends beyond current literature on price 
barriers, which focuses mainly on locating barriers within stock markets.  The 
paper combines two strands of literature by using similar methodology seen in 
previous studies on the systematic errors in the B-S model and looking for errors 
predicted by behavioral finance theories.  
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III. Methodology
This paper focuses on testing the validity of the Black-Scholes model 
when accounting for the presence of price barriers through the exploration of 
systematic errors.  Previous literature has found price barriers at round numbers 
for multiple securities by looking at frequency of a security’s price (Donaldson 
and Harold 1993, Sonnemans 2003, Koedijk and Stork 1994, ect.).  As the price of 
a stock approaches a price barrier the movement of the price slows, allowing for 
frequency analysis to locate the barriers.  This results in the Brownian movement 
assumption of the B-S model being violated.  The violation of this assumption at 
select price levels should create an error at those levels that is not seen otherwise. 
Evaluating the difference between the B-S predicted price and the market price is 
contingent on accurately evaluating the volatility of a security’s return to find the 
correct B-S price.
A. Finding the Correct B-S Price
 To accomplish this initial task, we use the methodology of MacBeth 
and Merville in “An Empirical Examination of the Black-Scholes Call Option 
Pricing Model.”  Their analysis is reliant on the assumption that the B-S model 
accurately predicts an at-the-money call option price.  Black notes errors in his 
model on options far in- or out-of-the-money, and in options with less than 90 
days to expiration (Black 1975).  To account for this, the model used to estimate 
implied volatility of a security’s return controls for distance from the money using 
only options with greater than 90 days to expiration.  
Taking the B-S implied volatility of an at-the-money option as the true 
volatility for the underlying security’s returns, we run a regression to estimate this 
volatility.  The regression is run on all options traded on that day for a particular 
security.  In total, 252 trading days per security, less the days the particular security 
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had fewer than 5 different options traded were used.  The estimated regression, 
taken from MacBeth and Merville, is the observed implied volatility of an option’s 
market price regressed on its distance from the money.  The model is given by
where i ranges from 1 to I representative of the I companies, t ranges from January 
3, 2011 to December 30, 2011 for each trading day, and j ranges from 1 to J, 
with J≥5, for all different options of company i on day t.  Here, the only control 
variable m is the distance the option is from the money as a percentage of the 
security’s price.  More formally,
    
 
where S is the stock price of company i on day t, X is the strike price of option j of 
company i discounted by the risk free rate back to its present value.  This measure 
is a slight variation on MacBeth and Merville’s work, where the difference is 
taken as a percentage of strike price.  The use of call options to hedge positions 
caused their measure of distance from the money to be severely skewed, but this 
small variation decreases the skew substantially without drastically changing the 
results (Blyler 2012).
 In the above regression, the intercept  is the estimated implied volatility 
of an at-the-money option.  Our assumption states that this estimate is the correct 
volatility of the underlying security’s return and should be used to find the B-S 
prediction of that security’s options at any strike price on the given day.  This 
allows us to find the difference between the market price () and the B-S predicted 
price given by 
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In the above equation, is the market price of option j on day t of the underlying 
security and  is the B-S predicted price of that call option using the estimated true 
volatility.  
B. Systematic Difference between Market Price and B-S Predicted Price 
MacBeth and Merville find the difference between the market price of a call 
option and the B-S predicted price to be a function of the distance of the option’s 
strike price from the money and the option’s time to expiration.  MacBeth and 
Merville’s model estimating the difference between the market price and B-S 
predicted price of a call option is given by 
       
The regression is run separately, not only for each underlying security, but also for 
different properties of options.  Based on previous literature, finding differences in 
pricing errors between options with short or long times to expiration and options 
in- or out-of-the-money, each underlying security has four separate regressions to 
allow different estimates for all possible combinations of options near or far from 
expiration and in- or out-of-the-money.  
MacBeth and Merville’s model uses linear variables, but through 
empirical work a model including a squared term for distance from the money 
was found to be more appropriate (Blyler 2012).  In their 1979 paper, the data 
is not treated as panel data although options are followed over time, resulting 
in heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  More recent advances in panel data 
analysis have led to an increase in financial data being analyzed using panel 
techniques to correct for these problems inherent in the data (Petersen 2005, Gow 
et al. 2010).  Previous authors using panel data and similar regression techniques 
to estimate volatility have suggested the square of distance from the money 
and the liquidity of both the underlying asset and option contribute to pricing 
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difference from the B-S option pricing model (Ncube 1996, Feng 2011).  To allow 
analysis over all stocks, we introduce a new dependent variable,
     
 
Therefore, MacBeth and Merville’s original model is revised so that
         
            (9).
The variables y, m, and T are taken from equation 7, and the addition of 
m2 comes from our empirical work and other authors (Feng 2011, Blyler 2012). 
Furthermore, Feng’s work on the liquidity effect in the option market makes 
controlling for the volume of trading of each option on each day appropriate.  In 
his study, volume of trading also affected the curvature of the error caused by 
distance from the money.  In order to account for Feng’s finding,  is the number 
of trades an option had on a given day.  Its effect on the curvature is controlled for 
by multiplying , while its overall effect on the error is given in log scale because 
of decreasing returns.  The analysis of this paper focuses on the dummy variables 
and , representing price barriers above and below the underlying security’s current 
price respectively.  Price barriers above the current price, denoted , are expected 
to have a negative sign because they represent levels of resistance.  Alternatively, 
price barriers below the current price, denoted , are expected to have a positive 
sign because they represent levels of support.  
Previously mentioned price barriers have been found in the stock 
market by numerous authors; therefore, if the options market is efficient, then 
these price barriers should impact the market price of options because all 
available information in reflected in the price of the option.  The B-S model 
assumption of Brownian motion in a security’s price does not allow for price 
barriers to exist.  Hence, they cannot be priced into the B-S predicted price.   If 
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price barriers in the stock market are priced into call options, then those options 
with strikes near the barriers should have differences between the market and 
B-S predicted price not explained by other independent variables. How price 
barriers affect a stock, and therefore the corresponding options price, differ 
depending on the location of the barrier relative to the security’s current price. 
 A price barrier above a security’s current price acts as a level of resistance 
to a price increase.  As the price of a security approaches a level of resistance, 
its rate of change of price is expected to decrease.  Furthermore, the probability 
of the price rising above the price barrier is less than the probability of it rising 
above an arbitrary level that offers no resistance.  A smaller chance of breaking 
the level of resistance and an expected decrease in the rate of change should 
lower the price of options with strike prices near the barrier.  Out-of-the-money 
options have a lower probability of finishing in-the-money if the strike price is at 
or slightly above the barrier. Additionally, finishing far enough in-the-money for 
the buyer to recoup the B-S predicted option premium is less likely if the strike 
price is slightly below the barrier.  
Alternatively, a price barrier below a security’s current price can be seen 
as a level of support to a price drop.  As the price of a security decreases towards 
a level of support, the absolute rate of change is expected to slow.  The properties 
of a level of support act similarly to a level of resistance, but should result in a 
higher option price if the strike is near a level of support.  Such an option is less 
likely to fall out-of-the-money before expiration and should command a higher 
premium from the buyer.  
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IV. Hypothesized Price Barriers 
A. Bollinger Bands
 In this section, possible locations for price barriers are presented along 
with hypothesized reasons and potential implications.  The first location for 
possible price barriers comes from a commonly used financial technical indicator, 
Bollinger bands.  Bollinger bands were made famous by analyst John Bollinger 
who believed “asking the market what is happening is always a better approach 
than telling it what to do” (Bollinger 1992).  His standard for measuring volatility 
of a stock started with a simple n-period moving average of a stock’s price, which 
evolved into a weighted moving average in some cases, with k standard deviations 
of the stock’s last n prices added and subtracted from the moving average.  
For our analysis the period length is Bollinger’s suggested 20 days and 
the distance from the simple moving average is two standard deviations (Bollinger 
1992).  Bollinger bands being a measure of historic volatility, an investor could 
view the bands as price barriers the security’s price is unlikely to break if historic 
estimates of volatility hold.  She would then calculate the Bollinger bands at the 
end of a trading day and use those levels to adjust her valuation of options the 
upcoming day.  Using this strategy, investors would buy options near the bottom 
Bollinger band and write options near the top Bollinger band, driving prices up 
and down respectively.  Of course, an option’s strike price will rarely be exactly 
at a Bollinger band, meaning some distance must be deemed ‘close enough’ to the 
Bollinger band for investors to believe the effects of price barriers would play a 
role in evaluating the option.  
Options have strike prices at $10 intervals if the underlying security’s 
price is greater than $200, $5 intervals if the security’s price is between $25 
and $200, and $2.5 or $1 intervals if the price less than $25.  Notice the strike 
price interval is never less than 5% of the underlying security’s price besides 
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the extreme cases of very expensive stocks.  Working off of this, we deemed an 
option’s strike price ‘close enough’ to a Bollinger band if
This method effective creates a 5% interval around Bollinger band, but does not 
allow two different strike prices to be ‘close enough’ to the price barrier.  Because 
of the uncertainty of the differences between options with strike prices directly 
above and strike prices directly below the price barrier, two separate dummy 
variables are utilized; however, the expected sign on both is the same depending 
on the strike being near the upper or lower Bollinger band.  
 Bollinger bands suffer from a few draw backs that make them less 
likely price barriers than the other proposed barriers.  Investors can use 10 period 
Bollinger bands as well as vary the number of standard deviations added and 
subtracted, which would result in differing opinions about the exact location of 
price barriers.  Additionally, Bollinger bands change daily using this formula, 
meaning an investor using the above strategy would only believe the price barrier 
existed at that level for a day.  Options affected by a barrier for a day would not 
vary greatly in worth as it is likely they do not expire for many days to come and 
the barrier would likely shift by then.  A more realistic price barrier would stay 
constant throughout time, or at least for a meaningful length of time.
B. Round Numbers
 Most current literature on price barriers focuses on round numbers, 
meaning integers when a security’s price is low, multiples of ten when the price 
is slightly higher, or multiples of 100 when the price is higher still.  Many authors 
find the existence of price barriers at these numbers in a variety of securities and 
markets.  Barriers at round numbers are the easiest to defend as given because the 
psychological reasoning behind their existence is a staple of behavioral finance. 
!"#$%& − !"##$%&'(  !"#$ <    .025 ∗ !"#$%&'(")  !"#$%&'!!!  !"#$%. 
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Investors seem to weight round numbers more than their mathematical worth if 
markets are perfectly efficient.  
Here the issue that arises is options are often sold at round numbers as 
explained above.  To avoid this problem, barriers, or at least stronger barriers, are 
hypothesized to exist at round numbers seemingly more important to humans. 
For most securities, options are sold with strikes at multiples of ten or five 
because their underlying price is greater than $25.  As such, for all securities 
with a price of $20 or more, the important round number strike prices are chosen 
to be at multiples of $50.  For securities with a price less than $20, important 
round number strike prices were chosen at multiples of 5.  While these numbers 
are reasonable selections, there is an inherent weakness is simply choosing these 
barriers rather than investigating all round numbers; however, our methodology 
would not hold if all round numbers were taken into account.  
 There are multiple price barriers at any given time and the arguments 
for round numbers result in barriers switching between support and resistance 
depending on their position relative to the security’s current price.  This means a 
broken level of resistance becomes a level of support and should drive the price of 
the security higher as investors grow more confident in its performance.  Similarly, 
a broken level of support becomes resistance and should drive the price down even 
further.  This could counteract the differing value given to options with strikes near 
the barriers.  A less risk adverse investor may be willing to pay more for an option 
with a strike near a level of resistance, knowing if the option moves into the money, 
it is likely to move further into the money.  Additionally, an option with a strike near 
a level of support may not appear less risky knowing if the option moves out-of-
the-money one day it is less likely to move back into the money than other options. 
The final hypothesized price barrier locations avoid both problems of changing over 
time and switching between support and resistance.  
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C. Gann Levels
 Infamous investor W.D. Gann is known for his unorthodox beliefs 
about the stock market and the success he had with trading strategies based on 
seemingly unrelated occurrences.  From the effects of planetary retrograde motion 
to the mathematical properties of geometric shapes, Gann’s trading methods are 
unconventional; however, numerous books have been written by Gann and others 
about these special proportions in markets (Brown 1999).  While skepticism 
should accompany outlandish claims, the success and popularity of both the 
books and methods demonstrate many traders know about, if not use, Gann’s 
approach.   Knowing investors in the stock market may act differently at special 
price levels, their expected actions should be priced into the options market.  This 
makes no statement about the logic behind Gann’s method; rather, if enough 
investors believe his approach has merit it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 Although Gann makes numerous claims, the analysis here will focus on 
levels created by a method referred to as Gann’s wheel.2 Gann’s wheel involves 
levels of support coming from a pivot high and levels of resistance coming from 
a pivot low where a pivot is an important price level.  Following the methodology 
described in Brown 1999, we examined the charts of each stock in 2010 to find 
initial pivot highs and lows of our stocks.  These chosen pivots remained until the 
stock’s price fell below the pivot low or rose above the pivot high, at which point 
the broken pivot switched to  the new year to date high or low.  From here, Gann 
describes the angles 45, 90, 120, 180, 240, 270, 315, and 360 degrees of having 
particular importance.  In a Gann wheel, these angles are drawn from the pivot 
low and pivot high on a plane of price and time until they intersect what Gann 
calls the square of nine.  The time of the intersection is Gann’s prediction for when 
2 For a more detailed explanation of both how to pick pivot highs/lows and the methodology 
behind Gann’s wheel see Brown, Constance M. Technical analysis for the trading professional: 
Strategies and techniques for today’s turbulent global financial markets. McGraw-Hill, 1999.
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the stock’s price will reach that barrier; however for this analysis we will only 
focus on the price level at which the intersection occurs.  An example of these 
intersections can be seen in the figure below.  
(Brown pg 234, 1999)
These price barriers will remain constant until either the pivot high or pivot 
low changes, and the important intersections can be calculated by the following 
equations for a given degree.
 
   
   
Similar to the Bollinger Band price barriers, options are unlikely 
to be sold with strike prices exactly at Gann’s levels.  Again, 
the strike price is deemed ‘close enough’ to the price barrier if 
creating a buffer area for the strike price to fall.
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 The drawbacks of Gann’s price barriers come from their complexity 
and often misunderstood fundamentals.  Different trading programs calculate 
Gann levels with built in functions; however, these functions differ in their 
implementations of Gann’s wheel (Brown 1999).  If investors are not in agreement 
on the location of Gann’s price barriers, the effect on option prices would not 
be significant.  This could allow traders who correctly estimate Gann’s levels to 
make larger gains or it could push investors away from Gann’s method towards a 
more straightforward method.  
V. Data
 The data for this paper is called National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) data 
collected by Options Pricing and Reporting Authority (OPRA).  It contains 
information on the traded call options of 33 companies, most of which currently 
make up the DOW 30, as well as several important technology firms.  The firms 
and their ticker symbols are shown in the following table.
Company 
Name
Apple
American Express Co.
Bank of America Corp.
Boeing Co.
Citigroup Inc.
Caterpillar Inc.
Cummings Inc.
Chevron Corp.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.
Walt Disney Co.
General Electivc Co.
Google Inc.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Halliburton Co.
Hewlett-Packard Co.
Home Depot Inc.
Intel Corp.
Ticker 
Symbol
AAPL
AXP
BAC
BAC
C
CAT
CMI
CVX
DD
DIS
GE
GOOG
GS
HAL
HPQ
HD
INTC
Company 
Name
International Business Co.
Johnson & Johnson
JP Morgan Chase and Co.
The Coca-Cola Co.
3M Company
McDonald’s Corp.
Microsoft Corp.
Pfizer Inc.
Qualcomm Inc.
Transocean Ltd.
AT&T Inc.
United Technologies Corp.
Verizon Communications Inc.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Exxon Mobil Corp.
Standard & Poors 500
Ticker 
Symbol
IBM
JNJ
JPM
KO
MMM
MCD
MSFT
PFE
QCOM
RIG
T
UTX
VZ
WMT
XOM
SPY
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The data is end of day data from all 252 trading days in 2011 with strike 
prices ranging from far in-the-money to far out-of-the-money.  The times to 
expirations at the initial sale of the options include one month, three months, 
six months, and a few times of a year or more.  All options are followed until 
expiration and every day includes the ending spreads, greeks, and trading volumes 
for the options.  
 Since the analysis relies on market prices containing all information, only 
options traded (trading volume greater than zero) on a specific day are included 
in the analysis.  Because the companies involved in the analysis are commonly 
traded companies, this does not eliminate many options besides those with strike 
prices too far away from the underlying security’s price to be useful to traders, 
or those with extremely long times to expiration.  In order to eliminate data we 
viewed as likely mistakes, options that were sold for less than the intrinsic value 
of the option were not included. Additionally, options with less than two days 
to expiration are not included in the analysis because end of the day data is not 
reflective of the changes occurring with only a couple days left in the life of the 
option.  
 Using regressions to estimate the true volatility of a stock’s return creates 
a weighted average of implied volatility from all of the traded options on that 
day.  In order to assure enough inputs into the weighted average, the true implied 
volatility is only calculated if options with 5 different strikes or expirations were 
traded that day.   This estimate is then used to calculate the inputs required in the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model.  In order to estimate the annualized risk free 
rate, the annualized return rate on a three month U.S. Treasury Bill was obtained 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve.  The time to expiration is obviously not always 
three months; however, this should not be a problem because annualized Treasury 
Bill returns only vary slightly with changes in time to maturity from a day to a 
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year, and the B-S predicted call price lacks sensitivity to the riskless return rate. 
In fact, MacBeth and Merville note, “…[their] results would be virtually identical 
had [they] used a single riskless return for a Treasury Bill… .”  
The data used differs from MacBeth’s and Merville’s data in two distinct 
ways.  First, the data includes information on more than five times the number of 
stocks.  Second, many days have over fifty observations used in the regression 
to calculate the estimated at-the-money volatility.   These advantages allow for 
stronger conclusions because it reduces the likelihood that small sample sizes will 
cause the results.  
VI. Results
Looking at the difference between the market price and B-S predicted price as 
a percent of the market price allows for comparison of options regardless of the 
underlying stock.  However, our data set does not allow for comparison regardless 
of distance from the money.  Using our formula the percent error cannot go above 
100%, but it has no lower bound.  When options are in-the-money, y% has a 
smaller range and a reasonable standard deviation, with summary statistics 
On the other hand, with options out of the money, y% has a much larger range, 
as seen below:
The extreme difference leads to drastically different coefficient estimates in 
our regression, which are divided up between in- or out-of-the-money and less 
or greater than 90 days to expiration.  This division is based on the differences 
in pricing observed by Black, MacBeth and Merville, and others.  As such, the 
 
Variable	   Observations	   Mean	  
Std.	  
Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
y%	   296554	   0.534	   12.091	   -­‐2622	   98	  
 
 
 
Variable	   Observations	   Mean	  
Std.	  
Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
y%	   398889	   -­‐61.05	   154	   -­‐16620	   100	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   28.032**	   27.899**	   27.556**	  
	  
(1.123)	   (1.138)	   (1.148)	  
m’2	   -­‐34.192**	   -­‐34.103**	   -­‐33.014**	  
	  
(2.293)	   (2.304)	   (2.286)	  
month	   -­‐0.152**	   -­‐0.152**	   -­‐0.131**	  
	  
(0.011)	   (0.011)	   (0.011)	  
volume	   -­‐0.316**	   -­‐0.319**	   -­‐0.334**	  
	  
(0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.026)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   0.068**	   0.068**	   0.080*	  
	  
(0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.032)	  
Lower	  BB	  Above	   -­‐0.202	  
	   	  
	  
(0.124)	  
	   	  Lower	  BB	  Under	   0.373**	  
	   	  
	  
(0.104)	  
	   	  Gann	  Support	  Above	  
	   	  
0.051	  
	   	   	  
(0.085)	  
Gann	  Support	  Below	  
	   	  
0.124	  
	   	   	  
(0.082)	  
Round	  Number	  Under	  
	  
0.114	  
	  
	   	  
(0.180)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐3.060**	   -­‐3.053**	   -­‐3.468**	  
	  
(0.202)	   (0.200)	   (0.214)	  
Observations	   148696	   148696	   163745	  
R-­‐squared	   0.19	   0.19	   0.19	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
+	  significant	  at	  10%;	  *	  significant	  at	  5%;	  **	  significant	  at	  1%	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coefficients of the regressions are less important than the significance and sign of 
the coefficients.  In all regressions, observations are demeaned by the underlying 
stock and the standard errors are clustered by option, allowing for correlation 
between the errors of the same option sold on different days.  Clustering by 
option, prevents the autocorrelation that plagued previous papers (see MacBeth 
and Merville 1979, Blyler 2012) and makes the significance tests useable.  
Running the regression on options in the money with more than 90 days 
to expiration yields the following results where positive coefficients mean higher 
relative market value.
The first proposed price barriers, Bollinger bands, have contradicting 
signs for their coefficients; however, only the coefficient on the variable for 
options with strikes slightly below the lower Bollinger band is statistically 
significant.  This is promising as it has the sign predicted by our hypothesis that 
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investors likely view the lower Bollinger band as a level of support and therefore 
options with strikes slightly below the band are more likely to finish in the money 
and should have a higher market value than other equivalent options.  The results 
for options with strikes at our selected round numbers also suggest investors may 
view round numbers as a level of support, but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  An option with a strike near a Gann level of support, while yielding 
coefficients with the sign predicted by our hypothesis, also does not result in a 
statistically significant increase in the option’s price.  While the results of the first 
regression are promising, similar results are needed in order to provide strong 
evidence for our hypothesis.
 The same regressions run on options with less than 90 days to expiration 
yields certain contradictory results, preventing stronger inferences from being 
made about levels of support. 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   32.181**	   32.228**	   30.334**	  
	  
(1.633)	   (1.621)	   (2.248)	  
m’2	   -­‐54.963**	   -­‐55.247**	   -­‐52.348**	  
	  
(3.288)	   (3.297)	   (3.315)	  
month	   -­‐0.693**	   -­‐0.698**	   -­‐0.823**	  
	  
(0.059)	   (0.059)	   (0.082)	  
volume	   -­‐0.551**	   -­‐0.560**	   -­‐0.742**	  
	  
(0.035)	   (0.035)	   (0.053)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   0.077**	   0.080**	   0.177**	  
	  
(0.022)	   (0.023)	   (0.050)	  
Lower	  BB	  Above	   -­‐0.498**	  
	   	  
	  
(0.170)	  
	   	  Lower	  BB	  Below	   0.496**	  
	   	  
	  
(0.137)	  
	   	  Gann	  Support	  Above	  
	   	  
-­‐0.455**	  
	   	   	  
(0.163)	  
Gann	  Support	  Below	  
	   	  
-­‐0.044	  
	   	   	  
(0.153)	  
Round	  Number	  Under	  
	  
0.279	  
	  
	   	  
(0.245)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐2.689**	   -­‐2.749**	   -­‐3.312**	  
	  
(0.246)	   (0.237)	   (0.407)	  
Observations	   111662	   111662	   132823	  
R-­‐squared	   0.15	   0.15	   0.04	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 Switching from options that are far from expiration to options that are 
near to expiration not only affected the signs of some of our variables of interest but 
also their significance levels.  Options with strikes just below the lower Bollinger 
Band once again have an increased value in the market’s view and this increase is 
statistically significant.  Once again, options with strikes slightly above the lower 
Bollinger Band are less valuable relative to the B-S predicted price, but this time 
the difference is statistically significant.  Our hypothesis has no explanation for 
this phenomenon, but the positive and statistically significant coefficient when the 
strike is slightly below the lower Bollinger band provides evidence that investors 
do use the previous day’s Bollinger band to predict the stock’s future movement 
and investors believe a stock’s price is less likely to fall below the lower Bollinger 
band than an arbitrarily selected price.  A possible reason for this phenomenon is 
the liquidity of the options market allows investors to trade frequently; therefore, 
they only try to predict movements for a short time before selling the option.   
Price barriers at round numbers appear to have the expected affect in 
the options market, although the coefficients were not statistically significant in 
either regression.  Price barriers being a relatively new discovery in the stock 
market, investors may be slow to change their evaluation methods.  A smaller 
number of investors using round numbers as levels of support may be pushing the 
price of these options higher, but not a significant amount because other investors 
continue to pull the price downwards.  
The result from Gann’s levels of support in this second regression is 
most surprising.  The statistically significant negative sign suggests investors 
pay attention to Gann’s levels; however, investors value options with strikes near 
Gann’s levels of support less than other options.  The inconsistency between 
options near to expiration and options far from expiration may be from the time 
aspect of Gann’s wheel that is not incorporated into this analysis.  If Gann’s wheel 
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predicts a level of support being reached long after an option expires, investors are 
unlikely to put weight into Gann’s analysis.  Our hypothesis does not explain the 
statistically significant negative coefficient for options with strikes near Gann’s 
level of support with less than 90 days to expiration.  It does not appear that 
Gann’s levels of support, at least using the levels our methodology located, are of 
importance to investors.  
Next, the regressions are run on options out-of-the-money; thus we 
move from level of support to resistance.  These coefficients are not comparable 
to the previous two tables; however, the signs and significance test are still viable. 
We again begin with options with more than 90 days to expiration and find the 
following with regards to levels of resistance.
 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   374.262**	   379.530**	   358.130**	  
	  
(14.297)	   (13.867)	   (12.802)	  
m’2	   90.057**	   92.373**	   85.137**	  
	  
(11.765)	   (11.922)	   (11.329)	  
month	   3.035**	   3.062**	   3.091**	  
	  
(0.191)	   (0.195)	   (0.176)	  
volume	   1.110**	   1.247**	   1.090**	  
	  
(0.326)	   (0.341)	   (0.314)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   0.313	   0.314	   0.343	  
	  
(0.300)	   (0.301)	   (0.304)	  
Upper	  BB	  Above	   7.888**	  
	   	  
	  
(1.319)	  
	   	  Upper	  BB	  Below	   6.609**	  
	   	  
	  
(1.550)	  
	   	  Gann	  Resistance	  Above	  
	   	  
11.594**	  
	   	   	  
(1.582)	  
Gann	  Resistance	  Below	  
	   	  
16.573**	  
	   	   	  
(1.722)	  
Round	  Number	  Above	  
	  
-­‐4.877	  
	  
	   	  
(3.395)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐14.314**	   -­‐11.259**	   -­‐23.244**	  
	  
(2.321)	   (2.144)	   (2.060)	  
Observations	   220929	   220929	   237111	  
R-­‐squared	   0.27	   0.27	   0.28	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Analyzing out-of-the-money options with strikes near Bollinger Bands, 
the results are opposite of what our hypothesis suggests. Options with strikes 
around the upper Bollinger band appear to have a higher relative value to 
investors.  A possible explanation is investors believe the upper Bollinger Band 
acts as a spring board and once broken investors will buy up the stock, increasing 
the price significantly past the strike price.  As seen in options out-of-the-money, 
investors seem to impute a higher probability to a stock’s price staying within the 
Bollinger bands, so the increase in price expected if the upper Bollinger band is 
broken must be large enough to offset this decreased probability of its occurrence. 
Alternatively, investors may simply put less weight in the upper Bollinger band, 
believing the market will be bullish and the upper Bollinger band will not be as 
important.  
Options with strikes at round numbers continue demonstrate the expected 
effects of a price barrier on the option market; however, the coefficient is still not 
statistically significant.  Gann’s levels of resistance on the other hand, display 
similar traits to the upper Bollinger band.  Options with strikes near to a Gann 
level of resistance, whether the strike price is slightly above or below the barrier, 
have a higher relative value to investors.  Since Gann levels do not switch between 
support and resistance relative to the underlying stock’s price, our hypothesis does 
not explain this occurrence.  
Similarly, the regressions on options close to expiration find the 
following results, supporting the results for levels of resistance from options far 
from expiration.
32
In options near to expiration, the only proposed price barrier with 
a significant effect is the Bollinger band.  Again, options with strikes near the 
upper Bollinger band are of relative higher value to investors, contradicting our 
hypothesis.  The Gann barriers appear to be insignificant when the option is 
close to expiration for both levels of support and resistance.  This is most likely 
explained by our exclusion of the time component of Gann’s wheel.  
Options with strikes near our selected important round numbers again 
have the expected devaluation associated with a level of resistance.  Throughout 
our analysis, round numbers have not had a statistically significant coefficient, 
but have continually had the predicted change relative to the B-S predicted price.
 Overall, the results for round numbers and the lower Bollinger band 
are promising, but the significant coefficients of the wrong sign do not provide 
strong support for our hypothesis.  Because Bollinger bands and Gann levels have 
 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   34.360*	   48.320**	   50.946**	  
	  
(17.394)	   (17.995)	   (15.917)	  
m’2	   72.511**	   80.594**	   69.491**	  
	  
(17.056)	   (18.185)	   (13.968)	  
month	   -­‐18.036**	   -­‐18.136**	   -­‐24.714**	  
	  
(1.234)	   (1.238)	   (1.166)	  
volume	   5.258**	   5.945**	   0.464	  
	  
(0.494)	   (0.514)	   (0.544)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   -­‐4.464	   -­‐4.846+	   -­‐1.421	  
	  
(2.755)	   (2.878)	   (2.145)	  
Upper	  BB	  Above	   8.851**	  
	   	  
	  
(2.269)	  
	   	  Upper	  BB	  Below	   27.004**	  
	   	  
	  
(2.168)	  
	   	  Gann	  Resistance	  Above	  
	   	  
-­‐0.052	  
	   	   	  
(2.525)	  
Gann	  Resistance	  Below	  
	   	  
4.728+	  
	   	   	  
(2.565)	  
Round	  Number	  Above	  
	  
-­‐7.558	  
	  
	   	  
(4.723)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐24.072**	   -­‐15.152**	   -­‐26.201**	  
	  
(2.647)	   (2.502)	   (3.086)	  
Observations	   139226	   139226	   161778	  
R-­‐squared	   0.15	   0.14	   0.08	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not been explored as price barriers in the literature, it is not surprising options 
with strikes near those levels do not act as expected; although, the statistically 
significant coefficients suggests more research is needed at these levels.  The 
obvious skew caused by taking the difference as a percentage of market price 
hinders comparison and most literature focuses on absolute difference between the 
market price and the B-S price.  Further exploration into the effect of examining 
the error as a percentage of market prices is needed before absolute conclusions 
can be drawn.  
VII. Conclusions
A. Price Barrier Hypothesis
We propose three price barriers, Bollinger bands, round numbers, and 
Gann levels, in the stock market and attempt to find evidence of their internalization 
in the options market.  Options with strikes near levels of support are expected 
to have higher market prices, whereas the opposite should be true if the strikes 
are near a level of resistance because the B-S price does not take the lowered 
probability of breaking a price barrier into account.  To find relatively lower and 
higher prices, the market price is compared to the Black-Scholes Option Pricing 
Model predicted price, which does not allow for price barriers to exist in the stock 
market.  
We find evidence of systematic deviation from the B-S price at Bollinger 
bands in options both in- and out-of-the-money.  Gann levels of resistance had 
the opposite effect of what was expected, and the levels of support did not appear 
to have an effect on the price of options.  This suggests investors are more 
comfortable with conventional measures when attempting to estimate volatility; 
however, if Gann levels act as price barriers in the stock market, investors could 
make substantial profits by buying options at levels of support and selling those at 
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levels of resistance.  Testing this proposed trading method is left for future work. 
The results for options with strikes near round numbers were inconclusive 
although there was evidence of them beginning to be treated as levels of support 
and resistance.  Although no coefficient was statistically significant, all had the 
sign predicted by our hypothesis.  Not only does this support the behavioral 
finance findings of price barriers in the stock market, but also shows efficiency 
in the options market as option traders recognize patterns in the stock market not 
allowed by the efficient market hypothesis.
Closer to hypothesized results were found when analyzing options in-the-
money, possibly because of the use of options as a hedge.  Increased attention to 
in-the-money options could push the price closer to the fair present value, while 
out-of-the-money options have a less efficient price.  This paper does not attempt 
to prove the existence of price barriers in the stock market; rather it examines how 
the options market acts around special price values.  Significant results provide 
evidence that investors do care about certain price levels more than others, although 
further exploration is needed to completely understand how the option market 
internalizes investor preferences of these numbers.  However, when looking for 
systematic errors in the B-S model, special price levels should be included with 
the commonly accepted distance from the money, time to expiration, and liquidity 
control variables.  The discovery of price barriers affecting the options market 
allows future research on price barriers to occur regardless of a stock’s current price.
B. Updated Expected Volatility Hypothesis
 Differences between the market price and B-S predicted price of options 
with strikes near Bollinger bands and Gann levels had differences not explained by 
previously found control variables, but these differences were not the differences 
predicted by our hypothesis.  The coefficients on the dummy variables being 
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statistically significant indicate investors do pay attention to these levels, but not 
in our hypothesized manner.  When the Bollinger bands were below the current 
price, hypothesized to act as levels of support, options just above (inside) the 
band were valued less, while options just below (outside) the band were valued 
more.  For both Bollinger bands and Gann levels, when the strike was near 
those proposed barriers and above the strike price the results were opposite the 
hypothesized result.  If those barriers acted as levels of resistance, the coefficient 
would be negative, but in both cases it was positive and statistically significant.  
 To explain these divergences from our original hypothesis, we propose an 
alternative explanation.  Bollinger bands and Gann levels may not have any effect 
on a stock’s price, but investors may pay attention to them for other reasons.  The 
B-S predicted price, which is commonly used by investors as a baseline, depends 
heavily on expected volatility of a stock.  When evaluating a stock, investors often 
look at not only the price, but also technicals such as Bollinger bands.  Therefore, 
an investor may use Bollinger bands and Gann levels as indicators their original 
estimation of volatility needs to be updated.3  Updating expected volatility around 
these levels would result in higher values for the option relative to the B-S price 
that holds a constant expected volatility estimate.  This hypothesis explains the 
positive coefficient around barriers proposed to be levels of resistance and why 
levels of support followed our initial hypothesis more closely than resistance. 
Further research is needed to test the validity of this hypothesis, but it appears as if 
academic researchers need to obtain more information from real investors before 
price barriers can be fully explored.  
3 Imagine seeing a stock price with Bollinger bands and using its historical volatility to estimate 
volatility.  Since Bollinger bands are 2 SD away from the moving average, if the price breaks 
out of the bands, then the historical estimate is likely incorrect.  At that time it may be best to 
update expected volatility to a larger value.  Therefore, if Bollinger bands or Gann levels are 
reached, expected volatility expands and options are worth more.  
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Welfare Incentives and Interstate Migration: 
An Analysis of the Migration Decisions of Poor, Single Mothers
John Weis
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of welfare incentives in the 
decision to move for poor, single mothers.  Using micro-level data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and other sources, I develop an econometric 
model that estimates the influence of state welfare benefits on the interstate 
migration decisions of poor, single mothers, whether that be moving from states 
with low benefits or to states with high benefits.  This study builds upon previous 
literature concerning interstate migration by considering new methodological 
approaches and theoretical models.  Ultimately, the evidence suggests that while 
the welfare benefits offered at the current state of residence and those at potential 
states of residence influence the migration decisions of poor, single mothers, the 
effects are modest.
 
I. Introduction
 Under The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
replaced Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as a primary federal 
cash assistance program.  The provisions of TANF obligated states to individually 
develop their own welfare systems.  As a result, there was a rapid and substantial 
increase in the diversification of welfare policies between states relative to the 
past (Blank, 2002).  These diversified welfare rules and benefit levels potentially 
provide greater incentives for poor families to move to those states offering 
greater benefits levels in order to receive more financial aid (De Jong, Graefe, 
and St. Pierre, 2005).  Of those affected by welfare incentives, poor, single 
mothers comprise the subgroup of the population most likely to be influenced 
by greater welfare benefits given their comparatively difficult situation (Levine 
and Zimmerman, 1999).  Thus, if a welfare-induced migration phenomenon does 
exist, it is most likely present in the migration decisions of poor, single mothers. 
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As such, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the migration decisions of poor, 
single mothers by estimating to what extent they move from low welfare benefit 
states to high welfare benefit states.
  The economic significance of welfare-induced migration has been well-
documented.  Assuming the poor can afford the cost of moving, states with lax 
welfare requirements or large benefit payments could experience considerable 
influxes of populations largely comprised of poor families (Gelbach, 2004). 
Having to bear the burden of the additional poor population has concerned states 
for decades (Meyer, 2000).  In response, setting lower benefit levels or stricter 
eligibility requirements for a state can disincentivize poor families from moving 
there (Cushing, 2002).  However, multiple states attempting to accomplish 
the above can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ wherein states compete to export 
their poverty burden by offering progressively lower welfare payment benefits 
(Brueckner, 2000).  Evidence of the efforts by states to outcompete other states 
to avoid poverty populations has been well-documented (see Figlio et al. (1998) 
and Saavedra (1998)).  The efforts by state policymakers have even led to several 
prominent Supreme Court cases (Shapiro v. Thompson [1969] and Saenz v. Roe 
[1999]) in which residency requirements for welfare payment were deemed 
unconstitutional (Gelbach, 2004).  Overall, the results of the economic policy 
and changes to welfare systems enacted by states have tangible impacts on the 
well-being of those individuals and families living in poverty.  Since the lives of 
individuals are dependent upon state-specific objectives influenced by welfare-
induced migration concerns, the economic significance of welfare-induced 
migration is clear.
 My interest in the research subject developed from two primary sources 
of personal significance.  Firstly, as will be developed later, the literature on the 
topic is largely inconclusive.  This represents an opportunity for someone to make 
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a significant contribution and have a lasting impact on the discourse surrounding 
the issue.  Additionally, because the research is uncertain, any significant research 
could have substantial policy implications for state policymakers.  Secondly, I 
have always had a general interest in welfare policy and the effects of said policy 
(in this case potentially adverse effects).  While the purpose of the paper is largely 
exploratory in nature, exposing potential shortcomings of welfare policy, it also 
serves as an attempt to promote better practices for policymakers by encouraging 
a deeper consideration of the consequences of state policies.  The hope is that 
this research paper may, in some way, generate progress in the form of more 
appropriate policy. 
 As stated earlier, this paper will investigate the degree to which poor, 
single mothers move from low welfare benefit states to high welfare benefit states. 
In the next section, a brief survey of relevant welfare migration literature will 
be provided.  Afterwards, using the theoretical frameworks provided by recent 
welfare-induced migration research, an econometric model will be developed 
to analyze the research question from an alternative perspective.  In the section 
that follows, the description of data and data collection will be presented.  In 
the penultimate section, the empirical results of the econometric model will be 
discussed.  Lastly, I will conclude with a brief summary of the study’s findings 
and implications for future research.
II. Literature Review
 In developing the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis of local public 
expenditures, Tiebout (1956) became one of the first individuals to discuss, albeit 
indirectly, the potential for welfare-induced migration.  While the focus of the 
original paper was on the role that the mobility of workers played in promoting 
an efficient allocation of public goods, underlying ideas and concepts are directly 
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applicable to research on welfare-induced migration. Specifically, the concept 
that individuals moved to states or regions which offer a bundle of goods that 
maximize their utility has served as a primary motivating factor in the decision to 
move.
 According to Moffitt (1992), early researchers in the 1970s only had 
access to aggregated data, making it impractical to identify poverty populations. 
They were forced to rely on race as a proxy variable for poverty.  Furthermore, 
they failed to account for important state-level differences, such as unemployment 
rates, in their analyses of the migration decision-making process for families. 
Therefore, research in the 1970s is generally discounted (Cushing, 2002).  
 Meanwhile, the research of the 1980s remedied shortcomings of 
previous work with the aid of microdata which gave them the ability to directly 
observe poverty populations. In this period, Gramlich and Laren (1984), Friedli 
(1986), Blank (1988), Cebula and Koch (1989), Peterson and Rom (1989), and 
Dye (1990) all conducted studies that found strong evidence for the existence of 
a welfare effect on the decision to move for poor families. Most of the work at 
this time made use of the newly available Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS) to 
examine welfare-induced migration. Compelling evidence that suggest opposing 
conclusions during the same time period is relatively scarce, if not entirely 
nonexistent.
 Of course, if there was such an overwhelming consensus today, I would 
be doing research on a different topic.  In fact, the research conducted since the 
early 1990s has witnessed a significant split in general opinion.  Hanson and 
Hartman (1994), Borjas (1998), Gelbach (2004), and Snarr (2011) all reached 
conclusions supportive of a substantial influence of welfare benefits on the 
decision to move.  Conversely, Walker (1994, 1995), Allard and Danziger (2000), 
Kennan and Walker (2010) failed to find any evidence of a welfare effect on the 
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decision to move.  These two groups represent different extremes with most of 
the research reaching conclusions that lie somewhere in between these two sides. 
Specifically, Frey et al (1996), Enchautegui (1997), Schram, Nitz, and Krueger 
(1998), Levine and Zimmerman (1999), Meyer (2000), Kaestner, Kaushal, and 
Van Ryzin (2003), Gelbach (2004), and McKinnish (2005, 2007) have all found 
results suggesting there is welfare-induced migration but that this effect is fairly 
modest.  Unfortunately, direct comparisons are difficult to establish given the 
drastically different methods employed in literature.  As suggested by Snarr 
(2011), the reason for such large discrepancies in the literature is that there is no 
strong theoretical justification for any particular model or research design, the 
literature is largely empirical.  Therefore, all of the research is justifiable in its 
own right, insinuating that more effort has to be taken in establishing a stronger 
theoretical foundation or basis for the field so that a consensus may be reached.
 The principal difference between the empirical studies lies in their 
research methods, particularly how they decide to measure the decision to migrate 
between states, and how they decide to model such a decision.  For instance, 
Walker (1994) and Levine and Zimmerman (1999), like early empirical studies, 
examine population flows into states (inmigration) and out of states (outmigration) 
for different groups.  Meyer (2000) decides to compare differences in welfare 
participation rates between those who migrate to another state and those who do 
not.  McKinnish (2005, 2007) studies the differences in welfare expenditures at 
the county-level between border counties of adjacent states.  Blank (1988) adopts 
a less conventional and more time-consuming choice model of location which 
develops a more theoretical foundation than most research in the literature.  Unlike 
prior work, Frey et. al (1996) treats the decision to move as a sequential decision-
making process where individuals first decide if they are going to migrate and 
then where to migrate using a nested logit framework.  While some of these works 
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reach similar conclusions, the only other thing they have in common as that they 
all adopt drastically different fundamental approaches to the research question. 
This notion is consistent for the entire literature of welfare-induced migration.
 The second major difference between the studies in the literature that 
contributes to their differing conclusions is the choice of data employed by 
the researchers. As with the research methods, there is no strong theoretical 
foundation supporting any particular data set, especially considering that the 
choice of data is dependent on the methodology employed.  For example, Levine 
and Zimmerman (1999) and Kennan and Walker (2010) make use of data from 
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) for examining young, female 
subpopulations.  Breuckner (2000) and Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003) 
use TANF-era data while Schram, Nitz, and Krueger (1998) and Gelbach (2004) 
utilize the Public Use Microdata Series derived from the U.S. Census.  Allard and 
Danziger (2000) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  Despite all of 
the different data sets, the U.S. Census is perhaps the most commonly used data 
source.  Enchautegui (1997) uses data from the 1980 U.S. Census, Meyer (2000) 
uses the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data, and Frey et. al (1996) uses the 1990 U.S. 
Census data.  Again, the differences in Censuses used are largely dependent on 
the individual study and how they decided to examine welfare-induced migration. 
Ultimately, the differences in methodology and data combine to form two of the 
prominent factors leading to the general inconclusive nature of the literature. 
III. Research Methods and Modeling
 Given the preponderance of logit and probit models in the literature4, the 
econometric model developed in this study follows the probit framework.  The 
primary advantage of this model over other probabilistic models, specifically the 
4 Blank (1988); Frey et. al (1996); Enchautegui (1997); Levine and Zimmerman (1999); Davies, 
Greenwood, and Li (2001); Cushing (2003); Bailey (2005); Gelbach (2004).
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Linear Probability Model (LPM), is that the effect of explanatory variables (e.g. 
welfare benefit levels) can estimated to dynamically influence the likelihood of an 
event.  Additional benefits include imposing limits on the likelihood of an event 
(i.e. the probability of an event cannot be greater than 1 or less than 0).  
 The dependent variable measures whether or not the poor, single mother 
family moved from one state to another.  The explanatory variables in the model 
are the level of welfare benefits for a family of four offered in the current state of 
residence as well as the level offered in the previous state of residence.   These 
variables encapsulate the potential welfare effect.  The control variables are 
established by previous literature5.  I estimate the following probit model:
PR(MIGRATED) = Φ (B0 + B1HDAGE + B2HDEDUC+ B3HDEXPER 
+ B4NOKIDS + B5AGEYNG + B6BLACK + B7RACEOTHER + 
B8WELFLAST + B9MAXBEN + B10MAXBENLAST + B11UNEMP + 
B12UNEMPLAST+ B13DISTANCE)
where
AGEHD = Age of head of household 
HDEDUC = Education of head of household
HDEXPER = Experience of head of household
NOKIDS = Number of kids
AGEYNG = Age of youngest child
BLACK = 1 if head of household is black, 0 otherwise
RACEOTHER = 1 if head of household is non-white and non-black, 0 otherwise
WELFLAST = 1 if family was on welfare last year, 0 otherwise
MAXBEN = Maximum welfare benefits for a single-parent family of four in 
current state 
MAXBENLAST = Maximum welfare benefits for a single-parent family of four 
in previous state 
UNEMP = Unemployment rate in current state
UNEMPLAST=Unemployment rate in previous state
DISTANCE = Log of population-weighted greater area circle distance between 
previous state and contiguous state with highest welfare benefit offering
5 Rogers (1968); Todaro (1969); DaVanzo (1978); Tienda and Wilson(1992); Enchautegui (1997)
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 Using the previous literature, I generate expectations for the signs of dependent 
variables in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Briefly discussing the expected signs of the coefficient estimates, one would 
expect that being older, having more kids, and having older kids would all 
decrease the likelihood of migrating from a convenience standpoint.  Being black 
or another non-white and non-black race would also potentially decrease the 
likelihood of moving for these families as they generally have less income and, 
therefore, an inability to afford moving.  We would also expect greater education 
and experience for the head of household to decrease the likelihood of moving 
because they are aware of the negative impacts moving can have on a family, 
especially the children. Being the focus of the research question, we would expect 
that greater welfare benefits of the previous state would have a negative influence 
on the likelihood of moving (i.e. they wouldn’t need to move) and that greater 
welfare benefits in the current state would have positive influence on the likelihood 
of having moved (i.e. they moved to get the benefits).  The unemployment signs 
can be interpreted similarly.  
IV. Data
1. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1968 -2007
 The primary data set used in this econometric analysis will be the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 2007.  Developed by the 
Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan in 1968, the 
PSID is a longitudinal data set comprised of both individual and family level data 
Table 1 
Variable Sign 
HDAGE Negative 
HDEDUC Negative 
HDEXPER Negative 
NOKIDS Negative 
AGEYNG Negative 
BLACK Negative 
RACEOTHER Negative 
WELFLAST Negative 
MAXBEN 
MAXBENLAST 
UNEMP 
UNEMPLAST 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
DISTANCE Negative 
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collected for a variety of variables every year. While the previous discussion on 
the uncertainty of data selection in the literature suggested that any sufficient data 
set can be justified, the U.S. Census seemed to be the most universally accepted. 
The justification for the decision to use the PSID instead of the U.S. Census 
is twofold.  Firstly, PSID data was readily available and easy to manipulate to 
generate the necessary sample data.  Secondly, migration in the U.S. Census data 
is indicated by a person living in a different state than five years prior.  In effect, 
migration in each U.S. Census would only account for moves for every five years. 
In contrast, because the data comprising the PSID is collected every year, one is 
able to find yearly migration patterns.  This allows for a more dynamic analysis 
than the U.S. Census could provide.
 An additional fact to note, the PSID sample data used in the analysis was 
not the raw data but rather a subset of the data.  More precisely, the sample PSID 
data is comprised of only poor, single females who have been heads of household 
at some point in their life.  This was the best representative sample for examining 
the decision of poor, single mothers to move.  Assuming the decision to move is 
largely determined by the head of household, being a head of household would be 
a prerequisite for a mother to be able to make the decision to move.  While there 
are potential issues of specification bias involved with using a specific subset, for 
the sake of answering the research question, it is necessary.  Overall, the PSID 
data set accounts for all variables in the model except for unemployment rates, 
welfare benefits, and the distances between states.
 Most of the variables from this data set included in the econometric 
model were used in their raw form.  However, the dummy variables for black 
and raceother were derived using the variable for race, with white serving as the 
omitted condition.
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2. Bob Moffitt Welfare Guarantee Variables
 The first supplemental data set was independently developed by 
established scholar Bob Moffitt and aggregates a variety of data from a wide 
array of sources.  With respect to this analysis, the data set contains information 
on unemployment rates of states and the maximum payment benefit for a single-
parent, family of four from 1968 to 1996.  As a note, the identification of welfare 
benefits in the model was at the state level instead of the county level, even 
though welfare benefits vary across counties for some states.  While county 
level information was available for individuals in the PSID, there was no clear 
procedure to assign the welfare benefits to the counties across time using the 
Moffitt dataset and the HHS dataset, described below.  As such, the welfare 
benefits levels used for states with varying welfare benefit levels across counties 
was that of the county with the greatest proportion of the total state population 
and, therefore, the most likely destination for a mover.
Available at www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/ben_doc.pdf
3. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 The second supplemental data set was developed by the Urban Institute 
for the Welfare Rules Database.  The data set contains maximum payment benefits 
for a single-parent family of four data from 1996 to 2007.  
Available at http://anfdata.urban.org/WRD
4. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
 The third supplemental data set used consisted of the historical tables of 
average state unemployment rate for each state from 1996 to 2007.  
5. Greater Circle State Distances
 The final supplement data provides data on the log of the population-
weighted greater circle distance between any two states.  The population weights 
are used to determine population centers of states while the greater circle 
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measures incorporate the curvature of the earth in the calculation of distances 
between these population centers.  In the context of this analysis, the distance 
variable measures the distance between the state of residence in the previous year 
and a potential state, determined by finding the contiguous state with the greatest 
welfare benefits offerings.  This variable will serve as a proxy variable for the 
moving costs associated with interstate migration.
 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, derived and described 
previously, were also generated as shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2
 Given prior knowledge, none of the variables seem particularly strange, 
although 99 years for the age of head, education and experience is relatively 
concerning. Further inspection of the data reveals that there are only a few 
observations with this problem, mostly from the earlier years of the dataset when 
there was likely more measurement error.
 
Table 2 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
HDAGE  31.20968  11.60559  0 99  
HDEDUC  6.905973  9.568182  0  99  
HDEXPER  
NOKIDS  
17.61352  
1.596788  
33.955  
1.523294  
0  
0  
99  
11  
AGEYNG  3.516814  4.255007  0  17  
BLACK  0.752964  0.4313111  0  1  
RACEOTHER  0.0472085  0.2120959  0  1  
WELFLAST  0.3798314  0.4853713  0  1  
MAXBEN  
MAXBENLAST  
385.2062  
380.7177  
179.7597  
177.7997  
60  
55.02  
1064  
1064  
UNEMP  
UNEMPLAST 
DISTANCE  
6.542549  
6.541871 
4.583395  
2.066404  
2.105017 
3.234206  
2.1  
2.1 
0.384506  
15.5 
15.5 
11.2152  
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V. Empirical Results
 Estimating the econometric model, I obtained the regression output 
shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3
 Before interpreting the regression output for the probit regression, it was 
important to run an alternative regression model (LPM) to allow for the testing of 
common regression issues. Issues of heteroskedasticity were present in the model, 
namely in the hdage, hdeduc, and hdexper variables, as evidenced by the Breusch-
Pagan Test and White’s Test for heteroskedasticity and accompanying graphical 
analyses.  In response, one could employ robust standard errors.  Additionally, 
problems of multicollinearity where found, using variable inflation factors, 
particularly between unemp and unemplast, and maxbenlast and maxben.  This 
is unsurprising since these variables are strongly collinear (only approximately 5 
 
Table 3 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Score  P-value  Marginal Effects 
HDAGE  -0.038255  -5.47  0.000*  -0.0016894  
HDEDUC  -0.0013423  -0.31  0.759  -0.0000593  
HDEXPER  
NOKIDS  
0.0047558  
-0.0741016  
1.81  
-1.69  
0.070**  
0.091**  
0.00021 
-0.0032724  
AGEYNG  -0.0229523  -1.52  0.129  -0.0010136  
BLACK  -0.131427  01.06  0.291  -0.006228  
RACEOTHER  -0.0319729  -0.15  0.882  -0.0013707  
WELFLAST  -0.5434885  -4.35  0.000*  -0.024173  
MAXBEN  
MAXBENLAST  
0.0012908  
-0.0013529  
2.36  
-2.42  
0.018*  
0.015*  
0.000057 
-0.0000597  
UNEMP  
UNEMPLAST 
DISTANCE  
-0.2134598  
0.1289763 
0.019423  
-3.26  
2.05 
1.25  
0.001*  
0.040* 
0.212  
-0.0094266 
0.0056957 
0.008577  
N = 3001  Prob > chi2(13) 
= 0.0000  
Psuedo R2 = 
0.1567  
Log likelihood =    
-375.42839  
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percent of the total observations actually migrate to another state).  Since dropping 
or transforming these key variables would negate the analysis hitherto, nothing 
will be done, although one should remain mindful of the negative consequences 
of multicollinearity.  Lastly, we find evidence of model misspecification using the 
Ramsey RESET test.  The most obvious functional form issue lies in the omission 
of a squared term for distance whose addition may improve the model as the 
effect of distance on the likelihood of moving may increase at a decreasing rate. 
For further information on these tests, refer to the Appendix.
 Enacting the remedies for these regression issues, most notably the 
addition of a distance-squared term, I generated the regression output depicted in 
Table 4 below.
Table 4
All of the coefficient estimates with a single asterisk were found to be statistically significant at the 
0.05 significance level while those with a double asterisk were found to be statistically significant at 
the 0.10 significance level.
 
Table 4 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Score  P-value  Marginal Effects 
HDAGE  -0.0391325 -5.52 0.000*  -0.0016446 
HDEDUC  -0.0019966 -0.45  0.656  -0.0000839 
HDEXPER  
NOKIDS  
0.0051451 
-0.0814076 
1.95 
-1.82  
0.051**  
0.068**  
0.0002162 
-0.0034214  
AGEYNG  -0.0225078  -1.46  0.143  -0.000946 
BLACK  -0.0696176  -0.55 0.582  -0.0030258 
RACEOTHER  0.0122366 0.06  0.955  -0.0005202 
WELFLAST  -0.5492922 -4.36  0.000*  -0.0232821 
MAXBEN  
MAXBENLAST  
0.0012441  
-0.0010184 
2.28 
-1.79  
0.023*  
0.074** 
0.0000523 
-0.0000428 
UNEMP  
UNEMPLAST 
DISTANCE  
DISTANCESQ 
-0.220425  
0.1242484 
0.2361678 
-0.017081 
-3.36  
1.97 
3.07 
-2.89 
0.001*  
0.049* 
0.002* 
0.004*  
-0.009264 
0.0052219 
0.0099256 
-0.0007179 
N = 3001  Prob > chi2(13) 
= 0.0000  
Psuedo R2 = 
0.1666  
Log likelihood =    
-371.02267   
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 All of the signs of the coefficient estimates on the variables were found to 
be in accord with prior expectations except for the sign of the coefficient estimate 
on hdexper, which was presumed to have the same sign as hdeduc (i.e. positive). 
The exact cause of this discrepancy is difficult to discern, but hdeduc and hdexper 
moving in opposite directions does not seem entirely intuitive.  Overall, all of 
the coefficient estimates were found to be statistically significant at the 0.10 
significance level except for those on the education of the head of household, 
the race dummies, and the age of the youngest child.   However, these coefficient 
estimates being statistically insignificant does not necessarily impact the research 
question in any substantial manner.  
 Interestingly, we find that coefficient estimate on maxben is significant 
at the 0.05 significance level while the coefficient estimate on maxbenlast is 
significant at the 0.10 significance level.  This suggests that, given the sign of these 
coefficients, as the benefit level of the previous state decreases, the probability of 
moving increases and that as the benefit level of the current state increases, the 
probability of having moved increases.  Taken in conjunction, these results suggest 
that the population of poor, single mothers move from states with low welfare 
benefits to states that offer high welfare benefits.  In effect, this is evidence that the 
phenomenon of welfare incentives may exist for poor, single mothers, incentivizing 
them to move to other states in order to receive higher benefits.
 Further analysis of the magnitude of the marginal effects of the 
coefficient estimates is necessary to determine whether the welfare effect is 
economically significant. In order to accomplish this analysis, I use the marginal 
effects generated by the regression analysis to estimate the effect of certain benefit 
levels on the likelihood of moving to another state for poor, single mothers. 
More precisely, I develop a general range of effects for both benefit variables, 
ranging from two standard deviations below the respective mean benefit level to 
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two standard deviations above said mean. With respect to the Maxben variable, I 
calculate a predicted increase in the likelihood of moving for poor, single mothers 
ranging from 0.134 percent to 3.895 percent at benefit levels of 25.69 dollars and 
744.73 dollars, respectively. Similarly, with respect to the Maxbenlast variable, I 
calculate a predicted decrease in the likelihood of moving for poor, single mothers 
ranging from 0.108 percent to 3.151 percent at benefit levels of 25.12 dollars and 
736.32 dollars, respectively.  Thus, the role of welfare benefits in the migration 
decisions of poor, single mothers ranges from fairly inconsequential to somewhat 
substantial.  Still, even at their most substantial, the influence on the decision to 
move is relatively minimal.  Overall, these results largely agree with the majority 
of the prior literature on welfare incentives which found a statistical significant 
but economically modest role for welfare incentives.
  Additionally worth discussing, adding the distancesq term to the 
regression analysis made both the coefficient estimate on it and distance 
statistically significant at even the 0.01 significance level.  Clearly, being as 
the purpose of these variables was to control for the cost of moving, one would 
imagine that they would play a significant role, even if they were not the best 
proxy for moving costs.  Taken in conjunction, these variables suggest that as 
the distance between the current state and a potential state with greater benefits 
increases, the probability of moving increases but at a decreasing rate.  This does 
not make theoretical sense as, presumably, greater distances would decrease the 
likelihood of moving because of greater moving costs. A better proxy for moving 
costs, given the likely measurement error in this variable, may alleviate this 
inconsistency.
 Furthermore, we find that the coefficient estimates on the unemployment 
variables were statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.  This evidence 
suggests that employment opportunities play an important role in the decision to 
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role for poor, single mothers.  Given their difficult situation, greater employment 
opportunities, as measured by the unemployment rate of states, would reasonably 
provide incentives for moving.  Even so, the marginal effects of these coefficient 
estimates are relatively small when considering that a one percentage increase 
in the unemployment rate of the previous state would increase the likelihood of 
moving by less than 1 percent, as predicted by the model.
 Given the diagnostic tests run, there is some concern that these results may 
not be valid but, beyond basic amendments, any significant changes to the model 
may itself invalidate the ability of the model to address the research question. 
While issues of heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity are concerning, however, 
they would not necessary nullify any of the conclusions of the model, but they do 
suggest that the probit framework may not be the ideal model for answering the 
research question, at least in the incarnation used in this analysis.  Recently, the 
literature on welfare incentives in migration decisions has begun to adapt optimal 
choice models wherein an individual must consider multiple locations across the 
country before deciding where to move.  Comparatively, the model used in this 
analysis was relatively simplistic, which may not be ideal given that the decision 
to move can be very complex.  Furthermore, these issues may arise as a result of 
poor identification of explanatory variables, although the problem does not seem 
as severe as it was prior to several amendments. 
VI. Conclusions
 In order to investigate how the migration decisions of poor, single 
mothers migrate were influenced by the welfare benefits offered by states, I chose 
to estimate a basic econometric probit model.  Using prior research to determine 
relevant control variables and data from a variety of sources, I tested my model 
and found evidence for a modest influence of welfare incentives on the decision 
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to move for poor, single mothers.  Most of variables included in the model were 
found to be statistically significant with appropriate signs at the designated 
significance level, suggesting that poor, single mothers do move from states with 
low welfare benefits to those with high welfare benefits.  
 These results are generally in accord with the majority of the literature on 
welfare incentives and interstate migration, which finds modest roles for welfare 
incentives in the decision to move.  The policy implications of this study, and those 
that found similar conclusions, are vast.  Specifically, the foundation of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ between states is largely unfounded if welfare incentives do substantially 
influence decisions to move.  As such, the only effect of competing to offer lower 
benefits may be to simply worsen the standard of living for poor populations rather 
than export those populations.  Ultimately, while state legislators should consider 
welfare incentives when changing welfare policy, it should not be a primary 
consideration.  Further research into the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon, how 
much state legislators consider welfare incentives when crafting policy, and the 
potential impacts of the latter on the poverty population are all advents for further 
research.  Within the scope of the literature, further consideration should be given 
towards developing a more theoretical foundation so that a greater consensus in 
the literature can be obtained, at the very least establishing theoretical preference 
to certain datasets or methodologies.  Otherwise, it will remain impractical 
to compare the conclusions of these widely differing analyses.  In addition to 
further consideration to these topics, the econometric model may be improved by 
utilizing an optimal choice framework, better indentifying explanatory variables, 
and obtaining better measurements for certain variables such as moving costs. 
If done, one may be able to obtain even better evidence for the moderate role of 
welfare incentives in the decision to move, especially as relates to poor, single 
mothers.
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Appendix
Tests for Heteroskedascity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of chgstate 
         chi2(1)      =   200.41 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity 
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
         chi2(100)    =   1814.64 
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |    1814.64    100    0.0000 
            Skewness |     452.91     13    0.0000 
            Kurtosis |      84.66      1    0.0000 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |    2352.22    114    0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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Graphical Analyses for Heteroskedasticity of Relevant Variables
60
Test for Multicollinearity
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
   UNEMPLAST |     27.66    0.036159
       UNEMP |     27.62    0.036208
  MAXBENLAST |     23.18    0.043146
      MAXBEN |     23.15    0.043195
       BLACK |      1.47    0.682390
    WELFLAST |      1.28    0.778561
   RACEOTHER |      1.28    0.782762
      NOKIDS |      1.27    0.785496
       AGEHD |      1.17    0.853040
    DISTANCE |      1.15    0.865918
     HDEXPER |      1.14    0.876884
      AGEYNG |      1.09    0.915698
      HDEDUC |      1.04    0.963181
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      8.65
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On the Orthodox Nature of Heterodox Income 
Distribution Theory
By Ross Nichols
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to show that orthodox and heterodox theories of personal 
income distribution developed in the mid-twentieth century are effectively 
identical, despite their claims to the contrary.  While segmented labor market 
theory contends that neoclassical theories of personal income distribution, such as 
human capital theory, ignore the impact of social institutions on the labor market, 
human capital theory actually implicitly incorporates them.  Social institutions 
are, therefore, just as important in the orthodox approach to personal income 
distribution.  Yet, while this is the case, the heterodox perspective is valuable 
because of the stress it places on social institutions, the importance of which is not 
always explicitly recognized in human capital theory.  
Introduction:
 A.B. Atkinson titled his 1996 Presidential Address to the Royal 
Economic Society, “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold.”  His 
rationale for doing so was that income distribution in the twentieth century was 
studied mainly through the lens of development economics, and that it therefore 
neglected the theory behind income distribution itself (Atkinson, 1997, 299). 
He believed that economists placed too much emphasis on studying the effects 
of income distribution at the cost of failing to attempt to understand the causes 
of income distribution.  The study of income distribution had diverged from 
explaining “how the economy works” (ibid., 299).  Atkinson urged the need for 
economics to collaborate with other social sciences to incorporate the importance 
of social norms into income distribution analysis because “a subject so central 
to social science as income distribution is one that we [economists] cannot solve 
on our own, and…a receptiveness to outside ideas [is] a sign of a discipline in 
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good health” (ibid., 318).  Building an adequate income distribution theory thus 
required an interdisciplinary approach.  But what Atkinson, as a representative of 
contemporary mainstream economics, failed to recognize was that great strides 
had been made in income distribution theory during the twentieth century.  A 
renaissance had occurred several decades earlier that was of paramount importance 
to the theory of income distribution.  Theories of personal income distribution 
emerged during the mid-twentieth century.  
 A study of the rebirth of income distribution theory naturally raises 
questions concerning the timing of this renaissance.  One of the main goals of 
classical political economy was to explain how income was distributed between 
classes.  During that time, a tension developed between the classical theory of 
income distribution and its Marxian critique that stemmed from the implications 
Ricardo and Marx drew from their respective class theories of income distribution. 
Renewed vigor of theoretical work on income distribution occurred in the mid-
twentieth century and led to a seemingly much more decisive split between 
neoclassical economists and their critics.  Whereas the theoretical foundations of 
Ricardian and Marxian theories of income distribution were similar, heterodox 
economists argued that the logic underpinning neoclassical theories of income 
distribution was flawed. 
 Sahota (1977) found human capital theory to be one of the most 
complete theories of personal income distribution developed by the neoclassicals. 
Human capital theory drew closely upon the theory of marginal productivity 
to explain how income was distributed between individuals rather than social 
classes.  Instead of analyzing income distribution within the context of capitalists 
and laborers, the focus of income distribution theory shifted to an analysis of 
how income was distributed between labor and capital as factors of production. 
Segmented labor market theory was introduced as a neo-Marxian critique of 
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human capital theory. 6  It was based on the argument that sociopolitical forces 
sorted workers into distinct and rigid labor markets.  Individual incomes were 
thus largely the product of class relations in the workplace.  Segmented labor 
market theory argued that “the law of one price will not prevail in labor markets, 
even in the long run” (Rebitzer, 1993, 1411).  The rebirth of interest in income 
distribution thus appeared to generate a wide split between competing theories of 
personal income distribution.  Segmented labor market theory criticized human 
capital theory for neglecting the role of social institutions in the distribution of 
personal income. 
 Closer analysis of human capital theory and segmented labor market 
theory, however, reveals that these two theories are essentially equivalent.  Rebitzer 
(1993) cites several instances of neoclassical economists incorporating the notion 
of segmented labor markets into their work, but the relationship between human 
capital theory and segmented labor market theory is much closer than previous 
literature implies.  Therefore not only is it important to study the rebirth of 
income distribution in the mid-twentieth as a reminder to contemporary economic 
discourse of the theoretical work done on income distribution during this time, the 
mid-twentieth century also produced a heated debate between neoclassicals and 
neo-Marxists concerning the explanation of the distribution of personal income. 
And while Rebitzer acknowledges that these opposing views were reconciled to 
an extent, this paper will show that human capital theory and segmented labor 
market theory are even more fundamentally similar than Rebitzer suggests.  In 
short, a better understanding of how income distribution theory was “brought in 
from the cold,” and the implications associated with this revival, is needed. 
6 Both neo-Marxists and neo-institutionalists advocate forms of segmented labor market theory.  
While Osterman, Rebitzer and Piore are referenced in the text, they are considered neo-insti-
tutionalists. Since the purpose of this paper is to compare segmented labor market theory with 
human capital theory rather than examine the various forms of segmented labor market theory, 
the two groups are not differentiated.
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 The following analysis is divided into six sections.  The first section 
examines the origins of income distribution theory in classical and Marxian 
economics, and show that classical political economy never attempted to develop 
a theory of personal income distribution.  In the second section, I discuss how 
Clark’s theory of marginal productivity served as a bridge to the development 
of theories of personal income distribution in the mid-twentieth century.  In the 
third section, I analyze the circumstances that contributed to the rise of theories 
of personal income distribution and present the theoretical foundations of human 
capital theory.  I also examine the criticisms of human capital theory.  The fourth 
section focuses on the critique of human capital theory developed by radical 
political economy in an effort to show how segmented labor market theory 
emerged as an important heterodox explanation of personal income distribution. 
The fifth section shows that orthodox and heterodox explanations of personal 
income distribution share close theoretical foundations and are thus effectively 
identical explanations for the distribution of personal income.  The only discernible 
difference between the two is the emphasis placed on social institutions.  In the 
final section, I briefly summarize my findings.      
    
I. Classical and Marxian Theories of Income Distribution
 Writing at the height of classical political economy, Ricardo believed 
that income distribution was so important to political economy that economics 
should be defined as “an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the 
produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation” (Ricardo, 
1951, 278).  In short, Ricardo contended that the distribution of income was the 
machine that drove the economy.  Explaining the rate of profit was one of the main 
goals of Ricardo’s Principles.
 Ricardo argued that “the produce of the earth – all that is derived 
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from its surface by the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is 
divided among three classes of the community” (Ricardo, 1821, v).  The profits 
that accrued to capitalists were the product of capitalist relationships with both 
landlords and laborers.  Ricardo accepted the Malthusian theory of population 
and its attendant assumption that rapid population growth would drive wages 
down to the subsistence level.  Profits were thus governed by a socially and 
morally7 determined level of subsistence.  Yet while profits were determined by 
the subsistence wage level, the subsistence wage and technology level was in 
turn determined by “the quantity of labour requisite to provide necessaries for 
the labourers, on that land or with that capital that yields no rent” (ibid., 128).  In 
effect, the profits of capitalists were determined by the extent to which infertile 
land was being used to grow the crops on which workers subsisted.  
There was thus a tendency for the rate of profit “to fall; for, in the progress 
of society and wealth, the additional quantity of food required is obtained by the 
sacrifice of more and more labour” (ibid, 120).  As society progressed, increasingly 
less fertile land came under cultivation which subsequently increased the amount of 
rent collected by landlords.  This made food more expensive, forcing capitalists to 
pay higher wages and keep a smaller portion of their revenue.  Furthermore, a high 
rate of profit attracted outside capital so competition depressed profit rates, but “a 
fall in the general rate of profits is by no means incompatible with a partial rise of 
profits” (ibid., 119).  Capitalists could therefore experience positive profits despite 
declining rates of profit due to counteracting influences such as increased demand.
Karl Marx agreed with the general framework of class income distribution 
theory laid out by Ricardo.  He too believed that there was a tendency for the rate 
of profits to fall and wages to fluctuate around the subsistence level.  Non-wage 
7 Ricardo argues that the natural wage in a country “essentially depends on the habits and 
customs of the people” in a given country (Ricardo, 91).  That is, the level of sustenance that is 
acceptable in one country is not necessarily the same in all countries.  If a worker lives in a so-
ciety with high wants, their wage will be higher than if they lived in a society of simpler means.
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income was accepted as a residual measurement.  Marx, however, thought two 
important aspects of class income distribution needed to be addressed.  First, he 
differentiated between labor and labor power.  Labor power “is to be understood 
[as] the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human 
being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description” 
(Marx, 1867, 167).  Marx believed that labor power was a commodity sold by 
laborers.  Whereas labor power was the potential to do work, “labour-power in 
use is labour itself” (ibid., 177).  Labor was thus the act of realizing the ability to 
work.  This distinction was important because it is the foundation for his concept 
of surplus value.  Humans had a capacity to work much greater than the amount of 
labor we need to expend to replenish this potential.  Marx referred to the portion 
of the working day needed to earn enough for subsistence “‘necessary’ labor 
time” (ibid., 217).  Any labor expended beyond this point generated surplus value 
for capitalists.
Capitalists therefore paid laborers just enough to ensure their subsistence 
but extracted an excessively large amount of labor compared to the amount of 
labor necessary for subsistence.  Marx also argued that wages tended towards 
subsistence, but his rationale for why this occurred was different from Ricardo’s. 
Marx rejected the Malthusian theory of population as an explanation for the 
tendency of wages to fluctuate around the subsistence level.  He instead believed 
that an “industrial reserve army” of unemployed workers was maintained by 
capitalists in order to foster competition between laborers and prevent wage 
increases (ibid., 632).  Furthermore, the presence of an industrial reserve army 
resulted from the historical evolution of capitalism.  As capitalism progressed, 
capitalists accumulated increasingly more capital.  The majority of this 
accumulation was ever more productive physical capital.  Demand for variable 
capital (i.e. labor) therefore grew at “constantly diminishing rate” because it 
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became a smaller and smaller portion of total capital (ibid., 629). According 
to Marx, downward pressure on wages was thus not a natural occurrence but 
rather a phenomenon specific to the historical conditions of the capitalist mode 
of production.      
 Classical and Marxian income distribution theories shared similar 
foundations.  While Marx sought to improve upon Ricardian theory, the biggest 
difference between the two was the nature of capitalism.  Ricardo argued 
that since capitalists would only produce commodities for which there was 
sufficient demand, capitalists would naturally seek to accumulate capital up to 
the point where profits equaled zero (Ricardo, 340).  A decreasing rate of profit 
was attributable to higher wages made necessary by the diminishing marginal 
productivity of agriculture.  Accumulation was thus portrayed as a self-regulating 
phenomenon that ensured stability in capitalism.  Ricardo acknowledged the 
existence of intense competition between capitalists to accumulate capital, but did 
not believe that capital necessarily became concentrated within an ever smaller 
group of capitalists.        
 Marx rejected the notion that accumulation was governed by the rate of 
profit.  He contended that accumulation was necessary for capitalist survival in 
the capitalist mode of production: 
“the development of capitalist production makes it constantly 
necessary to keep increasing the amount of capital…and competition 
makes the immanent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each 
individual capitalist, as external coercive laws.  It compels him to keep 
constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it” (ibid., 592).
Accumulation fostered vicious competition between capitalists, the losers in which 
did not survive.  Marx believed that as capital became concentrated in a shrinking 
group of capitalists, capitalists would exert a greater degree of exploitation of the 
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working class.  Ultimately, this desire for accumulation would contribute to the 
downfall of capitalism after a critical mass of degraded proletariats was reached, 
sparking a popular revolt against the capitalists (ibid., 763).  While Ricardo 
asserted that the desire for accumulation could wane peacefully, Marx depicted a 
much more urgent picture of capital accumulation.
Obstacles to an Analysis of Personal Income Distribution
 There are two important reasons why Ricardo and Marx never attempted 
to develop a theory of personal income distribution.  Class conflict caused a rise 
in class consciousness that hindered the ability of Ricardo and Marx to analyze 
income on a personal level.  It simply did not make sense for Ricardo and Marx 
to study how personal income distribution when people increasingly identified 
themselves as members of a class rather than as individuals.  This is exemplified 
in the controversy surrounding the Corn Laws, where capitalists and landlords 
competed to attain supremacy in the public arena. Whichever class prevailed was 
effectively able to dictate how income was distributed between classes.  Capitalists 
and landlords viewed themselves as part of a greater class movement rather 
than individual members of society.  In addition, the labor force of the time was 
relatively more homogenous than it is today.  This made it difficult to differentiate 
workers or treat them as individual economic agents.  Ricardo and Marx, at least 
from an economic perspective, would have had difficulty distinguishing between 
individual members of a given class.
Ricardo and Marx lived in an era when class conflict was at the center 
of policymaking in Europe.  Class distributions of income reflected economists’ 
perspectives on class conflict.  The controversy over the British Corn Laws 
demonstrated the tension between landlords and capitalists that persisted during 
the rise of classical political economy.  Landlords favored implementing the Corn 
Laws because protection from foreign competition allowed landlords to charge 
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higher rents.  Capitalists wanted to keep food prices as low as possible because the 
subsistence level depended upon the price at which workers could feed themselves 
in order to restore their labor power.  Cheaper food meant higher profits for 
capitalists.  While enacting the Corn Laws seemed to favor the landlords and their 
repeal appeared to cater to the interests of the urban capitalists, class conflict was 
much more complex than a dispute between capitalists and landlords.  Conflict 
also arose between members of the same social class as class distinctions blurred. 
 One instance of intra-class tension arose between established landlords 
and newly landed capitalists.  Many established landlords favored legislation that
 “served to reinforce the status of the existing elites of both town and 
countryside by re-emphasizing the notion that the prosperity of the 
various classes which composed the same interest group was primarily 
affected not by one another but by a rival interest group [the urban 
capitalists],” (Moore, 1965, 544). 
The Corn Laws thus strove to maintain the status quo of class relations in 
British society.  That hierarchy survived mainly on the mutual interest among 
well-established landed and capitalist elites to preserve traditional British social 
structure.  Yet as industry expanded in Great Britain, the formerly mutual interests 
between rural and urban elites diverged.  Capitalists sought cheap food to keep 
production costs down but established, or hereditary, landlords wanted prices to 
remain high.  Hereditary landlords sought to maintain prosperity through high 
agricultural prices, but an “arriviste” class of newly landed elites who had made 
a fortune in the cities strove to reap profits by implementing innovative farming 
techniques that increased crop production (ibid., 551).  Social standing of older 
landed elites was further undermined by capitalists who purchased land in order 
to accumulate more capital.  As the pace of capital accumulation accelerated 
and landed capitalists subsequently gained influence, older landlords felt their 
authority in the public arena begin to wane.
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The eventual repeal of the Corn Laws ultimately benefited the capitalist 
class because foreign competition lowered food prices, but Sir Robert Peel’s 
official justification for presenting the necessary legislation was “to extricate the 
kingdom from the social dilemmas” that arose from the incessant class disputes 
in European society that dominated the era (ibid., 560).  Thus while the repeal 
of the Corn Laws had economic implications, it was more focused on achieving 
social harmony.  Peel wanted to encourage the hereditary landed elite to shift their 
focus from prices to output, and thus develop an entrepreneurial outlook similar 
to capitalists.  Unfortunately, this legislation was misguided in that it “failed to 
recognize the impossibility of commercializing the status of the landlord without 
also commercializing the status of the tenant” (ibid., 559).  Urban capitalists 
emerged as the victors from repeal of the Corn Laws because legislators failed to 
comprehend the nature of the rural hierarchy properly. The controversial nature of 
the Corn Laws and their repeal was representative of the divide within classes that 
existed during the rise of classical political economy and the critiques that quickly 
followed.  Since class conflict dominated European society, income distribution 
was viewed as a class-based issue rather than one pertaining to individuals.
 The relative homogeneity of the labor force also inhibited the ability 
to differentiate between individuals.  Reich, Gordon, and Edwards argued that 
before the era of monopoly capitalism began in 1890, production was governed 
by the rules of competitive capitalism (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 1973, 360). 
Production was heavily standardized, primarily took place in factories, and involved 
many simple tasks.  Capitalists favored this type of production strategy because 
strong competition disincentivized the extra expenses associated with the types of 
specialized training that accompanied monopoly capitalism.  Monopoly capitalism 
was characterized by the production of differentiated good by specialized labor. 
Furthermore, the dramatic rise in population and movement of unskilled workers 
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into concentrated urban areas ensured that a large supply of easily substitutable 
labor was readily available for capitalists to draw from (Brown, 1977, 72).
 Increasing class consciousness and a relatively homogenous labor 
force prevented Ricardo and Marx from examining the distribution of income 
on a personal level.  It did not make sense for them to study personal income 
distribution when public debates such as those surrounding the Corn Laws were 
class-based.  Individuals were viewed more as members of a social class rather 
than unique economic agents.  The structure of industry during this era made 
it even more difficult to study society on an individual level.  Production often 
centered on simple, repetitive tasks so labor was easily interchangeable.    
II. Marginal Productivity Theory
 Ricardo first introduced the marginal principle to economic theory.  He 
argued that as less fertile land came under cultivation, the rent on more fertile land 
increased (Ricardo, 1821, 60).  John Bates Clark endeavored to expand Ricardo’s 
marginal principle in two important ways.  In his Distribution of Wealth, Clark 
generalized the principle of substitution to include all factors of production, and 
proposed that “the pay of labor in each industry tends to conform to the marginal 
product of social labor employed in connection with a fixed amount of social 
capital, as such” (Clark, 1899, 116; emphasis his).  Although Clark articulated 
an explanation of how the natural rates of profits and wages were determined 
endogenously, he maintained the classical assumption that the endowments of 
capital and labor were naturally determined.  Consequently, while the theory of 
marginal productivity inspired later theories of personal income distribution, it is 
itself more a theory of factor demands than one of income distribution.  
Clark developed his theory of marginal productivity as an analogue to 
Ricardo’s explanation of rents.  He imagined a “universal field for employment” 
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that included all workers (ibid, 110).  Those who had access to the central field 
of fertile land or a sufficiently stocked store naturally had access to higher levels 
of productivity.  Workers located farther from this central field had to choose 
from lower quality employment.  In the zone of indifference, employers earned 
zero profit and thus stopped hiring.  Competition ensured that all employers hired 
employees up to this point.  The analogy of a universal field for employment is 
important because of an important aspect Clark omitted from his discussion: he 
did not explain how workers were placed throughout the field, or if it was possible 
for them to move from their initial position.  Their position was determined 
naturally.  During the rebirth of income distribution theory in the coming decades, 
this assumption motivated human capital theory and segmented labor market 
theory to explain how workers moved within the “universal field of employment.” 
 The theory of marginal productivity also maintained the classical 
assumption of homogenous labor.  Clark acknowledged that skilled workers were 
more productive than unskilled workers, but argued that all labor could be measured 
in the same units of labor (ibid., 63).  He therefore assumed that all labor could 
be reduced to a common denominator, which minimized the importance of skill 
differential.  A skilled worker could be replaced by two or more less-skilled workers. 
Although Clark maintained these important classical assumptions, he departed from 
the classical theory of income distribution in several important ways.  
Foremost among Clark’s critiques of classical political economy was the 
argument that Ricardian economics was an endeavor that “was really studying a 
static…world with no complete idea of its nature,” which he addressed by relaxing 
the assumption of a static economy (ibid., 69).  Clark believed that economic 
theory needed to reflect the dynamic nature of the world.  The Distribution of 
Wealth can thus be viewed as his attempt to complete Ricardo’s work.  While 
natural law remained a governing principal in that the productivity of workers was 
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naturally determined, “social economic dynamics” such as increasing population 
and wealth, technological innovation, introduction of new products, and labor 
flow between groups were introduced (ibid., 73).  Clark realized that the state of 
the world in the present was not the same as it was in the past, and that it would 
also be different in the future.  Even though wages naturally tended to their natural 
level, the dynamic nature of society had to be taken into account.  The biggest 
contribution Clark made to income distribution theory was that the determination 
of wages adhered to natural law because they were equal to an exogenously 
determined marginal productivity, while granting that these exogenous forces 
changed over time.  To put it concisely, “what we have to see is how static laws 
operate in a dynamic state” (ibid., 403).    
 It is clear that Clark drew upon Ricardo when formulating his theory 
of marginal productivity, yet there is also evidence that he did more than simply 
apply the marginal principle to include all factors of production.  Ricardo held 
the proportion of capital to labor constant; his theory of rents, therefore, assumed 
varying fertility of the soil.  Clark varied the factors of production separately (ibid., 
163).  While Ricardo assumed technology to be unchanging, the interchangeability 
between labor and capital in The Distribution of Wealth implied that technological 
change was an important aspect of production.  This is an important implication 
because it allowed human capital theory to maintain that labor was both dynamic 
and highly substitutable, a necessary condition for the assumption of perfect 
competition in the labor market underpinning human capital theory.  
 The Distribution of Wealth inspired future work on personal income 
distribution theory through the introduction of the idea that workers were paid 
according to their marginal productivity.  Clark touted his work as “an inspiring 
vista for future advances” in economic theory (ibid., 75).  What he did not foresee, 
however, were future attempts to treat social economic dynamics as endogenous 
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to the explanation of personal income distribution.  Relaxing the assumption of 
natural skill determination served as the impetus for numerous theories of personal 
income distribution.  Whereas Clark took the distribution of factor endowments 
as given, future work on income distribution sought to explain how marginal 
productivity was determined.  Theories of personal income distribution can be 
seen as an extension of marginal productivity theory.  While marginal productivity 
closely identified with classical political economy, Clark’s work effectively broke 
the hegemony of class income distribution in economic analysis. 
III. Theories of Personal Income Distribution
Circumstances Contributing to the Rise of Theories of Personal Income 
Distribution
 One of the reasons economic thought focused upon theories of personal 
distribution during the renaissance of income distribution in the mid-twentieth 
century was the widespread study of the causes of discrimination.  Becker’s The 
Economics of Discrimination (1957) was one of the pioneering works on the 
subject.  Becker argued that it was possible to conduct an economic analysis of the 
effects of discrimination because “if an individual has a ‘taste for discrimination,’ 
he must act as if he were willing to pay something either directly or in form of 
reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others” (Becker, 
1971 (1957), 14).  Employers associated non-pecuniary costs of production with 
minority employees.  This “taste” resulted from prejudice and ignorance, and 
varied both temporally and spatially.  
 Although Becker believed that discrimination in the labor force existed, 
he also believed the forces creating discrimination were dynamic.  The level of 
discrimination present in the work place could thus change over time.  To test 
this, he measured the change in average occupational position for both whites 
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and minorities from 1910-1950.  Relative occupational position was measured by 
comparing the income for skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled minorities with the 
average incomes for their respective white counterparts.  Becker found that the 
relative occupational position of minority workers had remained stable over time 
(ibid., 140).  Discrimination had therefore not decreased.  An absolute increase 
in income for minorities did not necessarily imply an increase in their position 
relative to whites because the incomes of white employees increased as well.  
 The Economics of Discrimination served as an impetus for numerous 
studies examining the impact of discrimination.  Rayack (1961) and Gilman 
(1965) criticized Becker’s arguments about the persistence and magnitude of 
discrimination in the workplace, respectively.  Rayack argued that Becker’s 
conclusion of an unchanged level of discrimination towards blacks, as measured 
by their income relative to whites in the first half of the twentieth century resulted 
from the erroneous construction of his occupational index (Rayack, 1961, 210). 
Rayack believed Becker did not account for the fact that blacks were heavily 
concentrated in semi-skilled and unskilled professions.  After generating an 
occupational index that factored in this characteristic, Rayack showed that 
income for blacks had, in general, increased more than it had for whites so that by 
1957 the occupational position of blacks had increased by 34 percent relative to 
1900 (ibid., 211).  He also contended, however, that this increase did not reflect 
a decrease in discrimination.  The increase was instead due to increased demand 
for labor, and any sustained increase in occupational position was “substantially, 
a function of the tightness of the labor market” (ibid., 214).  Becker could thus 
be correct in his assessment that the level of discrimination in the labor force 
had remained unchanged throughout the twentieth century and simultaneously 
incorrect in his belief that the position of blacks in the workplace had improved 
neither absolutely nor relatively.
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 Gilman (1965) provided a further critique of The Economics of 
Discrimination.  He believed that the impact of discrimination on minority 
unemployment was significantly smaller than initially thought (Gilman, 1965, 
1080).  This evidence challenged the notion that minorities were targeted in the 
hiring-firing process.  Gilman drew a conclusion similar to Rayack (1961) by 
suggesting that discrimination was most evident in wage rigidity.  Minorities 
experienced greater wage rigidity and thus higher unemployment rates because 
“the greater the pressure in an occupation or region for nonwhite-white wage 
equality, the greater will be the gap between equilibrium and actual wages, and 
the greater will be the reduction in employment opportunities for nonwhite 
relative to white workers” (ibid., 1091).  Minimum wage laws and unions keep 
the actual wage above the equilibrium wage.  The greater this disparity, the fewer 
employment opportunities for minority workers there would be.
 Regardless of the extent to which discrimination existed, one reason it 
endured in the labor market was imperfect information.  Gathering information on 
potential employees was costly, which made it difficult for minorities and females 
to show that they were equally as skilled as their white male counterparts.  Arrow 
(1971) claimed that minorities and women were paid less than equally skilled white 
male employees because “skin color and sex are cheap sources of information” 
(Arrow, 1971, 25).  Employers had preconceived notions of the productivity of 
women and minorities, and imperfect information in the labor market allowed 
these prejudices to persist.  There was less incentive for female and minority 
workers to make the investments necessary to increase their productivity because 
no amount of investment could outweigh the cheap information provided by their 
skin color or gender (ibid., 29).  Therefore while a minority or female worker and 
a white worker could begin with the same productive potential, the latter would be 
more likely to realize this potential and thus enjoy a better occupational position. 
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 Marxists viewed discrimination differently.  While neoclassical 
economists treated the origins of discrimination as exogenous to the capitalist 
system of production, Marxists believed that discrimination was perpetuated 
endogenously.  Capitalists implemented various forms of discrimination as a 
means to prevent camaraderie among workers (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 
361).  Employers exploited ethnicity, race, and sex to ensure competing factions 
of workers who would not compromise capitalist hegemony.  They hired groups 
of rival nationalities to antagonize each other.  Jobs were “race-typed” and 
women were paid less than men as a means of forcing these workers to accept 
submissive roles in society (ibid., 362).  As capitalism evolved beyond a relatively 
homogenous labor force, capitalists stoked race conflicts and other forms of social 
unrest to ensure their continued perch atop the social hierarchy.         
   Such an emphasis in academia on discrimination encouraged 
development of theories of personal income distribution because discrimination 
was fundamentally based on the notion that not all workers were the same. 
Employers assumed that white male workers were superior to other workers even 
if the “intrinsic identities” between workers were equal (Arrow, 1971, 28).  The 
presence and influence of discrimination required that laborers no longer be viewed 
as homogenous members of a social class but instead be considered individual 
economic agents.  When studying income distribution, economists acknowledged 
that individuals faced different environments and constraints that influenced their 
position in the labor force.  There was thus a need to conduct economic analyses 
on a personal level.  Becker foreshadowed the rise of human capital theory in The 
Economics of Discrimination by mentioning that a relationship existed between 
economic capacity and “the capital invested in [people] through education” 
(Becker, 1971 (1957), 112).  
 The notion of heterogeneity in the labor force was an important 
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implication of the discussion on discrimination.  Incorporating a heterogeneous 
labor-force into income distribution analysis became necessary because people 
could no longer be sorted into broad categories such as laborers and capitalists. 
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) studied heterogeneity within the labor market 
from a historical perspective.  They asserted that the captains of industry sought 
to capture control over product and factor markets because they had been relieved 
of the competitive pressures inherent in the previous stage of capitalism (Reich, 
Gordon, and Edwards, 1973, 361).  In order to establish themselves in product 
markets, capitalists of the new age of capitalism had to differentiate themselves 
from their competitors in order to survive.  Yet while product differentiation 
conferred the indirect benefits of monopoly capitalism, Reich, Gordon, and 
Edwards pointed out another, more sinister and explicit motive for promoting 
heterogeneity in the labor force that accompanied the rise of monopoly capitalism.
 Reich, Edwards and Gordon argued that capitalists encouraged a shift 
away from homogenization in the labor force “to break down the increasingly 
unified worker interests that grew out of the proletarianization of work” (Reich, 
Edwards and Gordon, 1973, 361).  They believed that a homogenous labor force 
fostered a sense of unity among the workers that threatened the consolidation of 
power in the capitalist class.  A strategy of “divide and conquer” was therefore 
needed to quash any semblance of solidarity in the labor force (ibid., 361).  Thus 
while heterogeneity of the labor-force may have arisen with the evolution of 
capitalism, it was perpetuated by the capitalists as a preventative measure against 
class cohesion amongst laborers.    
 There were also studies conducted within a neoclassical framework that 
showed evidence of heterogeneity of the contemporary labor force.  Gallaway 
(1967) found that although workers responded positively to earnings, distance 
acted as a deterrent to job mobility.  Workers thus did not always move to regions 
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paying higher wages (Gallaway, 1967, 465).  The decision to forego a higher 
income was rational because the uncertainty due to imperfect information created 
trade-off costs between distance and earnings.  Workers faced a higher degree of 
uncertainty with longer distances because distance acted as an “information filter 
which inhibits the flow of labor market knowledge between areas” (ibid, 472). 
Trade-off costs became increasingly large with distance so workers were less 
likely to move in order to gain a marginal increase in income.  Wages therefore 
did not necessarily equalize across regions; differences in incomes for identical 
jobs could persist.  
 Gallaway (1967) also found evidence that labor was not easily 
substitutable.  Trade-off costs were not limited only to distance, skill also acted 
as a barrier to entry for employment in an industry (ibid., 471).  Workers from 
some industries faced more restrictive barriers to entry than workers from other 
industries because labor was specialized.  A wide range of trade-off costs existed 
across industries: workers in professions with higher trade-off costs embodied less 
transferable skills as a result of extended parochial training (ibid., 472).  Workers 
who thus received highly specialized training were not able to find alternate 
employment outside of their chosen industry and earn an income comparable to 
the one they received in their former industry.  Specialization of skills in the labor 
force therefore greatly affected the ability of workers to switch professions.  Both 
interregional and inter-industry heterogeneity therefore challenged the classical 
assumption of homogeneity within the labor force.     
 Analyses of discrimination and labor force heterogeneity facilitated 
a renaissance of interest in income distribution theory.  They signaled that 
labor could no longer be viewed through the perspective of classical political 
economy.  Workers could no longer be viewed as easily interchangeable.  But 
while discrimination and heterogeneity of the labor force identified the need for 
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a reevaluation of income distribution, these studies did not develop theories of 
personal income distribution on their own.  Human capital theory and segmented 
labor market theory offered competing explanations of how discrimination and 
heterogeneity within the labor force influenced personal income distribution.  For 
instance, discrimination encouraged segmented labor markets, but “discrimination 
itself does not create the segmentation” (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 698).  Human 
capital theory sought to “single out individual investment behavior as a basic 
factor in the heterogeneity of labor incomes” (Mincer, 1970, 6).  Theories of 
personal income distribution that emerged during the rebirth of thought on income 
distribution were thus influenced by the prominent issues of the mid-twentieth 
century.  
Human Capital Theory 
 Human capital theory operated under the assumption that individuals 
decided to invest in training or education that allowed them to obtain the skills 
that made them more productive and consequently determined their income 
(Becker, 1962, 9).  The distribution of personal income could thus be explained 
through an analysis of the distribution of human capital among participants in 
the labor force.  Human capital theorists argued that demand for this training and 
education was determined by the marginal rate of return on investment, and that 
its supply was determined by the volume of funds available for an individual 
to acquire training or investment (Mincer, 1970, 18).  Wage rates were market 
prices that reflected the relative scarcity or surplus of different types of labor.  This 
explanation of the personal distribution of income was thoroughly grounded in 
neoclassical economics.        
 Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz, and Gary Becker were the pioneers 
of human capital theory.  All three acknowledged that human capital was a 
broad term that included components such as physical health and psychological 
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well-being, but they agreed that training was the most important type of human 
capital formation.  Mincer (1958) constructed a model examining the effect of 
investment on human capital under the assumption of rational choice. He argued 
that individuals chose the amount of training they wanted based on their perceived 
learning capacity (Mincer, 1958, 286).  People with greater learning capacities 
chose to acquire more training and enter professions requiring more training. 
Furthermore, earnings within a profession fell along a “life-path” where older 
workers earned more than younger workers (ibid., 288).  Mincer suggested that 
workers gained experience the longer they worked in a profession, which increased 
their productivity and income.  Professions that required more training also paid 
higher salaries because they required longer postponement of earnings (Mincer, 
1970, 7).  Higher incomes were thus partly compensation for the shortened period 
during which those who received the training enjoyed returns on their investment. 
Personal income distribution was determined by the initial decision of how much 
training to acquire and how much on-the-job training a worker obtained in their 
chosen profession.
 Schultz (1961) built upon Mincer’s work by contending that the decision 
to invest in human capital was influenced by the expected return on investment. 
He asserted that while “any capability produced by human investment becomes 
part of the human agent and hence cannot be sold; it is nevertheless ‘in touch 
with the marketplace’ by affecting the wages and salaries the human agent can 
earn” (Schultz, 1961, 8).  Similar to Mincer, Schultz concluded that people who 
benefited the most from investment in human capital were the most likely to 
invest the greatest amount in training.  Schultz’s analysis diverged from Mincer’s, 
however, in the type of training studied.  Schultz focused on measuring the 
returns to formal education because he believed that the exact role of on-the-
job training in modern industry was not adequately understood (ibid., 10).  He 
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argued that formal education had taken over a significant portion of the training 
and preparation traditionally acquired through on-the-job training arrangements 
such as apprenticeships.  Schultz chose to study how the stock of education in 
the labor force affected economic growth.  He asserted that a more educated 
labor force was a more productive labor force and found that between 1900 and 
1956, the stock of education in the labor force grew twice as fast as the stock of 
reproducible capital (ibid., 11).  It was therefore greater educational attainment, 
and subsequently higher levels of human capital, that drove American economic 
growth in the first half of the twentieth century.
 Perhaps the most comprehensive promotion of human capital theory 
advocated during the rebirth of income distribution theory was Human Capital 
and the Personal Distribution of Income by Becker (1967).  He constructed a 
model of income distribution similar to Mincer’s by incorporating the assumptions 
of rational choice and variable life-paths of earnings.  Furthermore human capital 
was discussed mostly in the context of educational attainment.  But rather than 
simply reviewing earlier work, Becker also wanted to expand “our rudimentary 
knowledge of the forces generating income distributions” (Becker, 1967, 12). 
Therefore while Mincer and Schultz identified the causes of the skewness of 
income distribution, Becker undertook to explain them better.
 Becker first summarized two special cases of the distribution of human 
capital.  Under the “egalitarian” approach, he assumed that all people faced the 
same demand conditions for human capital and that income was determined by the 
supply of opportunities to invest in human capital faced by individuals.  In short, 
the egalitarian approach proposed equal capacity to benefit from investment in 
human capital, and that differences in environment determined the distribution of 
human capital (ibid., 13).  Income variances could be explained by family wealth, 
subsidies and factors such as luck that shifted the supply curve for human capital 
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outward.  The “elite” approach was essentially the opposite.  It presumed supply 
conditions to be identical and that demand for human capital was determined 
by the amount of investment in training and education (ibid., 16).  More able 
workers, for instance, were more likely to invest in human capital and thus have a 
higher demand for it.
 Becker believed that in reality, social institutions influenced both the 
supply and demand for human capital (ibid., 24).  Students with greater natural 
ability not only had greater demand for human capital, their exceptional capacities 
also made them likelier to attend better schools and make them more attractive 
scholarship applicants.  Legislation aimed at eradicating poverty shifted the 
supply curve of human capital for less wealthy people outward, thereby reducing 
the cost of investment.  Through his analysis Becker provided a comprehensive 
explanation for how investment in human capital determined the personal 
distribution of income.
 In the twentieth century, economists began to shift their focus from away 
from explaining the class distribution of income and towards analyses of the 
distribution of income among individuals.  This change was motivated by studies 
on economics of discrimination and increasing heterogeneity of the labor force. 
Clark’s theory of marginal productivity first broached the notion of disaggregating 
classes, and served as the foundation for human capital theory, the most influential 
neoclassical theory of personal income distribution that emerged during the 
renaissance of income distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.  Mincer, 
Shultz, and Becker developed human capital theory to explain how the marginal 
productivity of workers was determined, and thus develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between wages and marginal productivity.
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Criticisms of Human Capital Theory
 Three basic criticisms arose in response to human capital theory.  One 
group of economists cited various econometric issues with studies that measured 
the impact of investment in human capital on output.  Griliches (1977) asserted 
that an “ability” problem and the possible influence of optimizing behavior on 
schooling decisions by individuals had not been addressed in models constructed 
in the framework of human capital theory.  Ability accounted for the possibility that 
a given level of investment in human capital yielded varying returns depending 
on the person.  Including an ability variable in empirical analyses, however, 
proved troublesome because it was difficult to measure (Griliches, 1977, 6). 
Optimization of schooling decisions was troublesome for human capital theory 
because such behavior was based on anticipated future earnings.  Calculating 
the optimal level of schooling or on-the-job training implicitly required strong 
assumptions about individual behavior, which Griliches argued models of human 
capital theory failed to recognize.  For instance, while there was initially a positive 
relationship between age and experience, older workers also reached a point 
where they became less productive than younger workers (ibid., 14).  Human 
capital theory therefore implicitly assumed infinite life, even though it argued 
that jobs requiring more training required higher compensation due to a shorter 
working life.   Furthermore, he also stated that since optimal schooling decisions 
were based on anticipated earnings, any difference between ex-post and ex-ante 
incomes increased the correlation between the schooling and residual terms in a 
model measuring income (ibid., 13).  
 Blaug (1976) was also critical of the econometric viability of human 
capital theory.  Measuring the effect of on-the-job training on income was 
especially problematic because the various aspects of on-the-job training were not 
adequately defined.  He contended that human capital theory did not differentiate 
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between increased productivity from costless learning-by-doing and costly self-
investment (Blaug, 1976, 839).  Human capital theory therefore did not provide 
sufficient measures of on-the-job training by limiting itself to general and specific 
training.  Blaug faulted human capital theory models for producing significant, 
unexplained differences in returns to investment in different types of human 
capital as well.  These discrepancies were due to the neglect of variations in 
educational quality and the existence of an “overtaking point” (ibid., 838).  The 
benefits of schooling grew over time rather than being fully realized immediately 
after schooling was completed.  Blaug attributed these measurement errors to the 
overly ambitious nature of human capital theory.  He believed the focus of human 
capital theory was too broad, making it difficult to determine “what hypothesis is 
being tested” (ibid., 832).   
 Advocates of the screening hypothesis constituted another group critical 
of human capital theory.  They asserted that the assumption of perfect information 
in labor markets was unrealistic.  Economic theory needed to reflect the high 
degree of imperfect information employers faced when reviewing job applicants. 
Supporters of the screening hypothesis agreed that human capital theory was 
correct in that individual incomes were determined by the level of investment 
in human capital, but they developed a different explanation for how human 
capital affected income.  The link between human capital theory and the principle 
of marginal productivity did not explain personal income distribution because 
a “diploma serves primarily as an imperfect measure of performance ability 
rather than as evidence of acquired skills” (Arrow, 1973, 193).  The screening 
hypothesis essentially argued that education separated more able workers from 
less able workers.  Income was determined by ability, not productivity.  Stiglitz 
(1975) contended that educational screening occurred naturally in society because 
it was the “byproduct” of providing knowledge and career direction to students in 
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schools (Stiglitz, 1975, 294).  Bright students were identified by teachers who then 
passed this information along the educational chain.  School was used primarily to 
sort students into levels of ability, not to develop skills to make more productive 
workers, as human capital theory suggested.  
 Several important assumptions served as the foundation for the screening 
hypothesis.  Most important among them was the existence of inherent market 
failure within the labor markets stemming from the lack of knowledge and cost 
of obtaining information about potential employees (Taubman and Wales, 1975, 
112).  College diplomas were used by employers as a proxy for ability because 
they offered quick insight into the skills and capabilities embodied in applicants. 
As a result, the supply of labor for high-paying occupations is restricted to the 
well-educated (ibid., 118).  Stiglitz argued that access to information also affected 
the decision making of job applicants.  Individuals decided how much education 
to invest in based on their perception of their ability.  Risk-averse people therefore 
chose to forego the chance of being screened as a below-average worker even 
if they were highly capable (Stiglitz, 287).  Yet while educational screening 
was imperfect, Stiglitz cautioned against forbidding employers to practice it. 
Screening would still occur, it would merely change forms.  Forcing employers 
to rely solely on on-the-job screening would make screening more expensive and 
reduce output (ibid., 291).  Everyone would be left worse off.  
 The screening hypothesis made a compelling case against the limitations 
of human capital theory, but the former faced scrutiny on theoretical grounds 
as well.  In the development of his model supporting the screening hypothesis, 
Arrow (1973) acknowledged that “employers cannot measure ability directly, 
and there is no reason to suppose that the economist is going to do any better” 
(Arrow, 216).  Screening was based on the assumption that people have differing 
levels of ability and that the more able use educational attainment to signal this. 
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Yet if ability in general cannot be measured, it is nearly impossible to determine 
its distribution.  Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) also conducted an empirical 
study based on Arrow’s work and obtained results challenging the predictions of 
the screening hypothesis.  For instance, they found that dropouts and students 
who completed their coursework earned similar rates of return (Layard and 
Psacharopoulos, 1974, 991).  That challenged the notion put forth by the screening 
hypothesis that a bachelor’s degree signaled to employers a more capable worker 
than an applicant who completed only some coursework.  Although the screening 
hypothesis provided a neoclassical alternative to human capital theory, it failed 
to unseat human capital theory as the primary explanation of personal income 
distribution in orthodox economics.        
IV. Radical Political Economy
 Radical political economy criticized human capital theory from a 
heterodox perspective.  Its supporters were less concerned with the empirical issues 
of human capital theory, instead choosing to focus on the fundamental perception 
of production in neoclassical economics.  While neoclassical economics shifted 
focus to the functional aspect of production with the introduction of the theory of 
marginal productivity, radical political economy asserted that the social aspect of 
production was the primary determinant of personal income.  Marxists criticized 
human capital theory for artificially resolving the inherent class conflict associated 
with capitalist systems of production by considering every worker a capitalist 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1975, 74).  In fact, radical political economy questioned 
human capital theory’s definition of capital.  Learning could only be a form of 
capital if it allowed workers to go into production on their own (ibid., 79).  
 Radical political economists challenged the notion that workers were 
paid according to their marginal productivity because they believed that the 
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structure of capitalist firms encouraged the de-skilling of their workers (Rebitzer, 
1993, 1401).  Essentially this meant that, rather than encouraging workers to 
acquire more training in order to become more productive, they actually preferred 
workers to embody only a minimum level of human capital.  As a result they 
became discouraged and the mundane nature of their work prevented them from 
increasing, or even maintaining, their productivity.  This is a contemporary re-
statement of the inevitable alienation of workers by capitalists espoused by Marx. 
Human capital theory argued that higher productivity levels caused higher wages. 
Radical political economy effectively argued the opposite: lower wages caused 
productivity to fall.  Workers embodied a natural endowment of “human capital” 
that was augmented by schooling and training, but the economic return to these 
investments was governed by the extent to which these same workers legitimated 
the authority of firms over their employees (Bowles and Gintis, 1974, 80).  Schools 
were important, but not in the way human capital theory proposed.  The main 
goal of the education system was “to prepare students by developing attitudes 
appropriate to the political position they can be expected to occupy within firms” 
(Rebitzer, 1993, 1403).  Marginal productivity was therefore unimportant to an 
analysis of personal income distribution.     
 Since radical political economy criticized the theoretical foundations of 
human capital theory, it can be viewed as a critique of the orthodox theory of 
personal income distribution.  Radical political economy was “not ready to reduce 
the school system’s economically relevant activities to screening and labeling” 
(ibid., 75).  Imperfect information did exist in the labor market, but education was 
not used as a signaling device to help more capable workers of signaling their 
level of ability.  The screening hypothesis was thus not a sufficient explanation 
for the distribution of personal income distribution either.  While radical political 
economy acknowledged neoclassical economics’ contribution to the theory of 
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personal income distribution, its explanations of personal income distribution 
were incorrect.  Marxist dissatisfaction with neoclassical theories of personal 
income distribution led to the formation of their own theory of personal income 
distribution: segmented labor market theory.  
Segmented Labor Market Theory
 While human capital theory explained differences in personal income 
levels through a neoclassical perspective, segmented labor market theory sought to 
explain personal income distribution in a Marxian framework.  In this framework, 
“political and economic forces within American capitalism have given rise to and 
perpetuated segmented labor markets, and … it is incorrect to view the sources of 
segmented labor markets as exogenous to the economic system” (Reich, Gordon, 
and Edwards, 359).  Instead of contending that the personal distribution of income 
was determined by the functional aspect of production, proponents of segmented 
labor market theory argued that it was mainly the result of the social aspect of 
production.  Wages and productivities applied to the jobs themselves, rather than 
the individual workers occupying those positions (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 694). 
Similar to the divide in classical political economy between Ricardo and Marx, a 
split between neoclassicals and a group influenced by Marxism developed during 
the renaissance of income distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.
 Segmented labor market theorists differentiated between primary and 
secondary labor markets.  The primary labor market comprised firms with market 
power, sustainable sources of income, and the ability to pay above-subsistence 
wages (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 689).  Firms in this sector could afford to pay 
for training for their employees because their market power allowed them to pass 
some of the cost to consumers.  Firms also invested in human capital to increase the 
productivity of their workers.  Consistent with Marxism, members of a relatively 
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small group whose size was maintained by rigid entry requirements earned high 
incomes while most workers toiled away in unattractive and unfulfilling jobs. 
And since firms in the primary sector invested significant resources in training and 
physical capital, jobs in this sector required stable working habits.  The primary 
labor market thus provided relatively stable employment.  Due to higher wages 
and greater stability, jobs in this sector were highly valued.  Poor people were not 
excluded from the primary segment merely for being lazy or lacking the capacity 
for human capital necessary for entry into the primary segment.  The institutional 
framework of the capitalist system artificially restricted entry into the primary 
labor market (ibid., 694).  Poor people were poor mostly due to employment 
prospects restricted to the secondary labor market.    
 Jobs in the secondary sector were much less secure.  Unstable product 
demand prevented firms from ensuring long-term employment.  Furthermore, 
production processes in this segment were labor-intensive and involved simple 
or repetitive tasks so workers were interchangeable.  Stable working habits were 
discouraged as a result and there was little opportunity for career advancement. 
The secondary labor market was connected to the primary labor market through 
such means as subcontracting but “many adults are unable to escape from it and 
spend much or all of their lives there” (ibid., 690).  Secondary workers thus played 
an important role in the economy because the primary sector was dependent 
upon their employment for such services as subcontracting, but they were also 
expendable.  In effect, the secondary labor market was the modern Marxists’ 
equivalent to the reserve army of the unemployed.  Competition kept wages low 
among a group of people without which the economy could not function.  
 Labor market segmentation went beyond this general distinction between 
primary and secondary sectors.  Piore (1972) further segmented the primary labor 
sector into upper and lower tiers.  Workers in the upper tier held management jobs, 
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which conferred higher status and pay, and greater economic security.  There were 
relatively high turnover rates but this was attributed to career advancement rather 
than termination.  Members of the lower tier of the primary sector were regularly 
employed blue collar workers.  Workers adhered to a strict set of work rules that 
were predicated upon the hegemonic relationship between worker and supervisor. 
Each segment had a different “mobility chain” that signified the opportunity for 
career advancement (Piore, 1972, 6).  Workers in the upper tier had the most 
opportunity for promotion, the lower tier was more rigid, whereas there was little 
chance for advancement in the secondary labor market.  
 Race was cited as one of the primary causes of labor market segmentation. 
Segmentation by race arose from “certain jobs that are ‘race-typed,’ segregated 
by prejudice and labor market institutions,” (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 360). 
This was compounded by geographic separation of employment opportunities, 
which hindered the flow of labor.  Harrison (1972) found that underemployment 
and poverty persisted in urban ghettoes, due to a lack of economic opportunity 
for minorities.  Minorities were considerably limited to a selection of “typically 
urban” jobs that prevented workers from fully recognizing their productive 
potentials (Harrison, 1972, 811).  There were thus jobs that were often associated 
with specific races located in specific geographic areas.  According to segmented 
labor markets, social institutions were the most important factor in determining 
the distribution of personal income.  Workers with higher levels of productivity 
did earn higher incomes, but the access to investments that increased productivity 
was determined by social institutions prevailing at the time. 
 Segmented labor market theory presented a heterodox alternative in 
the proliferation of theories of personal income distribution in the mid-twentieth 
century.  While human capital theory offered an explanation for personal income 
distribution within a marginal productivity framework, segmented labor market 
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theory stressed the importance of social institutions to the determination of 
income distribution among individuals.  It therefore appeared that two polemic 
approaches to the analysis of personal income distribution developed during the 
renaissance of income distribution analysis.       
    
V. Reconciling Human Capital Theory and Segmented Labor Market 
Theory
 Previous work has been done comparing the relationship between 
mainstream orthodox economics and the heterodox alternative.  Rebitzer (1993) 
argued that “radical and mainstream neoclassical labor economics have exerted 
an important influence on the other” (Rebitzer, 1396).  A relationship could 
therefore be drawn between the two, despite their presumably opposed theoretical 
foundations.  But despite making this connection, Rebitzer treats neoclassical and 
radical approaches to labor market segmentation separately (ibid., 1412).  Thus 
while there was significant overlap between the competing theories of personal 
income distribution, they were still distinct.  A closer examination of the human 
capital theory and segmented labor market theory literature, however, reveals an 
even greater degree of overlap than suggested by Rebitzer, so much so that they 
effectively become identical.  
 The treatment of class conflict by human capital theory was one of 
the major points of contention segmented labor market theorists had with the 
orthodox approach to personal income distribution.  Proponents of segmented 
labor markets argued that human capital theory “formally excludes the relevance 
of class and class conflict to the explication of labor market phenomena” (Bowles 
and Gintis, 75).  One of the fundamental underpinnings that segmented labor 
market theorists built upon when responding to human capital theory was the 
argument that human capital theory artificially resolved class conflict by making 
everyone a capitalist.  Segmented labor market theorists believed that the persistent 
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significance of sorting workers into groups “is neither explained nor predicted 
by orthodox theory” (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 359).  Although segmented 
labor market theory championed itself as a theory of personal income distribution 
that had corrected the theoretical flaws in human capital theory, it was not the 
dramatic departure from orthodox theory promised.  Reconciliation between these 
competing theories is therefore not only possible, but relatively straightforward.  
It is not entirely correct for critics of human capital theory to argue that it 
“predicts that labor market differences among groups will decline over time” (ibid., 
359).  Human capital theorists implicitly acknowledged the importance of social 
institutions when explaining how individuals decided on the amount of human 
capital to invest in.  Accumulation of human capital was restricted by “legal and 
other obstacles to financing investment in human capital” (Becker and Chiswick, 
1966, 359).  Important social institutions such as inheritance of property income 
and availability of scholarships and loans were crucial factors that workers had to 
consider when making their investment decisions regarding human capital.  Since 
the type of employment available to applicants was determined by the amount 
of training and education they embodied, social institutions had direct influence 
on the personal distribution of income in human capital theory.  The influence of 
social institutions was thus an integral part of human capital theory and served 
to perpetuate differences between groups of workers.  To argue that differences 
between groups would decline over time necessarily implies a convergence of 
social institutions that allowed everyone equal opportunity to invest in human 
capital, and that everyone benefited equally from this investment.  
 More importantly, segmented labor markets themselves are implicitly 
developed in human capital theory.  The type of profession available to workers, 
according to human capital theory, depended on their investment in human capital. 
Once people decide how much to invest, they are effectively sorted into labor 
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market segments according to the level of training they have acquired.  Workers 
then remain in their assigned segment.  Human capital theorists develop their 
concept of segmented labor markets by referring to the stream of income as the 
life-path of earnings determined by investment in human capital.  The notion of 
mobility chains held by segmented labor market theorists articulated a similar 
progression.  Furthermore, both theories speak of stations as points along the life-
path of earnings or mobility chain. 
Mincer (1958) effectively argued that workers were more unlikely 
to switch professions in other industries and job categories once they decided 
how much to invest in human capital because life-paths of earnings existed for 
each occupation.  Jobs could be sorted by “occupational rank” (Mincer, 1958, 
288).   Higher occupational rank led to higher income and greater social standing, 
which resulted in steeper life-paths of earnings.  Workers gained experience and 
became more productive the longer they remained in a profession and moved 
up their respective life-paths of earnings (ibid., 287).  There was therefore little 
incentive for workers to switch professions.  They would not be able to obtain 
a job of higher occupational rank because they invested too little in human 
capital and were thus unqualified for such positions.  Switching to a profession 
of lower occupational rank was irrational because doing so required sacrificing a 
steeper life-path of earning for a flatter life-path of earning, as well as movement 
down the new life-path of earning to reflect the lost experience from switching 
professions.  Segmented labor market theory therefore essentially reiterated the 
notion of segmented labor markets developed by human capital theory.  
 Entry into stations occupying the primary labor market of segmented 
labor market theory was similarly regulated in human capital theory.  Segmented 
labor market theory argued that “the educational system does much more than 
produce human capital,” (Bowles and Gintis, 1975, 78).  Segmented labor market 
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theorists believed that the existence of meritocratic society that gave members of 
one group power over another group.  While there was small window for young 
workers to escape the secondary labor market, most did not.  Only those who 
obtained “bridge” jobs in such fields as metal-working could facilitate inter-
segment mobility (Osterman, 1975, 514).  Workers who were unable to enter 
the primary labor market early were trapped in the secondary labor market. 
Human capital theory developed rigid barriers to entry to labor markets prior to 
the development of segmented labor market theory.  The belief that entry into 
professions was regulated by investment in human capital implied the existence 
of a meritocratic society from a human capital theory perspective.  Furthermore, 
windows of opportunity were also an important aspect of human capital theory. 
Once individuals decided how much human capital to invest in, their window 
of opportunity effectively closed because they had sorted themselves into their 
respective professions.            
 There is thus a common perception of segmented labor markets and a 
labor market hierarchy.  Both human capital and segmented labor market theories 
of personal income distribution promoted the notion of a rigid stratification of the 
labor market in which “each occupation is seen as a set in a stratum of society 
defined by income and way of life” (Brown, 1977, 118).  Workers will be sorted 
into their stations at a fairly early age.  Segmented labor market theory argues 
that this sorting is governed by social institutions. Human capital theory argues 
that it is determined by the level of investment made in human capital, which 
itself is influenced by social institutions.  But regardless of how this sorting is 
actually conducted, both human capital theory and segmented labor theory argue 
that its effects are lasting.  Once the sorting process is completed, it is uncommon 
for workers to move between segments.  Thus contrary to a gradual decline in 
differences between groups of workers, human capital theory implies that there 
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is a tendency for them to endure, and even strengthen, over time.  A worker 
sorted into a lower segment of the labor market was not likely to move into the 
upper segment and subsequently propagate the benefits of greater opportunity for 
investment in human capital upon future generations.  
 It is therefore difficult for supporters of segmented labor market theory 
to criticize human capital theory when the implications of each theory of personal 
income distribution are so similar.  Human capital theory argues that segmented 
labor markets are the result of individual choice.  People face constraints on the 
amount of human capital they can invest in, but within these constraints people are 
free to choose any level of investment they want.  While segmented labor market 
theory also shows how labor market segmentation persists, it treats the origins 
of labor market segmentation as exogenous: the prevailing social institutions 
determined where in the labor market hierarchy an individual ultimately ended up. 
The largest theoretical difference between the two is thus a matter of endogeneity. 
This is ironic because Bowles and Gintis cite “the assumption of exogenously 
determined individual preferences” as a shortcoming of human capital theory 
while failing to recognize that segmented labor market theory is endogenous only 
to the extent that it explains how segmented labor markets reproduce themselves 
from an exogenously determined origin (Bowles and Gintis, 81).  
 The above criticisms are based on the argument that human capital theory 
does not account for the importance of social institutions in the determination 
of an individual’s income.  Yet as the discussion above demonstrates, this 
argument can be clearly and concisely refuted.  Human capital theory implicitly 
incorporates social institutions into its theoretical framework, and does develop 
a notion of segmented labor markets, but it is not manifested in the same way 
as segmented labor market theory.  The influence of social institutions is much 
more implicit in human capital theory because human capital theory implicitly 
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factors them into individual decisions to invest in human capital.  Therefore a 
more accurate assessment of human capital theory is that human capital theory 
assumes that individual incomes are determined by the level of investment made 
by individuals, given their unique constraints which are the product of social 
institutions.  Segmented labor market theory makes these constraints much more 
rigid, diminishing the impact of individual choice.  This, however, does not 
preclude the undeniable similarities underpinning the theoretical frameworks of 
orthodox and heterodox theories of personal income distribution, respectively. 
 
VI. Conclusion
 To argue that the late-twentieth century ushered income distribution 
in from the cold implies that its importance to economic theory had faded and 
needed to be revived.  It is important to recognize the renaissance of income 
distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.  Atkinson failed to acknowledge 
the important contributions of human capital and segmented labor market theories 
of personal income distribution, instead choosing to cite development economics 
as the primary focus of income distribution in the twentieth century.  In reality the 
twentieth century saw a great debate emerge over competing theories of personal 
income distribution, a debate that appeared to represent a wider gap than the one 
between classical and Marxian class theories of income distribution. 
 Ricardo and Marx developed class theories of income distribution to 
explain the class conflict that dominated European society during the rise of 
classical political economy.  Each acknowledged the importance of the rate of 
profit to class distributions of income, but from this common point of emphasis 
their analyses diverged considerably.  The divergence in class theories of income 
distribution was due primarily to competing beliefs about the sustainability of the 
capitalist system of production.  Ricardo believed a falling rate of profit regulated 
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capitalist accumulation: capitalists were competitive but could coexist.  Marx, 
on the other hand, deemed capitalism unsustainable.  The capitalist thirst for 
accumulation was driven by an eat-or-be-eaten urgency.  Accumulation meant 
survival and as capital became more concentrated, capitalist oppression grew to 
such an extent that it would help spark a proletariat uprising. 
 Neither Ricardo nor Marx attempted to develop a theory of personal 
income distribution because the labor force at the time was relatively homogenous, 
and they were living during an era of intense class competition, as evidenced by the 
Corn Laws.  The primary concerns facing economists during the era of classical 
political economy were thus much more related to classes than individuals.  The 
dominance of class theories of income distribution persisted until Clark introduced 
the notion that factors were paid according to their marginal productivity.  He 
did not explain how marginal productivity was determined, however, choosing 
instead to merely state that there was a relationship between the two.  Neoclassical 
economists developed theories of personal income distribution that sufficiently 
explained how marginal productivity influenced income.  Human capital theory 
emerged as an important theory of personal income distribution but faced many 
critics.  One group of critics, heavily influenced by Marxism, argued that income 
distribution on the individual level was determined by the social institutions of 
capitalist society.  They developed segmented labor market theory in response 
to human capital theory and it appeared that an even greater divide over income 
distribution theory surfaced than the one between Ricardo and Marx.  
 Growing interest in discrimination and increasing heterogeneity of the 
labor force also encouraged the development of theories of personal income 
distribution.  In short, the consensus that all labor was easily substitutable, 
which had persisted since classical political economy, began to break down. 
Economists began operating under the assumption that laborers were not easily 
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interchangeable.  Drawing upon the limitations of Clark’s The Distribution of 
Wealth, numerous theories of personal income distribution were developed. 
Among them, human capital theory and segmented labor market theory emerged 
as the most influential orthodox and heterodox theories, respectively.  
 Yet upon closer examination, the presumed differences between human 
capital theory and segmented labor market theory can be reconciled to a large 
extent.  Segmented labor market theory faults human capital theory for ignoring 
the role of social institutions and a segmented labor-force in the distribution of 
personal income.  Human capital theory, however, implies that labor markets 
are segmented, and that barriers to entry in the labor market are largely due to 
social institutions.  Workers were sorted according to the amount of human capital 
they embodied.  Investment in human capital, which was constrained by the 
environment produced by social institutions, thus acted as a barrier to entry.  The 
most significant difference between the two is the amount of freedom in workers’ 
initial employment decisions.  Human capital theory argues that segmented labor 
markets are essentially a product of individual choice while segmented labor 
market theory asserts that segmented labor markets are pre-assigned. 
 Not only were there numerous important contributions to income 
distribution theory during the period it was supposedly out in the cold, a close 
connection between human capital and segmented labor market theories of personal 
income distribution developed.  Segmented labor market theory was essentially 
a modification of human capital theory, placing more explicit emphasis on the 
role of social institutions in the explanation of individual income distribution. 
Although this distinction may seem nuanced, it is important to recognize that 
segmented labor market theory is not entirely redundant.  Segmented labor market 
theory stresses the importance of social institutions while human capital theory 
acknowledges their influence much more implicitly.  Professor Atkinson may have 
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had a valid argument that income distribution theory had become too focused on 
development economics, but the twentieth century was the most important era of 
income distribution analysis since classical political economy.
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China’s Local Government Debt and Economic Growth
By Tom Zhou
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of China’s local government debt on economic 
growth. This analysis, based on a panel of 31 provinces over 14 years, takes 
into account a broad range of economic growth determinants as well as various 
estimation issues including heteroskedascity and omitted variable. The empirical 
results suggest an inverse relationship between China’s local government debt and 
economic growth, controlling for other determinants of growth: on average, a 10 
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown 
in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.27 percentage points per year
I. Introduction:
             The financial crisis of 2007-2008, which originated in the United 
States, was considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. It not only dragged down many financial 
institutions in the U.S., but it also triggered the most severe economic contraction 
in many foreign countries. Even though China, an export-led growth country, has 
enjoyed double digit growth for the past ten years, China’s economy was also 
threatened by economic contraction in the West. Fortunately, China’s economic 
growth soon reclaimed lost ground thanks to a 4 trillion Yuan (USD 586 billion) 
fiscal stimulus package aimed to upgrade infrastructure and transportation and 
modernize different industries (Yerxa, 2011). Although the stimulus package 
received lot applause for boosting growth and reviving the economic contraction, 
it raised the leverage ratio for China’s government. Most importantly, the credit 
loosening due to the stimulus plan has increased debt burdens for local Chinese 
governments. As a matter of fact, the collapse of many private lending facilities 
in Wen Zhou, an eastern city in Zhejiang Province, which was well known for its 
exporting business, and other major cities in other provinces drew a lot of public 
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attention to the health of China’s public debt especially at provincial level (Caixin 
Magazine online, December, 2011).  
 Even though the worries that some local governments were not able to 
pay back their debts after series of default events in many local cities in 2010 
were intensified, it is still not clear whether China’s local government debts has a 
significant impact on China’s economic growth. Most of current studies on China’s 
local government debts rely on news analysis and observation. For instance, the 
debt problem in Wen Zhou in 2010 drew a lot of attention from domestic and 
foreign news media. Bloomberg, one of the most influencing financial media, 
released a news report saying that, “China’s first audit of local government debt 
found liabilities of 10.7 trillion yuan ($1.7 trillion) at the end of last year and 
warned of repayment risks, including a reliance on land sales” (Bloomberg news, 
2011). Professional economists and fiscal pundits such as Nouriel Roubini, an 
economics professor at New York University’s School of Business, start publishing 
paper to question the health of local government’s fiscal policy. Some of studies 
may have a convincing inside story to conclude that the current borrowing level 
carried by local government has detrimental effect on China’s fiscal sustainability. 
However, whether or not the growing amount of debts held by local governments 
has negative effect on China’s economic growth is still unclear at this stage. 
 Recently, there have been a lot researches focusing on the relationship 
between government debt and economic growth. Also, many literatures identify the 
determinants of China’s economic growth. Among all the literatures focusing on 
the impact of government debt on economic growth, Kumar and Woo (2010) did a 
distinguished job by providing an empirical analysis on the impact of high public 
debt on long-run economic growth based on a panel of advanced and emerging 
economies over four decades. Besides focusing on government debts, they also 
include a broad range of determinants of growth. Their empirical results suggest 
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an inverse relationship between government debt level and economic growth, 
controlling for other determinants of growth. Besides the international evidence 
of impact of government debts on economic growth, Lin (2003) identifies the 
components of China’s government debt, which comprises domestic and foreign 
debt. He concludes that risk of foreign debt is very low for China since China’s 
foreign exchange reserves are much higher than total foreign debt outstanding. 
For China’s domestic government debt, it is more complicated because domestic 
debt consists of explicit fiscal deficits, local government debt, state banks’ non-
performing loans, and fiscal subsidies made to social security funds (Lin, 2003). 
Lin (2003) attributes the local government debt to the tax system adopted in 1994. 
Since local government cannot get enough revenue from tax due to the shared 
tax collecting with central government, they have been running deficits since 
1994. Lin (2003) concludes that if current tax system remains unchanged, local 
government debts accumulated from fiscal deficits will cause a serious trouble.  
 However, what the two literatures above and other literatures focusing 
on government debt and economic growth in China have not identified is the 
impact of China’s local government debt. Most importantly, what Lin (2003) 
did not emphasize is that the true cause of local government debt after the 1994 
tax reform comes from local financing platform, which this paper will delve into 
later. As a result, this paper intends to fill up the research gap by answering the 
main question of the paper: does local government debt in China have significant 
impact on China’s economic growth?  In order to answer the question, this paper 
will contribute to the empirical literature on the relationship between china’s 
local government debt and economic growth by first providing a comprehensive 
historical analysis on local fiscal policy and implementation plan in China and 
then constructing a panel regression model by using cross provincial dataset. This 
regression model will include provincial GDP per capita growth from 1994 to 
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2011 as dependent variable and local debts and other determinants of economic 
growth from 1994 to 2011 as independent variables. And finally, this paper will 
run regressions to test whether local government debt has significant impact on 
China’s economic growth. 
 The results, based on a range of econometric techniques such as ordinary 
least squares (OLS), fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE), suggest an inverse 
relationship between local government debt and economic growth, controlling for 
other determinants of growth: on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP 
growth of around 0.27 percentage points per year. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 has four main 
parts. Part one provides an economic theory of government debt. Part two reviews 
the empirical evidence of government debt. Part three reviews China’s fiscal 
history and fiscal structure at local government. Part four highlights the debates 
from economists and reiterates this paper’s key contributions. Section 3 introduces 
the modeling and data. Section 4 discusses and interprets the regression results. 
Section 5 concludes with further research suggestions. 
II. Literature Review
A.  Economic theory of government debt
 Before going too deep into China’s local government debt problems, two 
critical questions are raised: why do high debt levels affect future growth, and 
how does high debt level affect future growth? From a conventional view, the 
government’s debt policy affects the economy both in the short run and in the 
long run. Government debt and deficit is interrelated because a country with a 
large debt have difficulty to finance annual deficits through more borrowing and, 
consequently, will be more likely to raise tax to collect more revenue. Therefore, 
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we begin analyzing the effect of debt on economic growth by discussing the short-
run effects of budget deficits.
 In the short run, if the government creates a budget deficit by holding 
spending constant and reducing tax revenue, this policy will raise households’ 
current disposable income. Based on the Keynesian view, the increases in income 
and wealth boost household spending on consumption goods and thereby, raise 
the aggregate demand for goods and services. In the long run, suppose that the 
government holds spending constant and reduces tax revenue, this policy creates 
a budget deficit and decreases public saving assumed the economy follows this 
identity:
Where S is private saving, T is taxes, G is government purchases of goods and 
services, I is domestic investment, and NFI is net foreign investment. The left side 
of this equation is national saving, which is the sum of private and public saving 
while the right side indicates save funds for investment at home and abroad. This 
identity is also a description of the market for loanable funds (Elmendorf and 
Mankiw, 1998). 
 If we adopt the conventional view that private saving rises by less than 
public saving falls, then national saving declines. After national saving declines, 
total domestic investment may decline as well because the sum of private and 
public saving equals to the sum of investment and net export. Reduced domestic 
investment will cause domestic capital stock to shrink, which implies lower 
output and income. The marginal product of capital will be higher after total 
capital becomes less and less. The rising marginal product of capital causes 
the interest rate to rise. Meanwhile, labor productivity would decrease, thereby 
reducing the average the average real wage and total labor income. (Elmendorf 
and Mankiw, 1998) As a result, the lack of domestic investment and the reduction 
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in productivity will drag down the total output in the economy, and thereby 
slowdown the economic growth.  
 Despite the short term and long term effect of government’s debt policy, 
debt financing is the center of financial system nowadays. Countries cannot 
flourish without borrowing. When individuals have the ability to borrow to 
expand their consumption level, the overall demand in the economy becomes 
stronger. When business owners have the ability to borrow to expand their firms, 
they are expanding the capacity of the economy to generate more jobs and 
demands. However, past experiences teach us that we cannot borrow forever 
because high leverage ratios create instability. As debt level increases, borrowers’ 
ability to repay becomes more sensitive to drop in asset prices and increase in 
interest rate because once the prices of their collaterals drop, they are no longer 
considered as creditworthy. After a series of default happens, lenders start to lose 
faith in the market and to scale back their lending. Once the entire credit line 
breaks, consumption and investment fall.  Afterward, high unemployment rate 
and insufficient aggregate demand will drag the real economy down. The real 
economy will experience an even worse economic downturn if the level of debt 
before crisis is enormous (Cecchetti et al, 2009).  
B.   Empirical Evidence of Government Debt           
 In order to see whether government debt problem poses a significant 
effect on China’s economic growth, we have to find an accurate model that can 
capture the effect of debt on economic growth.  Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) 
develop a model using data from 105 countries consisting of both advanced 
and emerging economies from the past twenty years to analyze the relationship 
between the public leverage ratio (debt-to-GDP ratio) and average GDP growth. 
Based on their calculation, they come up with a threshold for debt-to-GDP ratio. 
When the debt-to-GDP ratio rises above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by 
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one percent, and average growth falls considerably more. Also, they find that the 
thresholds for both advanced and emerging economies are similar even though 
emerging economies will more likely face a worse economic downturn when 
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent. Moreover, emerging markets face a lower 
threshold for external debt, which is usually denominated in a foreign currency. 
When external debt in emerging economy exceeds 60 percent of GDP, annual 
growth declines by about two percent (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). In addition, 
high debt level not only limits country’s long run economic growth, but it also 
limits the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
 However, the model developed by Rogoff and Reinhart does not take 
reverse causality into account. High debt can potentially lower the future economic 
growth, but low economic growth also can cause debt to grow in the long run. 
As a result, analyzing government debt requires a more comprehensive model 
because economic growth is determined by many factors ranging from political 
structures to cultural aspect. If a model cannot fully cover all the determinants 
of economic growth, the impact of debt on economic growth is biased.  In a 
paper written by Robert Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of 
Countries (1997), he provided a framework to analyze the factors that determine 
the economic growth rate in different countries. He derives his model from the 
hypothesis from the neoclassical growth model that poorer countries typically 
grow faster per capita at initial level and thereby catch up with the richer countries. 
The convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth model implies that the growth 
rate of real per capita GDP during a time period would tend to be inversely related 
to the level of real per capita GDP in the initial year. In this model,
Where g is the growth rate of per capita output, y is the current level of per capita 
output, and  is the steady-state level of per capita output. If the current level of 
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per capita output, y, is high, the growth rate of per capita output, g, will diminish 
for a given steady-state level of per capita output,. If holding the current level of 
per capita output constant, the growth rate of per capita output will increase with 
a rise in the steady-state level of per capita output, because the improvements in 
external conditions such as government regulations, law, and market openness, 
are beneficial to the long-run growth of the economy. The steady-state level of per 
capita output  is determined by a number of factors comprising social, economic, 
cultural and demographic. In addition, the steady-state level of per capita output 
is also determined by political factors such as the degree of political freedom, the 
extent of market efficiency, and size of government expenditure (Barro, 1996). 
 Barro’s model provides a frame work to analyze the determinants of 
economic growth even though he does not take government debt into account. 
To test whether government debt has significant effect on economic growth 
empirically, debt has to be added as a new variable into the model. Recently, the 
empirical literature on debt and economic growth has grown. But many of those 
growth regressions used in the literature have many shortcomings. Instead of 
focusing on a few socioeconomic variables that are statistically significant, they 
tend to include as many variables as possible to mitigate omitted variable bias. 
Even though they may correct omitted variable bias, they commit multicollinearity 
errors where two or more predictor variables in a multiple regression model are 
highly correlated. As a result, it is better to focus on a core set of explanatory 
variables that have shown a strong and consistent relationship with economic 
growth. If there are some extra variables that are important to explain economic 
growth, we can include them in the model while keeping the same core variables. 
 Specifically, the findings of Kumar and Woo (2010) select the core 
sets of growth determinants, which are consistent with Barro’s model. Besides 
selecting the core sets of growth determinants, Kumar and Woo utilizes a variety 
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of estimation methodologies, such as pooled OLS, robust regression, between 
estimator, fixed effects panel regression, and system GMM (SGMM) dynamic 
regression to capture the effect of government debt on economic growth. Since there 
are many sources of bias that can result in inconsistent estimates of the coefficients 
in panel regressions ranging from omitted-variables bias to endogeneity, using 
different estimation methodologies will mitigate them. The econometric results 
from Kumar and Woo (2010) suggest an inverse relationship between initial debt 
and subsequent growth after controlling for other determinants of growth: a 10 
percentage point increase initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown 
in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year. On 
average, a 10 percentage point increase in initial debt is associated with a decline 
of investment by about 0.4 percentage points of GDP.  Cecchetti et al (2009) use 
similar methodology analyzing data from OECD to conclude that high debt is 
bad for growth. When public debt is above 85 percent of GDP, further increases 
in debt may begin to have a negative impact on growth. More specifically, a 1 
percentage point increase in corporate debt is associated with an approximately 
2 basis point reduction in per capita GDP growth. A 1 percentage point rise in 
household debt-to-GDP is associated with a 2.5 basis point reduction in growth. 
 While the cross-country empirical results from Kumar and Woo (2010) 
and Cecchetti et al (2008) conclude the negative effect of government on economic 
growth despite of the size of economy, they have not emphasized the importance 
of local government debts especially in China. Even though a lot of previous 
literature helps explain and identify the determinants of China’s economic growth, 
only a few of them start to emphasize the importance of China local government 
debt on China economic growth in recent years.  However, finding the variables 
that best explain China’s economic growth is still very challenging due to the 
uniqueness of China’s economic structure. Most importantly, just like what 
111
Lin(2003) mentions in his paper, “No one knows exactly how large is the local 
government debt. It is believed that township government debt is widespread and 
severe.” Because of this, finding the correct variable to represent China’s local 
government debt is a very challenging task for this paper. Therefore, the first step 
before constructing a model that explains the effect of China local government 
debt on China’s economic growth is to review the history of China’s fiscal policy 
at provincial level. 
C.   China’s fiscal history and local government’s fiscal structure
 China’s debt problems are much more complicated than developed 
countries because China’s unique political system yields a different fiscal 
policy implementation plan. Before going to empirical analysis of China’s local 
government debt, we have to review the history of fiscal policy and the fiscal 
structure of China’s local government. 
 After Deng Xiaoping introduced the market economy to China in 1980, 
China’s economy started to take off. Between 1980 and 1999, the average growth 
rate of China’s GDP was around 9.5 percent. However, the robust growth of China’s 
economy did not increase the central government’s revenue because the tax system 
implemented in 1980 was not efficient enough to generate revenue for central 
government. The budgetary revenue-to-GDP ratio decreased from 28.4% in 1979 
to 12.6% 1993. Most importantly, the central government revenue-to-total revenue 
ratio decreased from 46.8% in 1979 to 31.6% in 1993 (Zhu, 2007). The insufficient 
revenue in central government diminished its authority in the implementation of 
fiscal policy. The central government was sometimes forced to borrow money from 
other local governments between 1980 and 1990 (Zhu, 2007). 
 One of the main reason that central government could not collect 
enough revenue to support its expenditure was China’s centralized fiscal system, 
which relied on local government agencies to collect revenues for transfer to 
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the national treasury. Each local government had an assigned duty to collect a 
certain amount of tax by the end of each year. In return, the central government 
assigned re-transferring revenues to local governments’ budgets. Because such 
a policy was basically a part of socialist planned economy, where everyone eats 
from the same pot, local governments had no incentives to promote the local 
economy. In addition, in order to address the insufficient revenue, China’s central 
bank, People’s Bank of China, had to print more money to ensure that there 
was enough money circulating around the economy. Such an aggressive money 
printing policy eventually resulted in the risk of high inflation. Many economists 
and policymakers in China during that time started to worry about the central 
government’s fiscal authority, and called reform in the tax system. However, 
because of different political interests, the tax reform did not take place until 1994 
after a series of fiscal crises in central government (Zhu, 2007). 
 To address problem of inefficient fiscal policy, China’s Prime Minister, 
Zhu Rongji, who was an economist himself and a devout follower of Milton 
Friedman, decentralized China’s tax system in 1994 by introducing a new tax 
system called the Tax Sharing System although he was under a lot political pressure 
from different interest groups. Before 1994 reform, there were three categories of 
taxes levied in China: the industrial and commercial tax, tariff, and the agriculture 
tax (Zhu, 2007). The three main taxes were controlled by central government. The 
new tax sharing system introduced in 1994 basically separated the tax revenue 
collected by central and local governments. The tax revenue (not tax legislation), 
according to the new sharing system, is divided in a way that some taxes are 
exclusively assigned to the central level, some are assigned exclusively to the 
local level, and some taxes are shared between both levels based on a fixed ratio. 
For central government, the tax revenue comes from taxes such as consumption 
tax, tariffs, vehicle acquisition tax, and business tax. For local government, the 
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tax revenue comes from taxes such as urban maintenance and construction tax, 
vehicle and vessel usage license tax, and orientation adjustment tax on investment 
in fixed asset. Since VAT (Value-added Tax) and income tax are the two largest 
tax revenues, they are divided between the central and local level. For VAT, the 
central level takes 75% while the local level takes 25%. For both individual and 
Enterprise Income Tax, the central level takes 60% and local level takes 40%. The 
new tax sharing system basically left local government no choice but to generate 
as much tax revenue as it could to support its annual expenditure level. As a result, 
the new tax sharing system provides incentives for local governments to generate 
more tax revenues by promoting their local economies (Zhu, 2007). 
 However, although the new tax system was designed to generate more 
revenue for the central government, it also limits the range of tax revenues 
collected by local government. From 1960 to 1985, local governments had budget 
surpluses. From 1986 to 1993, even though local government started experiencing 
deficits in some years due to the fixed asset investments, they soon recovered the 
“lost ground” in following years. But the tax reform in 1994 changed everything. 
Local government budgets jumped from a surplus of 6.1 billion yuan in average 
in 1993 to a deficit of 172.7 billion yuan in average in 1994 (Lin, 2003). Basically, 
starting in 1994, almost every local government from 31 provinces had a budget 
deficit each year. In addition, since China is currently undergoing massive 
infrastructure spending in different provinces after 1994, the local governments 
have to find another way to come up with more funds besides tax revenue to fund 
their building projects. 
 However, no matter how fast a local economy can develop, its economic 
capacity cannot expand without enough budget revenue to support. Since even 
the richest provincial government such as Guangdong province, one of the first 
provinces to experience market reform in 1980 had a hard time to collect enough 
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revenue to finance their annual budget deficit. Moreover, because the tax and 
budget reforms enacted in 1994 prohibit local governments from issuing bonds, 
the local governments could not simply issue debt to finance their projects. After 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the local governments came up with a new way 
to generate more funds. The law forbids the local governments to issue debts 
directly, but it doesn’t prohibit them to generate funds indirectly by setting up an 
entity called the Local Financing Platform (LFP) (Walter and Howie, 2011).
 These LFPs provide non-tax revenue to local governments to fund their 
operating budgets. Their sources of fund come from bank loans. But the question 
is how those LFPs can secure bank loans that local governments cannot obtain 
directly. In order to circumvent restrictions on local government borrowing from 
bank, local governments create corporations that act as the borrowers to obtain 
loans from banks. These corporations consist of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
and local incorporated investment companies. Sometimes they combine together 
to form a financial entity such as a private equity or a fund management company. 
The mechanism of the local government funding process through Local Financing 
Platform is not hard to comprehend. Basically, local governments contribute lands 
to local financing platforms and provide tax subsidies for them. The LFPs have 
lands as collaterals to borrow money from banks. Meanwhile, the LFPs use the 
lands they obtained from local governments to develop infrastructure projects 
such as high ways, railways, and airports. One the one hand, these infrastructure 
projects is beneficial to those LFPs because they solely control the profits from 
these projects. For example, China Railway Company was one of the biggest LFPs 
in northern China before the head of this company was arrested in 2010 because 
of corruption. They controlled 99% of railways in northern China. More than half 
of the profits made from ticket selling and cargo shipping goes to this company. 
They not only used the profits to develop more railways, but they also started 
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developing real estate projects in Beijing, Tianjing, and other major metropolitans 
in China to expand their financial influence. On the other hand, these projects 
developed by LFPs are beneficial to local economy. When a new railway or real 
estate project starts, they need more workers to work and more raw materials 
such as cement and steel to build bridges and airports, and thereby increase total 
industrial outputs at local level. That is why some provinces such as Guangdong, 
the biggest provinces in southern China, and Zhejiang, the biggest provinces in 
eastern China, experienced accelerating economic growth in recent years. 
 While the LFPs start developing projects, they secure more loans for 
local governments to finance their deficits. Since local governments need to pay 
wages to their employees, to provide funding for public schools, and to pay for 
healthcare payments to local government staff, the amount of revenue they get 
annually cannot cover their expenditure level due to the 1994 tax reform. After 
LFPs get loans from banks that are owned by the state by providing lands as 
collateral, local governments no longer experienced insufficient funds. Also, local 
governments can invest in those LFPs, which issue primary shares, to become one 
of the largest shareholders who can get dividend payment every year. Meanwhile, 
the LFP can issue municipal bonds backed by local government and sell them to 
bank and municipal bond investors. Then the cash obtained from bonds sell goes 
to local government to finance their budget deficits and other expenditures. Thus, 
the local financing platform serves as an agent to pass the loans from bank to 
local government (Walter and Howie, 2011). On the surface, this funding process 
between local governments and LFPs are mutually beneficial. Local governments 
do not have to beg money from central government in Beijing to finance their 
budget deficits and infrastructure projects. LFPs can get the lands for their projects 
at an artificially low price. Also, they can pay fewer taxes than other corporations 
especially private corporations. 
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 Theoretically, the whole funding process should work perfectly well 
under a high economic growth because the platform’s capacity for borrowing 
money from banks depends on the value of the collateral, which is mostly land. 
Because LFPs use the lands to develop real estate projects such as office buildings, 
resident houses, and shopping malls and other infrastructure projects, the price of 
the land might triple due to the increase in demands for housing or rental business. 
The repercussion of the increase in price of this land will spread to lands nearby. 
If the economic growth does not slow down in the near future, the price of lands 
will increase for a long period. The more valuable the land, the more money the 
LFPs can borrow from banks. Most importantly, those loans backed by the lands 
will not turn sour if the price of land is still very attractive for investment. 
          However, once the economic growth starts to slow down, it will be unclear 
whether the loans obtained by LFP to fund local government budget deficits and 
expenditures become a Chinese style of “subprime mortgage crisis”. Recently, 
because of global economic slowdown, China cannot immune from the global 
repercussion.  China’s GDP growth went down from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.6% in 
2008 due to the global financial crisis. Even though the 9.6% growth is still faster 
than a lot of countries, the 4.6% drop of GDP growth still had a lot impact on 
China’s economy especially at housing sector (World Bank Data). Based on the 
data from Global Property Guide, house prices in China rose rapidly from 2000 
to 2008, primarily driven by low interest rate and cheap credit (Global Property 
Guide). The skyrocketing house prices were partly caused by speculator who 
wished to make a huge fortune from selling their homes at higher price. Since it 
was cheap and easy to obtain a home loan, anyone can become a speculator. Most 
importantly, China was still lack of regulation in homeowner loan market. Many 
people who did not have a good credit history could easily take out a loan to buy 
house. As the economy started showing sign of weakness, the speculators pulled 
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out from the housing market. The lack of demand for houses caused the house 
prices to drop at the beginning of 2009. 
            But economic slowdown was not the primary reason causing home 
price to drop in China. In order to ease public complaint over the skyrocketing 
house prices in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major metropolitan areas due to the 
speculative activities before 2009, the government adopted some housing market-
cooling measures in April 2010. For instance, the down payment for first-time 
buyers’ mortgages was increased to 30% from 20%, while for second homes 
down payment rose to 60% from 50%. New property taxes were introduced in 
Shanghai and Chongqing between 0.4% and 0.6% in Shanghai (Global Property 
Guide). These government measures caused house prices to drop substantially 
in the last quarter of 2011. After house prices dropped, the price of land also 
decreased. Since those loans obtained by LFPs from banks are backed by lands as 
collaterals, the sudden drop in house prices will cause those loans to sour. 
 Theoretically, under the contract between borrower and banks, if the 
price of land drops, the borrower has to use other methods such as liquidation to 
pay back what it owes to the banks and bond investors. However, that was not the 
case in China. According to an article from Bloomberg News, written by Henry 
Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, “China Cities Value Land at Winnetka Prices 
with Bonds Seen Toxic”, many local governments tried to overstate the land value 
by three to four times the actual value in order to secure more loans from banks. In 
one case, local officials were not even able to the specify the exact location of the 
specific property securing loan, reportedly stating, “it’s somewhere north of town, 
I don’t exactly known where. It’s like the land outside the city, you know, with 
the big piles salt” (Bloomberg News, July 13, 2011). This investigation done by 
Bloomberg News clearly indicates that the attitude by local government officials 
towards repayment of the loan was disturbingly noncommittal and dismissive. 
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Recent data from China’s statistical yearbook indicates that the growth of loans 
in each province has already reached an unprecedented level. Also, most of 
loans shown in China’s statistical yearbook are one-year loans. Also, since only 
state-owned banks have authority to issue loans in China, the close relationship 
between state-owned banks and LFPs, which are mainly the cover identities of 
state-owned enterprises in each province, gives local governments a back channel 
to take out more loans no matter how turbulent the overall economy around the 
world is. Therefore, given by the evidence provided by Bloomberg try to pay back 
the loans they ask LFPs to borrow in previous years. 
 As a matter of fact, not many people before 2008 paid too much attention 
to the transaction between local governments and LFPs and most importantly, the 
amount of debt existed under local government’s balance sheet, because China 
was still on an accelerating growth before 2008. But after the growth correction in 
2009, local government’s unique funding process drew both applause and criticism 
from different economists after China experienced economic slowdown at the 
beginning of 2010. One the one hand, one group of economists thinks financing 
through LFP is less transparent and less manageable than direct government 
borrowing. The opaque business agreement between LFP and local government 
leads many economists to question the accuracy of the official reported number 
of total loan that local governments borrow each year. Also, they worry that the 
enormous amount of loan accumulated each will have a negative impact on China’s 
economy. On the other hand, some economists think that borrowing from LFP to 
finance infrastructure projects is beneficial to the economy because these projects 
will ultimately contribute to long-term economic growth. If the local government 
has ability to generate enough revenue to pay off its loans from previous years, 
LFP borrowing will not hurt the whole economy. 
 The pro sides of local government borrowing think because China 
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is still a developing country, the space for future growth is enormous. A well-
known economist, Justin Lin who is a Chinese economist and former Chief 
Economist and Vice President of the World Bank recently said in his speech, 
Beyond Keynesianism and The New “New Normal”, that China is not going to 
collapse because of global recession since China’s potential economic growth is 
still strong enough to compensate short run economic shock. Unlike the U.S. and 
other western advanced economies, China is still undergoing a transition from a 
poor country to a developed country. The large gap between rural area and urban 
area provides China a valuable opportunity to continue its infrastructure projects 
to reach urbanization. According to Lin, China’s fiscal expansionary policy during 
the past ten years has raised government’s debt-to-GDP ratio, but if adding central 
government debt and LFP loans together, the total debt-to-GDP ratio is around 
40 percent. Comparing this number to other countries such as Japan and Greece, 
China’s current debt-to-GDP ratio is still relatively healthy. In addition, not only 
does China have a fine fiscal condition, China’s high household saving rate and 3 
trillion U.S. treasury holding will provide adequate fund to expand its economy 
(Lin, 2011).
 Also, according to a report written by a group of economists from Credit 
Suisse, most of loans borrowed by local government financing platform is largely 
used in infrastructure projects. As shown in the graph, urban infrastructure and 
transport projects accounted 62% of the loans and land purchases accounted 
10.6%. Infrastructure and transport projects used more than 70% of the total loans 
borrowed by LFPs. Even though it seems that the amount of loans is enormous, 
local government’s assets are increasing from these investments. Unlike the public 
debt used to pay for social pension fund and other benefits in Southern Europe, 
local government’s debts in China are utilized to accumulate a large amount of 
fixed assets to increase the total output. Thus, if China’s economic growth is 
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steady over the next ten years, according to Credit Suisse, the debt problems at 
local level should not be problematic. 
 However, even though Lin’s and Credit Suisse’s arguments that China’s 
robust future growth mitigates government’s debt burden seems to be reasonable, 
many independent research departments and economists cast doubts on his argument. 
In a special report done by Bloomberg, China’s banks didn’t fully report the total 
loans they lent to local government financing platform. For instance, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), second largest state-owned banks in China, 
reported in 2011 that they include the total loans borrowed by 10,000 LFPs across 
the entire country in bank’s public report. However, Bloomberg sent its own 
investigation team and found that ICBC only includes 113 LFPs, or about 2% of 
those reported by the banks. The hidden loans, according to Bloomberg, sometimes 
contained toxic assets, which came from failed real estate and infrastructure projects 
from 2008 to 2011. Also, with prices dropping dramatically in China’s real estate 
market in 2011, many local governments were struggling to sell lands to raise more 
cash. Meanwhile, the decrease in land price causes the price of collaterals held by 
LFPs to drop. As a result, they were not able to obtain enough loans from banks for 
local governments (Bloomberg news, 2011). 
 In more scary news reported by Financial Times, it stated that some 
local governments are having troubles paying their wages in their public servants 
because of inadequate cash and loans:
 For example, in the Shandong Province capital Jinan, not a 
single developer bid for nine of the 11 plots offered by the city 
in early November. The two plots that sold went for bottom-
line prices.
A city with a serious land market crash is Guangzhou, where in 
November some 32-plots failed to sell. In some cases, auctions 
were suspended by the city government, which blamed poor 
market conditions. 
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These plots were supposed to generate about 18.7 billion 
yuan for Guangzhou’s city government, representing some 29 
percent of the planned land sale revenues written into the 2011 
fiscal budget. Asking prices averaged 5,584 yuan per square 
meter of floor space (Financial Times, 2011). 
Therefore, the decrease in residential real estate construction diminishes local 
government’s ability to pay back their debts through land sales. 
 In addition to the scary China’s local government debts reported by 
Financial Times and Bloomberg, Nouriel Roubini, a professor from NYU’s 
Stern School of Business, criticized that the high borrowing by China’s local 
governments eventually would become another “subprime mortgage” (Reuters 
news, 2011). His reasoning behind the prediction of China’s debt problem was 
based on his field study in 2011. He stated that even though local governments have 
spent billions of dollars to upgrade city’s transportation, housings, and schools, 
many investments cannot generate enough revenue to pay back those debts local 
governments borrow. He gave an example of high speed Maglev train between 
Shanghai and Hangzhou, another major city in eastern China. The governments of 
Shanghai and Hangzhou spent billions of dollars to develop the high speed train 
line. The initial investment was estimated around 300 million USD. Although the 
new high-speed train has already cut the travelling time between the two cities 
from four hours to less than one hour, the ticket is so expensive that frequent 
travelers can just take regional jet with much cheaper price. As a result, most of 
the trains were just half-empty. Roubini stated that the lack of passengers will 
reduce the profit generated from the high-speed train line and diminish local 
governments’ capacities to pay back their debts (Reuters news, 2011) (Project-
Sydicate, 2011).
 The high-speed train line between Shanghai and Hangzhou is just a 
small corner of China’s investment story. Many local governments, according 
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to Roubini, were developing the similar sumptuous projects, which could not 
generate enough revenue to pay back debts they borrowed. He worried if local 
governments continue the excessive investment, China’s local government debts 
will become a new debt crisis, which will drag the whole country down. 
D.   Summary
 At this stage, it is still not clear whether China’s local government 
debts pose a significant threat to China’s economic growth although the some 
economists suggests that China is facing a serious debt crisis. On the surface, the 
debt problem at local level in China seems to be manageable since China is still on 
the trend of high economic growth regardless of recent financial crisis. However, 
the data from China’s Statistical Yearbooks from 1994 to 2011 and investigations 
conducted by two authoritative news agents, Bloomberg and Financial Times, 
indicate that the borrowing levels at local governments are still too high. The 
question that whether the high level of debts held by local governments through 
local financing platforms has significant impact on China’s economic growth 
remains unanswered. Thus, the purpose of the rest of this paper is to provide 
a quantitative analysis to answer the remaining question left from the previous 
literature.
          Before going deep into quantitative analysis, we still need to find the 
right variable to represent local government. Since it is impossible to find exact 
numbers representing China’s local government debts at this point, we have to find 
a proxy number to represent China’s local government debts. In fact, based on the 
previous literature, we can identify the correct variable for debt. Since this paper 
centers around the loans borrowed by local governments through local financing 
platforms, the amount of loans from all 31 provinces that report on China’s 
statistical yearbook every year can be used as proxy variable to represent local 
debts. Even though it is possible that many China’s local governments are willing 
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to hide the actual debts they owe to the banks, the amount of annual loans from 
each province shown in statistical yearbook, conducted by central government’s 
banking regulation agencies and other statistical departments in Beijing, cannot 
cover the truth because they have to fully analyze the health of state-owned banks, 
which are public companies that list their shares in both mainland and Hong Kong 
stock exchanges. Also, given the evidence provided by Credit Suisse’s report that 
more than 70% of the debts borrowed by local financing platforms are short term 
loans, which are set to mature by end of 2013, we can conclude that most of LFPs 
are not going to pay back these debts. Moreover, we also have evidence from 
Bloomberg that most local governments have not even paid attention with the 
amount of debts they owe for a long time and, most importantly, they do not have 
plans to pay them back. Thus, we can conclude that the annual short-term loans 
from each province shown on China’s statistical yearbook are the best proxies to 
represent China’s local government debt. 
III.    Model Specification        
 Based on the findings in cross-country growth literature and discussion 
on China’s local fiscal history, we adopt a cross-provincial panel regression model 
to investigate the impact of local government debt on economic growth across 
thirty-one provinces in China. The panel spans 17 years from 1994 to 2011. 
        The baseline panel regression specification is as follows:
Where t denotes the end of a period; i denotes province; y is the growth rate of 
real provincial income per capita;  is an unobservable error term;   is a vector of 
economic variables;  is local government debt (in percent of GDP).
 Since Kumar and Woo (2010) and Barro (1996) uses a similar panel 
regression model to analyze the impact of government debt on economic growth, 
��� = �+ ��,��+ ���,� + ��,�, 
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this paper will select a core set of explanatory variables that have been identified 
in previous literatures. The variables X in the baseline model specification are as 
follows: human capital, to reflect the notion that provinces with an abundance 
of knowledge are more likely have a greater chance of surpass other provinces 
in the domestic competition; social-economic factors such as population growth, 
inflation rate, provincial government expenditure growth, State-owned enterprise 
industrial output growth, and personal disposable income growth. 
 The econometric model introduced above is actually based on the 
neoclassical model, which identifies the factors of long-run economic growth. 
In the neoclassical model, labor and capital are the two key components of 
this model. Later on, technology also plays a key role in determining long-run 
economic growth. But new technology requires advanced knowledge in order 
for the technology to become fully applicable. As a matter of fact, knowledge 
is acquired through a long duration of education. The higher the education, the 
more efficient a worker will perform in the real world. Recently, more and more 
empirical and theoretical research illustrate that human capital plays a key role 
in determining economic growth.  Nelson and Phelps (1966) use the experience 
of United States agriculture to support the evidence that better education leads 
to higher production level. The better educated farmer is quicker to adopt new 
technologies through different channels. He understands how the new technologies 
can help him to increase his output level since his education gives him ability to 
assess different ideas, and hence less likely to make errors. As a result, he will 
achieve a higher production level than other farmers. 
 Mincer (1981) and Barro (1996) identifies that investment in school 
education is a very essential component of human capital. Employers are willing 
to pay higher wages to workers who spend a lot of time and money to acquire 
proper skills and experience that required by the job. In addition, both Mankiw et 
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al (1992) and Barro (1996) include educational-attainment, which is the amount 
of students graduating from middle school, in his model to test whether education 
level has impact on economic growth. The empirical result from Barro (1996) 
indicates that an increase by 0.3 year of education increase the per-capita GDP 
growth by 0.2 percentage points per year. Mankiw et al (1992) use the percentage 
of working-age population that is in secondary school as a proxy to measure 
human capital. The empirical result from Mankiw et al (1992) also confirms the 
strong correlation between education attainment and economic growth. Countries 
with a higher level of education grow faster for a given level of initial per capita 
GDP. After China reopened universities after ten years of Cultural Revolution, 
the enrollment in higher institutions started to increase. Wang and Yao (2003) 
use different level of school enrollment rate as a proxy for human stock. They 
find that the accumulation of human capita was very quick from 1952 to 1999 
and the empirical result confirms that it contributed significantly to grow and 
welfare. Thus, in this paper, we use the growth of higher education enrollment as 
an indicator of human capital. 
 Since this model has to use other economic determinants as control 
variables, we have to take in account of the other interesting characteristics 
reflecting on China’s economic growth. Even though the theoretical growth studies 
have no conclusive evidence regarding the relationship between economic growth 
and trade openness, most empirical studies illustrate that a country with a more 
open trade policy will likely experience high economic growth.  Barro (1991) 
Yanikkaya (2003) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) use empirical evidence to 
show that there is a significant correlation between a country’s trade growth rate 
and economic growth. An improvement in trade growth stimulates and expands 
domestic output. If a country uses its comparative advantage to produce product 
with lower opportunity cost and trade with another country, it can result in more 
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efficient use of its scarce resource and reach higher standards of living (Ball and 
McCulloch, 1996). Most coastal cities in China have achieved high levels of 
economic growth due to high trade volume since Deng Xiaoping opened China’s 
economy to the world in 1989. Thus, trade growth is definitely an important 
variable in this model. In this paper, we calculate the growth of trade (sum of 
import and export) in each province starting in 1994. 
 Based on economic theory, unexpected inflation has three main costs 
to the society. First of all, unexpected inflation leads to wealth redistribution. In 
particular, the wealth of creditors may pass to debtors after unexpected inflation. 
Second, uncertainty about future price levels is likely to distort consumption, 
saving, borrowing and investment. In addition, variability of inflation has some 
significant impact on wages. For instance, variable inflation causes risk-averse 
workers to increase wage levels incorporated with premium, which serves as 
insurance to against rising price in order to maintain the current lifestyle. This 
will push up both nominal and real wages. Increase in nominal wage adds up 
the production cost of producers, and thereby causes the overall price level in 
the society to increase because producers are demanding higher price levels to 
compensate their costs (Briault, 1995) (Sidrauski, 1967). However, unexpected 
rising price in consumer goods may cause people to scale back their consumption. 
Once aggregate demand falls, investment will decrease. Thus, theoretically, high 
inflation has negative effect on economic growth. However, empirically, Barro 
(1996) only finds some country experience economic downturn after inflation 
level reaches certain level. According to Barro (1996), for a given rate of inflation, 
the variability of inflation has no significant relationship with economic growth. 
In this paper, we are not going to concentrate on this variable since inflation rate 
in the model above is only a control variable. 
 High population growth has been found to have a detrimental effect 
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on growth. If the population is growing, a part of the economy’s investment is 
allocated to provide capital for new workers (Barro, 1996). The empirical evidence, 
provided by Barro (1996), confirms that the relationship between population 
growth and economic growth is negative. In this paper, population growth is only 
used as a control variable in the model. We still expect the coefficient of this 
variable to be positive. 
 The last two economic variables, industrial output growth and 
infrastructure investment ratio, are very important variables to explain China’s 
economic growth. After the market reform in 1980, China’s economy started to 
take off mainly due to urbanization and investments in fixed assets. In this paper, 
we use these two variables as control variables.
IV.    Data and facts
        Since it is hard to find accurate data on China’s local government debt due 
to the opaque governance in China, it is necessary to find a proxy number for the 
amount of debt at local level. Because provincial short-term loans, as noted in 
previous section, are the best variables to represent local government debts, we 
will use this as the proxy for debt. Based on the table 2, the growth of provincial 
loans from state-owned banks especially in Northern provinces has increased 
dramatically over the past eleven years due to boom in housing market. As we can 
see from the table, the total amount of short-term loans borrowed by Shanxi, a 
resource-rich province in Northern China, was only 802 million yuan (133 million 
US dollar), but in 2010, the amount of short-term loans went up to 9634 million 
yuan (1605 million US dollar). The 110% increase in short-term loans in Shanxi 
province over the past thirteen years is just a tip of iceberg among all the local 
governments in China. Provinces in Southern China such as Hubei, as shown in 
Table 3, experienced a 200% increase in short-term loans over the past 17 years. 
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Thus, provincial short-term loan is the best proxies to represent local government 
debt (China’s statistical yearbook). 
 Another proxy used in this paper is educational achievement, which 
represents human capital. Since many previous theoretical models of economic 
growth such as those of Barro (1991), Mincer (1981), and Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) use educational achievement to serve as a proxy for human capital, this 
paper will emulate the same proxy used in those studies. Data from China’s 
annual statistical yearbook indicates that student enrollments in higher education 
have increased dramatically since the end of Cultural Revolution in 1979. For 
instance, the total of students enrolled into higher institutions in Anhui, one of 
the poorest provinces in China in 1979, was only 294000. Thirty-two years later, 
the number of higher institution students reached 990,000 in 2011. Not only has 
Anhui experienced this tremendous increase in human capital, but other provinces, 
which had the same economic growth level as Anhui in 1979, also have enlarged 
its human capital over the past 30 years. The increase in stock of human capital in 
most provinces in China indicates that the local governments have invested a lot 
of their funds to improve educational level in China. As a result, this paper will 
use student enrollments in higher education as a proxy to represent human capital. 
 Other key variables such as population growth, inflation rate, trade 
growth, government expenditure, disposable income growth, State-owned 
enterprise output growth, and infrastructure investment in percent of GDP are 
obtained from the China’s Statistical Yearbook from 1994 to 2011. The main 
analysis is based on a panel of 31 provinces for the period 1994-2011. The data 
for infrastructure investment implies that China’s economy is strongly dependent 
on government’s infrastructure investments such as bridges and highways. For 
example, Beijing experienced a 17% annual increase in infrastructure investment 
from 1997 to 2011. At the same time, Beijing’s annual real GDP growth reached 
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almost 14% before 2007. The fast economic growth in Beijing is also happening 
in other provinces especially those are heavily dependent on infrastructure 
investments. 
 Data on local government debt and growth clearly show that there is a 
negative correlation between government debt and growth of real per capita GDP. 
Figure shows a scatter plot of local government debt against subsequent growth 
of real per capita GDP over seventeen-year periods in the full sample.  According 
to the OLS fitted line, the coefficient of local government debt is -0.036. Taken at 
face value (i.e., ignoring the potential endogeneity problem, and not controlling 
for other growth determinants), it suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in 
local government debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in per capita 
GDP growth of 0.36 percentage points. This result is quiet consistent with the 
similar result shown in Kumar and Woo (2010). 
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V. Estimation Strategy
 As noted above, this paper intends to fill up the research gap by analyzing 
the impact of China’s local government debt on economic growth empirically. 
However, one of the most challenging obstacles facing this paper is to find an 
array of potential economic determinants, which can be used as control variables 
to explain economic growth. Even though Barro (1996) identifies an array of 
potential economic determinants by regressing output growth on an array of 
potential determinants, many variables he used in the paper cannot address the 
concern of robustness. By solving this issue, recent studies such as Sala-i-Martin 
et al (2004) focus on selecting the core set of growth determinants. 
 Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) uses Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates, 
which constructs estimates by averaging ordinary least squared coefficients across 
models, to conduct regressors selection, which can best explain economic growth. 
Of all 67 explanatory variables, they find 18 to significantly and robustly partially 
correlated with economic growth and another three variables to be marginally 
related. Among the 18 variables, there are a few economic variables such as share 
of government consumption in GDP, primary school enrollment, trade openness, 
and the average price of investment goods. The rest of the variables relates to 
socio-political factors such as fraction of population Confucian, which used to 
explain the economic growth in East Asia. 
 This paper also consider a variety of estimation methodologies, such as 
pooled OLS, random effect (RE), fixed effects (FE) panel regression, and GLS 
regression. Each of estimation method has a trade-off. Although one method 
corrects one particular econometric problem, it sometimes can lead to a different 
type of bias. For example, the slope coefficients from pooled OLS regression 
sometimes have the expected signs and the  value is reasonably high. It also 
assumes that the slope coefficients of the X variables are all identical for all the 
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provinces. Obviously, there are restricted assumptions for OLS regression. Thus, 
the pooled regression may distort the true picture of the relationship between 
Y and the X’s across the 31 provinces in China. One way to take into account 
the individual characteristic of each province is to let the intercept vary for each 
company but still assume that the slope coefficients are constant across provinces 
(Gujarati, 2003). 
        In addition, OLS regression sometimes encounters the presence of 
heteroscedasticity because the usual OLS method does not follow this strategy and 
thus does not make use of the “information” contained in the unequal variability 
of the dependent variable Y. In this case, generalized least squares (GLS) takes 
such information into account explicitly and is therefore capable of producing 
estimators that are best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) (Gujarati, 2003).
VI. Empirical results
 This section reports econometric results estimating cross-province GDP 
per capita growth rates in China. Five regressions are run on 557 observations 
with 17 years of time span. Among the 31 provinces in China, autonomous regions 
inhabited by different ethical groups such as Yunnan and Guangxi are under direct 
control of central government. Also, municipalities such as Shanghai and Beijing 
are under the authority of central government. 
 The main results for local economies are presented in Table 1. Columns 
1-5 show that the coefficients of local government debt are negative and are 
significant at the 1 percent level besides Column 1, with their values ranging 
from -0.022 to -0.047 across the various estimation techniques. The ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation in Column 1 suggests a 10 percentage points of GDP 
increase in local government debt is associated with a slowdown in growth in 
real GDP per capita of around 0.24 percent per year. The random effect (RE) and 
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general least square (GLS) in Columns 4 and 5 yield the same result. Even though 
the FE estimate of debt coefficient in Column 3 is somewhat larger than other 
estimates, it is still significant at 1 percent level. Also, the goodness of fit is quite 
promising, with an adjusted  ranging from 0.63 for FE estimation to 0.8 for OLS 
estimation.
 The coefficients on other explanatory variable (trade growth, government 
expenditure growth, disposable income growth, industrial output growth and 
investment in infrastructure to GDP ratio) are of the expected sign and mostly 
significant at 1% percent level across different estimation techniques. However, 
the coefficient for inflation is inconsistent with Barro’s theory that inflation has 
negative effect on economic growth because in China’s case, inflation tends to 
have positive effect on economic growth. Besides OLS estimation, all other 
estimations for inflation are significant at 1%. 
 After running test on heteroskedasticity given by Breusch-Pagan test, 
which tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. 
Since the p-value is very small in this OLS regression, we would have to 
reject the hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is 
not homogenous. Besides test on heteroskedasticity, we also conduct test on 
Multicollinearity. We use VIF, variance inflation factor, to test whether the OLS 
has strong multicollinearity. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are 
greater than 10 may merit further investigation. In this case, the VIF and tolerance 
(1/VIF) value for yeardum2 is worrisome. However, since yeardum2 is a dummy 
variable control for year, the high VIF is negligible.
 At last, model specification is final test we conduct on this OLS regression. 
A model specification error can occur when one or more relevant variables in the 
model. If relevant variables are omitted from the model, the common variance 
they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those variables, 
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the error term is inflated. We first use a link test command performs a model 
specification link test for single-equation models. We will be looking at the p-value 
for _hatsq,  which stands for the variable of squared prediction. If the model 
is specified correctly, the squred predictions should not have much explanatory 
power. That is we would not expect the variable of squared prediction to be a 
significant predictor if the model is specified correctly.  In this case, the p-value 
for _hatsq is 0.256. It indicates that the linktest has failed to reject the assumption 
that the model is specified correctly. Thus, it seems to us that we do not have a 
specification error. But now, we will conduct another test before we jump to the 
conclusion. After running ovtest, the test result indicates there is small probability 
that the model has omitted variables since p-value, 0.0483, is close to 0.05. The 
model may have specification bias, but both ovtest and linktest indicate the bias is 
not significant enough to be considered as problem. 
 Since the dataset for this regression model is a panel data, we have also run 
a panel regression with fixed effects. The result is similar to OLS regressions, but 
more variables become statistically significant. The coefficient of debt is negative 
and significant at 95 percent of confidence interval. Also, the coefficient of -0.026 
for FE is still in a similar range with OLS. Besides running fixed effect regression, 
we also consider random effect regression. After running a Hausman test to test 
decide between fixed or random effects. The null hypothesis is that the preferred 
model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects. It basically tests 
whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is 
they are not. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, we can conclude that we should 
consider fixed effect regression as the best choices for panel regression. 
 After running heteroskedasticity test for FE, the test results still indicates 
that the model has strong heteroskedasticity. Also, the Lagram-Multiplier test for 
serial correlation also indicates that the model has strong serial correlation. As a 
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result, in order correct both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, general-least 
squares model is considered. The coefficient for debt in GLS regression is still 
significant with a correct sign. 
VII. Conclusion
 Given the empirical evidence on the impact of debt on economic 
growth for a panel of 31 provinces in China over the period of 1994-2011, we 
can conclude that local government debt in China does have significant impact 
on China’s economic growth.  The results, based on a range of econometric 
techniques, suggest an inverse relationship between debt and economic growth, 
controlling for other determinants of growth: on average a 10 percentage point 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual per 
capita GDP growth of around 0.23 percentage points per year.
 Although econometric model cannot provide a concrete result that 
China has already in a fiscal crisis, the negative correlation between debt-to-GDP 
ratio and economic growth suggests that if local governments in China continue 
the current spending path without considering any future consequences, local 
government debt eventually will follow the path of Greece and other countries 
with high government debts.
135
Table 1. Panel Regression-Growth and Local Government Debt, 1994-2011
Sample: 31 Provinces in China
Dependent Variable : Provincial Real per Capita GDP Growth 
 
 
 
Explanatory	  Variables OLS	  (1) Panel	  Regression	  (2) FE	  (3) RE	  (4) GLS	  (5)
Population	  growth -­‐0.024 -­‐0.045 -­‐0.023 -­‐0.045 -­‐0.045
-­‐0.037 -­‐0.047 -­‐0.048 -­‐0.047 -­‐0.046
Debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio -­‐0.022* -­‐0.027** -­‐0.042** -­‐0.027** -­‐0.027**
-­‐0.009 -­‐0.005 -­‐0.011 -­‐0.005 -­‐0.005
Inflation	  rate 0.018 0.205** 0.219** 0.205** 0.205**
-­‐0.084 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.049
Trade	  growth 0.013* 0.041** 0.042** 0.041** 0.041**
-­‐0.006 -­‐0.006 -­‐0.006 -­‐0.006 -­‐0.006
Higher	  institution	  student	  enrollment	  growth -­‐0.033 -­‐0.117** -­‐0.129** -­‐0.117** -­‐0.117**
-­‐0.036 -­‐0.021 -­‐0.021 -­‐0.021 -­‐0.021
Government	  expenditure	  growth 0.077** 0.032 0.02 0.032 0.032
-­‐0.022 -­‐0.024 -­‐0.025 -­‐0.024 -­‐0.024
Disposable	  income	  growth 0.161** 0.523** 0.507** 0.523** 0.523**
-­‐0.041 -­‐0.029 -­‐0.029 -­‐0.029 -­‐0.028
Industrial	  output	  growth 0.027** 0.032** 0.027* 0.032** 0.032**
-­‐0.01 -­‐0.012 -­‐0.012 -­‐0.012 -­‐0.012
Investment	  in	  infrastructure	  to	  GDP	  ratio 0.082** 0.050** 0.053** 0.050** 0.050**
-­‐0.015 -­‐0.012 -­‐0.013 -­‐0.012 -­‐0.012
Constant -­‐0.012 0.082** 0.103** 0.082** 0.082**
-­‐0.017 -­‐0.01 -­‐0.015 -­‐0.01 -­‐0.01
Observations 557 557 557 557 557
R-­‐squared 0.8 0.63
Number	  of	  Province	  Name 31 31 31 31
Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses
+	  significant	  at	  10%;	  *	  significant	  at	  5%;	  **	  significant	  at	  1%
Explanatory Variables OLS (1) Panel Regression (2) FE (3) RE (4) GLS (5)
Population growth -0.024 -0.045 -0.023 -0.045 -0.045
-0.037 -0.047 -0.048 -0.047 -0.046
Debt to GDP ratio -0.022* -0.027** -0.042** -0.027** -0.027**
-0.009 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005
Inflation rate 0.018 0.205** 0.219** 0.205** 0.205**
-0.084 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.049
Trade growth 0.013* 0.041** 0.042** 0.041** 0.041**
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
Higher institution student enrollment growth -0.033 -0.117** -0.129** -0.117** -0.117**
-0.036 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
Government expenditure growth 0.077** 0.032 0.02 0.032 0.032
-0.022 -0.024 -0.025 -0.024 -0.024
Disposable income growth 0.161** 0.523** 0.507** 0.523** 0.523**
-0.041 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028
Industrial output growth 0.027** 0.032** 0.027* 0.032** 0.032**
-0.01 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
Investment in infrastructure to GDP ratio 0.082** 0.050** 0.053** 0.050** 0.050**
-0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
Constant -0.012 0.082** 0.103** 0.082** 0.082**
-0.017 -0.01 -0.015 -0.01 -0.01
Observations 557 557 557 557 557
R-squared 0.8 0.63
Number of Province Name 31 31 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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   Beijing	   Tianjin	   Hebei	   Shanxi	  
Inner	  
Mongolia	   Liaoning	   Jilin	   Heilongjiang	  
  1994 1,428.95 927.05 1,310.16 802.06 674.37	   2,412.02 1,099.77 1,396.60 
  1995 1,779.05 1,113.95 1,578.21 1,223.11 819.87	   2,881.80 1,302.76 1,636.80 
  1996 2,082.83 1,357.38 1,894.66 1,420.11 1,002.98	   3,556.74 1,608.84 1,909.80 
  1997 2,720.68 1,502.91 2,372.15 1,524.98 1,172.17	   3,980.29 1,913.61 2,381.10 
  1998 3,326.57 1,629.12 2,795.20 1,741.79 1,318.75	   4,439.65 2,118.79 2,702.90 
  1999 4,007.76 1,825.26 3,038.32 1,909.21 1,364.17	   4,833.76 2,580.41 3,103.94 
  2000 5,944.60 1,863.60 2,933.19 2,453.15 1,340.74	   5,195.56 2,651.18 3,145.10 
  2001 7,205.99 2,159.86 3,098.89 2,408.40 1,470.75	   5,597.40 2,828.25 3,358.60 
  2002 9,230.78 2,519.04 3,488.18 2,903.18 1,649.78	   6,247.40 3,057.70 3,624.00 
  2003 11,343.28 3,426.02 3,854.72 3,552.29 1,924.13	   7,222.30 3,288.87 3,981.30 
  2004 13,577.45 3,821.38 6,152.20 4,016.12 2,239.76	   7,753.00 3,435.02 4,038.90 
  2005 15,335.50 4,722.38 6,415.20 4,328.90 2,588.57	   7,958.05 3,401.30 3,658.50 
  2006 15,486.90 5,106.94 7,411.88 4,788.51 3,205.19	   9,117.20 3,870.30 3,971.90 
  2007 17,360.20 6,131.63 8,397.82 5,394.47 3,767.74	   10,403.88 4,306.00 4,256.40 
  2008 19,431.08 7,277.46 9,453.30 5,960.33 4,527.86	   11,794.60 4,835.89 4,532.70 
  2009 24,805.10 10,513.44 13,123.80 7,814.74 6,292.52	   15,549.60 6,234.70 5,988.30 
  2010 28,748.10 12,864.75 15,755.74 9,634.32 7,919.47	   18,689.80 7,205.94 7,230.50 
  2011 33,367.00 15,242.20 18,144.00 11,169.35 9,727.70	   21,621.00 8,122.41 8,548.70 
 
 
 
	  	   Hubei	   Hunan	   Guangdong	   Guangxi	   Chongqing	   Sichuan	   Guizhou	   Yunnan	  
  1994 1,396.82 1,263.11 4,339.76 835.53 596.96 2,218.14 421.07 684.68 
  1995 1,750.41 1,494.03 5,495.69 1,055.67 755.39 2,804.16 513.41 924.67 
  1996 2,273.20 1,880.94 6,319.77 1,203.41 913.93 3,359.54 610.51 1,194.51 
  1997 2,979.33 2,123.00 8,195.83 1,423.48 1,156.13 2,948.15 761.88 1,496.95 
  1998 3,500.36 2,274.41 9,523.56 1,516.49 1,358.61 3,151.74 840.63 1,713.97 
  1999 3,528.13 2,408.36 10,934.76 1,719.19 1,611.68 3,924.16 899.83 1,824.04 
  2000 3,493.91 2,403.39 11,636.25 1,613.25 1,881.29 4,053.46 1,064.82 1,987.83 
  2001 3,787.25 2,787.92 13,093.72 1,764.05 1,871.98 4,498.55 1,212.23 2,173.45 
  2002 4,312.79 3,227.46 15,206.62 1,941.07 2,244.72 5,158.76 1,403.92 2,418.48 
  2003 5,000.74 3,796.31 18,190.85 2,320.66 2,774.81 5,910.59 1,714.04 2,955.57 
  2004 5,377.43 4,258.03 19,491.77 2,759.65 3,246.28 6,475.92 2,020.04 3,398.29 
  2005 5,649.67 4,590.03 23,261.21 3,056.86 3,719.52 6,743.00 2,303.90 3,987.58 
  2006 6,430.44 5,173.87 23,182.16 3,595.25 4,388.28 7,833.32 2,696.11 4,803.51 
  2007 7,496.46 6,037.40 26,776.12 4,287.79 5,131.69 9,200.93 3,128.63 5,671.66 
  2008 8,465.64 6,989.42 30,224.01 5,066.68 6,320.81 11,163.39 3,569.27 6,594.33 
  2009 11,659.37 9,369.81 38,893.06 7,268.41 8,766.06 15,680.33 4,656.50 8,779.63 
  2010 14,136.58 11,303.76 47,191.56 8,867.52 10,888.15 19,129.79 5,747.50 10,568.78 
  2011 16,395.39 13,186.68 53,411.83 10,408.54 13,001.39 22,033.21 6,841.92 12,114.59 
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Renewable Resource Extraction:
Experimental Analysis of Resource Management Policies
Under Assumptions of Resource Migration
Kevin Lugo
Abstract
This paper presents research using a spatially explicit and dynamic common pool 
resource experiment to compare renewable resource extraction behavior between 
four treatments combining (1) open access and sole ownership institutions with (2) 
mobility and non-mobility of the renewable resource. The primary purpose of this 
research is to test the theory that introducing resource mobility into a sole ownership 
regime will remove the incentive for subjects to maximize the resource, instead 
causing them to revert to the myopic strategy predicted for the open access regime. 
I also test the hypothesis that open access firms are indifferent to resource dispersal. 
The results show that efficiency is unaffected by dispersal but the behavior of sole 
owners differs between dispersal conditions. Extraction requests increase at a faster 
rate under dispersal, fewer tokens remain unextracted in the final period, and some 
subjects show strategic behavior resulting in greater than 100% efficiency. This is 
a pilot study that presents preliminary evidence of a behavioral change. The results 
are subject to experimental factors such as subject misperceptions of linearity and 
statistical significance suffers from a small subject pool. 
1. Introduction
With population growth and economic development continually 
increasing world demand for natural resources, policy makers must have a 
robust understanding of the physical and economic factors affecting resource 
extraction. In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
also known as the Brundtland Commission, published Our Common Future. This 
report introduced the concept of sustainable development and elevated natural 
resource extraction to a prominent place in policy discussions. Among the many 
natural resources, renewable resources are of particular interest. These resources 
are extremely important and include resources like fish and timber, cornerstones 
of major commercial industries, as well as surface water and aquifers, essential 
inputs for agriculture and human consumption.
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Many renewable resources can be described as common-pool resources 
(CPRs) because (1) extraction produces an externality, reducing the resource stock 
and increasing the extraction cost of other firms and (2) restricting access, while 
not impossible, is difficult and costly. Over 40 years ago Garret Hardin (1968) 
presented a pasture shared by a number of herdsmen as a classical example of a 
CPR. According to Hardin, the profit-maximizing herdsman decides whether or 
not to add an additional herd based on a simple cost-benefit analysis. Because the 
marginal benefit of the additional herd accrues exclusively to the herdsman but 
the marginal cost is an externality divided between every herdsman, he chooses 
to add another herd. Unfortunately, when every herdsman pursues “his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons,” the outcome 
is “ruin [for] all.” This is the tragedy of the commons. More generally, Mancur 
Olson argued in The Logic of Collective Action that rational actors seeking their 
own self-interest will not act in the common good without a separate incentive 
(1965). Works such as these have played a pivotal role in developing policy 
interventions meant to modify economic incentives.
One such intervention is property rights. In the absence of property 
rights, CPRs operate under an open access regime where there is unrestricted 
entrance to the market and therefore potential for the tragedy of the commons. 
In his 1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost,” Ronald Coase presented 
transferable property rights as an efficient solution to externalities under a specific 
set of conditions. Assigning sole ownership is one extension of this principle 
and has proven a solution to a number of CPR problems (Hilborn et al, 1995; 
Johannes, 1978). For natural resources sole ownership is often established by 
granting a single firm sole extraction rights within a given geographic area. To 
assume that the benefits of sole ownership applies to this type of allocation regime 
is to implicitly assume that the sole owner controls every aspect of that resource. 
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This paper examines the effects of relaxing this assumption by considering the 
case of a mobile renewable resource.
Imagine an island nation that is physically isolated from other countries 
by a large expanse of sea and that has access to a fishery resource within its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ)8. Assume the fish in this zone are incapable of 
crossing the physical barriers separating the island from other nations. In this 
situation the country is not only the sole owner of extraction rights, but also the 
sole owner of the resource. On the other hand, consider countries bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea. While these countries also have their own EEZs, the geography 
allows fish to travel across EEZ borders. The countries in this situation have sole 
ownership of the extraction rights within their respective EEZ.  However, the 
ability of the resource to move between EEZs prevents any one country from 
having sole ownership of the resource itself. In this example Mediterranean 
countries continue to face a common-pool resource and the associated tragedy of 
the commons.  
Resource mobility and spatial attributes are the key factors that create 
this scenario.  Economic research on renewable resources has only recently begun 
to consider spatial dynamics and resource mobility, and there is a significant 
lack of experimental work on the subject. This paper presents an experimental 
methodology that examines the effect of spatial dynamics and resource dispersal 
on the outcomes of open access and sole ownership regimes. This is, to the 
best of my knowledge, the first study to do so. To examine this effect I recruit 
undergraduate students to participate in a dynamic CPR experiment modified to 
include spatial dynamics and resource mobility. 
Subjects are placed into groups of three and tasked with making 
token extraction decisions from either three common zones (in the open access 
8 An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area consisting of all waters within 200 nautical miles 
of a country’s coastline. A country has exclusive fishing rights within this EEZ.
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treatments) or one private zone (in the sole ownership treatments). At the end of 
each period a logistic growth function is applied to remaining tokens to simulate 
natural resource growth, and this growth is added to the zone’s previous token 
stock. I introduce resource mobility in the form of simplified, density-dependent 
dispersal that equalizes the token endowment across zones prior to the start of 
each period. I examine the open access regime and the sole ownership regime 
both with and without resource dispersal, for a total of four treatments. Payoffs 
are directly proportional to the total number of tokens extracted by each subject.
The primary purpose of this research is to test the theory that introducing 
resource mobility into a sole ownership regime will remove the incentive for 
subjects to maximize the resource, instead causing them to revert to the myopic 
strategy predicted for the open access regime. I also test the theory that open 
access firms are indifferent to resource dispersal because the myopic strategy 
exhausts tokens in the first period, making resource dispersal irrelevant. The main 
findings are that:
1. Average efficiencies are unaffected by resource dispersal. 
2. The behavior of sole owners differs when dispersal is introduced.
2.1. Dispersal causes requests to consistently increase every period, 
whereas without dispersal requests appear to follow a cyclical pattern.
2.2. Under dispersal, increasing requests cause fewer tokens to 
remain in the final period.
2.3. Dispersal allows many subjects to achieve greater than 100% 
efficiency, suggesting that some subjects capitalized on 
opportunities to harvest tokens dispersed from other zones. 
3. Open access behavior is not significantly affected by dispersal
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 The results show that the research design could be improved by 
respecifying parameters and extending the experiment length in order to capture 
long-term behavioral adaptation to dispersal. In this sense the results also highlight 
some shortcomings of the experimental methodology which will be discussed in 
detail later.9 However, as a pilot study of mobile renewable resource policies, this 
research shows that sole owners facing dispersal do not immediately follow the 
dominant strategy of myopic extraction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review 
of renewable resource policy, experimental findings from CPR experiments, 
and justification for the experimental methodology. Section 3 develops the CPR 
model and explains the experimental design. Section 4 presents the hypotheses. 
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the findings and section 7 
briefly concludes and makes recommendations for future research.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Renewable Resource Policies
There is substantial literature on renewable resource extraction in the 
both economics and the physical sciences. Fisheries have been studied extensively 
in the last century and have probably generated the most policy-related research. 
Modern fishery management policies began after WWII with open access 
regulations that dictated the number and species of fish that could be caught as 
well as how, when, and where fishing could occur (Wilen, 1999). During this 
time new research began connecting biological understandings of fishery stock 
dynamics to economic behavior and suggested that economic incentives could 
be manipulated to achieve targeted policy outcomes (Beverton and Holt, 1957; 
9 This was a pilot study with limited resources, time, and funding. A number of parameters 
showed differences across treatments but were not significant at the 5% level. See the results 
and discussion for details.
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Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1957; Scott, 1955). Now commonplace, the concept of 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) was developed as a policy goal to maximize 
both economic yield and biological growth (Schaefer, 1957).
The exclusive economic zones created in 1982 by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea introduced limited entry techniques to fishery 
management by excluding foreign fishers from very large domestic fishing markets 
(Wilen, 1999).10 In contrast to the open access regulations already in place, limited 
entry techniques attempt to constrain overexploitation by limiting the number 
of firms that participate in an industry. At the most extreme, a limited entry 
technique might establishment a government agency, nonprofit, or private firm as 
the sole owner of a renewable resource. Economic theory of the fishery suggests 
that sole ownership will result in a more socially optimal outcome than an open 
access regime. In open access an individual firm receives the market’s average 
revenue rather than its own individual marginal revenue, thus incentivizing an 
over-allocation of effort (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1957). In contrast, sole owners 
maximize profit by producing where marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. 
This corresponds to the optimal level of extraction that lowers effort allocation 
and maximizes net economic yield (Gordon, 1954) (Figure 1).
When a sole owner is the only producer in a market it can increase its profit 
by charging a monopoly price higher than the competitive equilibrium.  However, 
many renewable resources exist over a wide geographical area, making it possible 
to establish many sole owners of distinct resource patches. This prevents any one 
firm from establishing monopoly power and increasing the market price. Under this 
assumption, a sole owner who maximizes the present value of a fishery would find 
equilibrium closer to the social optimum than would firms in competitive equilibrium 
10 Prior to this convention, countries’ exclusive rights consisted of only their territorial waters 
within 12 nautical miles from their coastline.  Through this act exclusive rights were extended 
to 200 nautical miles
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(Scott, 1955). Sole ownership has proven one of the most effective institutions in 
promoting sustainable extraction of some renewable resources (Hilborn et al, 1995). 
In Palau, Micronesia, control of fishing rights by chiefs helped maintain fishing 
stocks and allowed mutually beneficial fishing transactions in the vein of the Coase 
theorem (Johannes, 1978). Experimental evidence has shown that sole owners are 
able to achieve high levels of efficiency in resource extraction decisions when given 
adequate information (Hey et al, 2008).
2.2 Common Pool Resource Experiments
CPR experiments typically find that self-interested behavior prevents 
collective action from following an optimal path. Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom 
(1990) run an experiment where subjects repeatedly choose to invest tokens 
in either a fixed-return investment or a CPR with decreasing marginal returns. 
Subjects consistently overinvest in the CPR and even create negative returns when 
given a large enough endowment. A further study with probabilistic destruction 
finds that while most subjects appear to play “safe” strategies, a few myopic 
subjects overinvest and create early termination and low efficiency for the group 
(Ostrom et al, 1992).
 Herr, Walker, and Gardner (1997) use the same basic design to compare 
performance between time independent and time-dependent treatments. They find 
that time dependency increases myopic behavior and exasperates the tragedy of 
the commons. High availability and low marginal extraction costs during initial 
periods cause subjects to over-extract early on, thus reducing future profits. This 
coincides with the “fall down” seen in emerging forestry and fishery industries 
where extractors face a dramatic drop in yield once they harvest all the original and 
unsustainable stock  (Hilborn et al, 1995). The consequences of overcapitalization 
based on initial harvests are discussed elsewhere in the literature (Johannes, 1978; 
Moxnes 1998, 2000; Rouwette et al, 2004; Walker et al, 1990; Wilen, 1999).
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 Economics research has largely ignored spatial distributions until the 
1960s and 1970s when biologists began examining discrete spatial distributions 
(Wiens, 1976). Levin (1976) develops a general mathematical model of 
populations in patchy environments and discusses density-dependent dispersal and 
the creation of uniformity across patches. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) develop 
a differential equations model of a patchy fishery system that includes spatially 
distributed effort allocation that adjusts according to resource dispersal patterns. 
Schnier (2009) adapts the CPR design used by Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom 
(1990) to examine the sink-source spatial dispersal model discussed in Sanchirico 
& Wilen (1999). He finds that the spatial component decreases average net returns 
because subjects consistently over-extract in the more plentiful source CPR. On 
the other hand, a study of groundwater extraction with a spatial component that 
increases private costs relative to external costs found that subjects were less 
likely to behave myopically with the spatial component (Suter et al, 2012).
2.3 Why Use an Experimental Methodology
The experimental methodology lends itself well to research on renewable 
CPRs for several reasons, one being the challenges facing empirical studies. Data 
on renewable resources are often limited and rarely accurate due to the inherent 
difficulty of measurement (i.e. fish stocks are impossible to observe directly and 
many fisheries rely on informal logbooks for economic data). Estimating economic 
parameters that rely on biological data is therefore extremely difficult to do with 
confidence. Most Schaefer production functions of fisheries typically overestimate 
carrying capacities and maximum sustainable yields which can lead to potential 
fishery collapse (Zhang & Smith, 2011). Research directly analyzing policy must 
use extra caution because management policies are sensitive to measurement 
error and increasing levels of measurement error increase sensitivity to stochastic 
variation (Moxnes, 2003). Poor estimation has overinflated our perception of the 
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health of resources and has played a major role in the collapse of some potentially 
sustainable resources (Hilborn et al, 1995). 
Experimental methods can solve some of these problems. Researchers 
can design a system with known biological parameters to mimic any type of 
resource environment. If desired, information about the resource can be withheld 
and stock signals to subjects can be intentionally blurred to simulate real-world 
uncertainty. Renewable resource extraction is extremely complex because it 
relies on economic and biological variables that are not only endogenously 
determined, but also impacted by innumerable exogenous effects such as weather 
and macroeconomic variables. Experiments use random assignment to control 
for these confounding variables that are difficult to control and, in some cases, 
impossible to observe (Angrist & Pischke, 2010; Leamer, 2010). By isolating 
the institutional and environmental changes from these confounding factors, this 
research attempts to discover the causal effects of dispersal on outcomes and 
behavior within open access and sole ownership policies.
3. Model & Experimental Design
3.1 The Model
This research uses a standard Gordon-Schaefer model of fishery extraction 
(Gordon 1954; Schaefer 1957). This model defines stock, extraction cost, and 
resource harvest as functions of effort. The resource is modeled as having logistic 
growth where growth is dependent on the resource’s intrinsic growth rate and stock 
density relative to the carrying capacity of the environment (Figure 2).11 N represents 
stock, K carrying capacity, and r intrinsic growth rate. Maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) occurs where growth and catch are maximized; in a standard logistic growth 
function this happens at one half the carrying capacity (Schaefer, 1957). 
11 Carrying capacity is determined by factors such as food, competition, predation, etc. Intrinsic 
growth rate represents the per-capita growth rate of a population.
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The current research investigates a resource inhabiting three distinct 
patches referred to as “zones.” I use a standard logistic growth function to model 
resource growth within each zone and I use a simple density-dependent dispersal 
that equalizes population densities across zones to model resource mobility 
(Figure 3). Growth & stock are modeled as:
 
 In this design the total number of periods (T) is set equal to 5 while the 
number of zones (I) is set equal to 3. The carrying capacity (K) is 100 tokens 
and the intrinsic growth rate (r) is set to 1. Nit represents stock in zone I at time t, 
and the experiment begins as a virgin resource meaning No=K=100. There is no 
harvesting cost and the discount rate is assumed to be zero. Token harvests (x) 
are positively and directly proportional to cash payments by σ. Thus payoffs to 
subject n can be represented by:
I develop two benchmark strategies for evaluating the results of the experiment. 
Substituting  into equation (1) and solving for  gives a growth maximizing stock 
level of 50 tokens. In this environment a rational agent thinking dynamically 
would maximize profit  by reducing the stock in all available zones to the optimal 
level of 50 tokens in the first period. The agent would then harvest only the new 
growth in periods 2-4 to return the stock to the growth-maximizing level. In the 
final period the agent would extract all remaining tokens. Thus the maximization 
strategy (MAX) is to request (50, 25, 25, 25, 75) tokens which achieves 100% 
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efficiency (Figure 4). The second benchmark is extremely simple and considers 
a rational agent who thinks only in terms of present conditions. Such an agent 
would request all the tokens from each zone in the first period, leaving no tokens 
for future consumption. The MYOPIC strategy is thus (100, 0, 0, 0, 0) with an 
efficiency of 50%. The logic behind this benchmark is explained in the next 
section.
3.2 Experimental Design
A total of 113 subjects were recruited to participate in this experiment.12 
Subjects were undergraduate students of Gettysburg College randomly recruited 
through email. They were told they would receive $5 for participating in the 
experiment and would be able to earn an additional cash payment based on their 
performance in the experiment. Payoffs are designed such that the average subject 
was projected to receive approximately $10 for 20 to 40 minutes of participation.
The experiment uses the z-Tree experimental software.13 The basic design 
follows a standard CPR experiment wherein subjects are placed into groups of 
three and must make individual token extraction decisions for five periods. After 
each period any remaining tokens within a zone grow according to the logistic 
growth function described in equation (1). The tokens available in the next period 
are calculated using equation (2) if the treatment does not include dispersal or 
equation (3) if dispersal is present. After each period subjects see a summary of 
the results from that period as well as the tokens available in the next period. Each 
stage of the periods is set to a nonbinding timer to encourage timely action.
There is one zone per subject. Extraction requests need not be whole 
numbers but may never exceed the endowment available in the zone. Tokens 
extracted by a subject are credited to her account and, at the end of the experiment, 
12 See Appendix B for details on recruitment.
13 Fischbacher, Urs. “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments.” 
Experimental Economics 10, no. 2 (2007): 171–178.
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are exchanged for dollars at a known rate of $0.05 per token. There are a total 
of four treatments: (1) open access with no dispersal (OAND); (2) open access 
with dispersal (OAD); (3) sole ownership with no dispersal (SOND); and (4) sole 
ownership with dispersal (SOD). 
In the open access treatments subjects are free to request tokens from all 
of the three common zones. If the group request from a zone is less than the zone’s 
endowment, each subject receives a number of tokens equal to her request. If the 
group request from a zone is greater than the zone’s endowment, each subject 
receives a number of tokens equal to her proportion of the group request. Period 
summaries display the group withdraw, the number of tokens received by the 
subject, and the number of tokens available in the next period for each zone. 
In the sole ownership treatment each subject may only request tokens from her 
own private zone. Likewise, period summaries only display the number of tokens 
received and the number of tokens available in the next period for the subject’s 
own zone.
An important component of the design is that subjects are given both the 
exact growth function as well as a table of growth possibilities.14 The experimenter 
reads the description of growth and dispersal aloud and gives subjects time to 
review the instructions before beginning the experiment. This availability of 
information is not representative of real-world renewable resources. However, 
giving subjects this information removes the confounding affect of adaptive 
management strategies subjects would need to use to determine the optimal stock 
level and extraction pattern.15
14 See Appendix C for experimental materials
15 See Hey et al (2008) for a discussion of a “reasonable” benchmark strategy when stock is 
known but the growth function is unknown. 
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4. Hypotheses
The current research tests three hypotheses concerning the effects of 
dispersal on outcomes: (1) subjects in sole ownership without dispersal follow 
the MAX strategy; (2) subjects in open access follow the MYOPIC strategy, 
regardless of dispersal condition, and (3) introducing resource dispersal to sole 
ownership causes subjects to follow the MYOPIC strategy rather than the MAX 
strategy. These hypotheses rest on the assumption that individual subjects are 
rational, self-interested, profit-maximizing actors.
Economic theory suggests that the equilibrium extraction level of a sole 
owner of a renewable resource maximizes the present value of the resource in 
the absence of price factors (Gordon, 1954; Scott 1955). Past studies have shown 
that sole owners without full information achieve poor outcomes (Moxnes 1998, 
2000, 2004) while subjects not directly given full information but with access to 
it fall somewhat short of complete maximization (Hey et al, 2008). Subjects in 
this study are directly given both the growth function as well as a table of every 
possible integer stock level and its corresponding growth. Thus subjects in SOND 
are expected to follow the MAX strategy and obtain 100% efficiency.
Rational choice theory, collective action theory, and theory of the 
commons predict that subjects in the open access treatments will act in their own 
best interest and not achieve the goals common to each subject. The theory of 
myopic loss aversion suggests that subjects emphasize present conditions over 
future conditions and will assign more weight to potential losses than potential 
gains when making extraction decisions (Benzarti & Thaler, 1993). Results 
from CPR experiments show that subjects consistently tend to act myopically 
(Ostrom et al, 1992; Herr et al, 1997; Walker et al, 1990; Walker & Gardner, 
1992). From a game-theory perspective, if each subject knows that the other 
subjects will request all tokens in the final period, it is then strategic to request 
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all tokens in the penultimate period. Using backwards induction it becomes clear 
that the dominant strategy of each subject is to extract all tokens in the first period. 
Because dispersal only affects next period endowments, dispersal should have no 
effect on open access outcomes. Thus, subjects in OAND and OAD are expected 
to follow the MYOPIC strategy and achieve 50% efficiency.
 It is easy to see how the same concept applies to sole ownership when 
resource dispersal is present. The benefits of sole ownership imply the owner is in 
control of not only the resource environment but also the resource itself. While a 
subject cannot request tokens from another subjects’ zone, she can “steal” tokens 
through the dispersal mechanism. Imagine a game in which subjects A and B 
play MYOPIC and subject C plays MAX. Subjects A and B each receive 100 
tokens in the first period while subject C receives only 50 tokens. In the second 
period subjects A and B are each endowed with 25 tokens that have dispersed 
from subjects C’s zone, leaving subject C with 25 tokens. All three subjects now 
play MYOPIC, as subject C can no longer play MAX and realizes her endowment 
may continue to drop even if she does not extract. All subjects receive 25 tokens 
and the game ends. Subject C receives a total of 75 tokens compared to the 100 
tokens she would have received if she had played MYOPIC from the start. Thus, 
subjects in SOD are expected to follow the MYOPIC strategy and achieve 50% 
efficiency.
5. Results
The experimental results are summarized in Table 1. Unless explicitly 
stated, all reference to statistical significance considers significance at the 5% 
level. The experiment can generate at most 600 tokens, so individual efficiency is 
compared to one third of this, or 200 tokens. Individual efficiencies greater than 
153
100% are thus possible in all but the SOND treatment.16 Subjects in open access 
make extraction decisions from three zones per period while subjects in sole 
ownership only make extraction decisions from one zone. Because the three zones 
cannot be treated as statistically different, I test that the percentage extractions do 
not differ between zones, and find that only the difference between zones B and C 
is statistically significant (p=0.0431).  With this in mind I construct a single period 
request that is the individual’s average request from the three zones in order to 
make open access requests comparable to sole ownership requests.
5.1. Open access
 Efficiency in open access is negligibly higher without dispersal 
but this difference was not statistically significant using a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (p=0.6591) (Figure 5). Neither treatment was statistically different 
from the MYOPIC result of 50% efficiency using a Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test (OAND p=0.0679; OAD p=0.4004). Three subjects in OAD exceeded the 
MAX benchmark with a high of 105.2% and one subject in OAND exceeded 
the benchmark with 101.19%.  Open access treatments exceeded the expected 
experiment length of one period (Figure 6). Still, 11% of groups with dispersal 
and 44% of groups without dispersal fully exhausted the resource in the first 
period. Dispersal increased average length by 0.55 periods but this result is not 
statistically significant (p=0.3091). Only one group in each treatment played the 
full five periods.
First period extractions are skewed heavily to the left, with the most 
prominent skew of the four treatments being in OAND (Figure 7). The average 
per zone request is higher without dispersal but the difference is not statistically 
16 In open access this is easy to understand: a subject could obtain up to 600 tokens if the other 
subjects in her group made no extraction requests. Similarly, subjects in MD can harvest tokens 
dispersed from other zones, up to a maximum of 335 tokens.
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significant (p=0.9035) (Figure 8). Between all three zones, the total individual 
requests in the first period exceed the initial endowment of 100 tokens. Extraction 
patterns in the open access treatments clearly reflect the fall-down in resource 
stock predicted by overharvesting in the first period (Figure 9). First period 
percentage requests are lower under dispersal but quickly increase to exceed 
requests in the absence of dispersal (Figure 10). Despite the fact that each of the 
two groups reaching the final period had an endowment of less than one token, 
neither group failed to achieve full exhaustion.
5.2. Sole Ownership 
 Sole ownership efficiency is identical across treatments and far exceeds 
open access efficiency, but falls short of the MAX prediction of 100% efficiency. 
Nine subjects in SOD exceeded 100% efficiency with a maximum of 112.43%, 
the largest of all treatments. Exceeding 100% was not possible in the SOND 
treatment. All groups in SOD played the full five periods while one subject in 
SOND exhausted the resource in the second period.
 Like in open access treatments, first period requests were right skewed. 
Sole ownership reduced first period per-zone percentage requests by 6.68 points 
with dispersal and 5.61 points without dispersal, but this effect was not statistically 
significant (p=0.0839 and p=0.5757, respectively). Moreover, total individual 
requests were significantly lower than in open access where subjects withdraw 
from all three zones. Within sole ownership, dispersal reduced initial requests by 
4.75 but was not statistically significant (p=0.1525).
The extraction pattern for SOND pulses around 30 tokens while the 
pattern for SOD follows a flattened quadratic form. The treatments have an 
identical final period request that is achieved by a sharp increase in final period 
requests in SOND. As a percentage of endowment, both treatments maintain their 
basic form but SOND is now increasing and SOD is increasing at a much faster 
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rate. First period extraction percentages in SOD are the lowest of all four treatments 
but steadily increase and triple over the course of the experiment, ending as the 
highest of the four treatments. Despite the increasing percentage requests, failure 
to exhaust tokens in the final period was a major problem in both treatments 
(Figure 11). Only 46.43% of SOND subjects and 36.67% of SOD subjects fully 
exhausted the resource.17 The maximum number of tokens remaining was 63.7 
tokens with dispersal and 79.6 without. This reduced efficiency by 10.8% in 
SOND and 6.4% in SOD. 
6. Discussion
6.1 Sole Ownership: Extraction Patterns
 The results did not support my primary hypothesis that sole ownership 
efficiency gains would erode when subjects faced resource dispersal. Rather than 
follow MYOPIC behavior, subjects in the SOD treatment appeared to have the 
most cautious behavior in the first period. Considering low first period requests 
as well as efficiency and game length on par with, and even slightly better than 
SOND, it would at first seem that adding dispersal did not cause sole ownership 
subjects to behave more like open access subjects.
On the other hand, a few subjects in SOD appeared to behave according 
to the MYOPIC strategy. In every period at least one subject requested the full 
endowment and 30% of subjects achieved over 100% efficiency, an outcome that 
could only occur if the subject was harvesting tokens that had migrated from 
other zones. Mean percentage requests also increased over time at an increasing 
rate. This suggests the possibility that subjects initially playing cautious strategies 
began to become more aggressive as the experiment progressed. It is impossible 
17 In making this calculation, remaining token values of less than one were treated as exhausted. 
See the next section for a discussion of this and its impact on behavior. The subject in MND 
who had previously exhausted his resource was not considered.
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to predict what would have happened given a longer experiment, but the linear 
decline in stock hints that early exhaustion may have occurred (Figure 12).
Given that two thirds of SOD subjects failed to exhaust the stock in the 
final period, it is possible that these subjects were playing as if the game would 
continue. Extraction in SOND appears to slow in the fourth period after stock 
finally drops below the optimal level. If the game were longer, this might reflect 
an adjustment that would bring the stock back towards the optimal level. On the 
other hand, SOD extraction in the fourth period increases stock deviation from 
the optimal level at an increasing rate. If this trend continued resource extinction 
would occur in only a few additional periods. These findings highlight the 
limitations presented by the length of the experimental design and suggest the 
effects of dispersal may be witnessed in long-term behavioral adjustment rather 
than immediate strategy change.
6.2 Sole Ownership No Dispersal: Failure to Maximize
Although these findings show that sole ownership subjects not facing 
dispersal did not follow the predicted MAX strategy, they still performed better 
than open access subjects. Subjects in SOND did extend the life of the resource 
throughout the game despite failing to maximize growth. Only 8 first period 
requests hit the optimal 50 tokens and 62.07% of requests were at or below 35 
tokens. Subjects did not bring tokens to the optimal stock in the second period 
either, with more than half of subjects having a stock level above the optimal. 
Clearly, subjects are choosing cautious extraction patterns. Furthermore, the 8 
subjects with optimal post-extraction stock in the first period shrank to 3 subjects 
in the second period and 2 subjects in the third and fourth periods. 
The fact that most sole ownership subjects do not reach or even approximate 
the MAX strategy suggests that subjects do not fully understand the game.  This is 
surprising because subjects are directly given growth information in both equation 
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and table format. Similar results have been found in another study of sole ownership 
extraction where subjects were given indirect access to full information (Hey et al 
(2008). This study found a SOND efficiency of 87.4% compared to 76.4% in the 
current study. This difference is probably in large part due to three factors. First, 
subjects in that study tended to over-extract in the first period compared to my 
research where severe under-extraction was common. Second, failure to extract all 
tokens in the final period was about 50% more common in my study.  Finally, the 
shorter length of my experiments put greater weight on the first few periods where 
deviation from optimal behavior was more common. For this reason I expect that 
SOND efficiency would increase in a longer experiment and more closely resemble 
the results found in Hey et al (2008).
6.3 Open access: Expected Outcomes, Unexpected Behavior
MYOPIC behavior was expected in both of the open access treatments 
in addition to SOD. There is evidence to suggest that a small number of subjects 
followed self-interested strategies although only two subjects in OAND and no 
subjects in OAD followed the MYOPIC strategy. In both treatments one subject 
closely approximated this strategy, requesting all but one token. Likewise, one 
subject in OAND and three subjects in OAD achieved efficiencies greater than 
100%. However, most subjects in the open access treatments did not behave 
aggressively. Over two-thirds of OAND subjects chose to request less than the 
‘fair’ value, which I consider to be one third of the tokens available to the group. 
In the second and third periods this jumped to 80% and 85%, respectively. The 
same is true for OAD where half of subjects requested less than the fair value in 
the first period. This remained true for the second and third periods, but increasing 
cumulative requests exhausted most of the resource before the fourth period. 
Clearly, most subjects were not following the self-interested strategy 
predicted by rational choice theory. On one hand, the two MYOPIC extraction 
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requests and the handful of other aggressive requests mixed with many more 
conservative requests suggests that only a handful. On the other hand, this 
evidence also supports criticism of the belief that subjects conform to self-
interested interpretations of rational choice theory. Regardless of interpretation, 
the results clearly show that the few subjects acting in self-interest succeeded in 
ensuring the tragedy of the commons occurred for all members of their groups. 
Thus, overall efficiency was nearly identical in both treatments and very close to 
the MYOPIC benchmark. No outcome variables were significantly different at 
the 5% level and extraction patterns were very similar. The evidence appears to 
support the hypothesis that dispersal has little effect on behavior and outcomes in 
open access.
6.4 Experimental Design
When experimental research reveals surprising results, it is necessary to 
consider whether the results are a consequence of the experimental design. In this 
experiment the lack of different outcomes between sole ownership treatments, 
as well as the lack of MYOPIC and MAX strategies in open access and SOND, 
respectively, are all surprising results. I will examine two factors that could have 
affected the results: (1) subject understanding (2) parameter values, incentives, & 
payoff structures.
Because subjects in SOND face no competition, any deviation from 
the predicted MAX strategy is a result of individual conceptualization and 
understanding of the experiment. A number of subjects in all treatments asked 
questions and made statements indicating that they did not fully understand the 
experiment. The wide range of efficiencies in SOND and the mixed strategies 
within each treatment backup the anecdotal evidence of misunderstanding (Figure 
13). The model of resource growth used is nonlinear in the growth equation, and 
there is evidence that subjects in experiments consistently misperceive linearity 
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in non-linear environments. Psychological studies have found that subjects 
tend to default to linear mental models and struggle to develop a non-linear 
understanding based upon feedback (Brehmer, 1980, 1992; Sterman, 1994). 
Even when using perfect property rights to remove the commons problem from 
resource management, subjects consistently mismanage the resource and achieve 
sub-optimal outcomes (Hey et al, 2008; Moxnes 1998, 2000, 2004; Sterman, 
1994). These studies suggest that mismanagement is worse in experiments with 
higher degrees of complexity and lower information availability.
 Misperceptions of linearity are one optimistic explanation of the 
mismanagement scene.  However, there is evidence that linearity is not the cause. 
In the study by Hey et al (2008) subjects fell short of maximization despite being 
given a calculator that they could use to explore post-extraction stock, growth, 
next period stock, and savings based on possible extraction amounts (Figure 14). 
Furthermore, subjects in the current study were given a growth table including all 
integer stock values. Subjects in these experiments can use the resources provided 
to find the optimal strategy without understanding the non-linear growth function. 
It was highly unexpected that subjects in the SOND would fail to maximize the 
resource given the ease of identifying the growth-maximizing stock. The reason 
for this failure is unknown.
Based on the results and findings by other experimental studies, subject 
understanding is likely the most serious problem that could be addressed by the 
experimental design. However, parameter specification also impacts results, 
specifically experiment length. A length of only five periods highlights initial 
mismanagement by weighting each period so heavily in overall outcomes.  This 
brevity also may have hidden differences between sole ownership treatments 
that would have become apparent in a longer experiment. The initial endowment 
and intrinsic growth rate likely influenced results by limiting absolute change 
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in marginal token growth to less than 1 token. This specification also created 
situations where subjects faced fractional endowments. With a payoff ratio of 
$0.05 per token and a difference between MYOPIC and MAX payouts of $5, 
subjects had very small real-world incentive to search for the optimal extraction 
path.18
6.5 Rationality
While poor understanding of the experiment was certainly present, 
the results also suggest that the calculating and self-serving homo economicus 
understanding of rationality may not be the most appropriate model of human 
behavior. First period withdraws in open access are not significantly different 
from the ‘fair’ request of one third of the tokens (p=0.894). Almost a quarter of 
requests fall between 30-33% of the endowment. This cooperative behavior is 
better understood through homo sociologicus, a definition of rationality focusing 
on norms and reciprocity rather than solely self-interest (Bruni 2008; Engelen, 
2007). Similar results have been found in many experimental studies, some of the 
most interesting of which are ultimatum games where subjects’ modal response is 
to split the endowment 50-50 (Gintis, 2000). 
Homo sociologicus could also explain the increasing requests in SOD. 
Experimental studies have shown that subjects heavily utilize tools to punish 
defectors, even when at a cost to themselves (Gintis, 2000;Janssen et al, 2010; 
Ostrom et al, 1992) or when no direct benefit can be obtained due to group 
reorganization (Fehr & Gächter,2000). In the absence of punishment tools, 
subjects may often choose to follow tit-for-tat strategies (Gintis, 2000). In the 
current study the only way social subjects can punish selfish subjects is by playing 
more selfish strategies. Thus, the increasing extraction rates in SOD may identify 
the reciprocal reaction of social subjects to extraction by selfish subjects.
18 It was necessary to limit payoffs in order to achieve a suitable number of subjects.
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 A final argument to be made against the classical assumptions of 
rationality is that subjects in SOND that failed to find the optimal growth level of 
harvest all tokens in the final period clearly were not “weighing off the expected 
costs and benefits of actions and choosing the action that they consider to be 
the best” in the manner predicted by homo economicus (Engelen, 2007). The 
same is true for subjects facing fractional endowments because, while possible 
profit was low, entering a request equal to the endowment was no more costly 
than entering a request of zero. It appears that subjects were not aggressively 
pursuing maximization but instead were satisficing with “good enough” (Simon, 
1957). Homo economicus cannot explain this mismanagement in the presence of 
full information, regardless of the explanation. Modeling rationality is difficult, 
and homo economicus is a convenient assumption because its simplicity makes 
analysis and drawing conclusions easier. But humans are intellectually and socially 
complex actors operating within complex social structures - simplification may 
not be the best way to examine the results of experimental economics.
7. Conclusion
 This paper uses experimental methods to examine the relative 
performance of open access and sole ownership policies in environments where 
renewable resources are characterized by equalizing dispersal. Renewable 
resource policies that assign sole ownership of a resource aim to increase 
efficiency by removing the perverse incentives subjects face in an open access 
regime. However, economic theory suggests that sole ownership fails when it 
provides only exclusive extraction rights and does not give complete control 
over the physical resource. Such a situation can occur when a mobile resource is 
capable of crossing ownership boundaries.
 As a pilot study, this research has furthered the understanding of how 
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renewable resource extractors respond to resource dispersal across management 
zones. As expected, subjects in the open access regime are largely indifferent to 
resource dispersal because the resource is almost entirely harvested in the first 
period. The hypothesis that sole owners facing dispersal will demand the entire 
resource in the first period was not supported by the results. In fact, dispersal did 
not affect sole ownership efficiency and actually reduced first period requests. 
However, subject behavior differed in the form of steadily increasing requests not 
seen by sole owners who did not face dispersal. Likewise, some subjects actually 
achieved efficiencies of greater than 100% by harvesting tokens dispersed from 
other subjects’ zones. Together, these findings suggest that the effect of dispersal 
is in long-run adjustments to aggressive behavior rather than in immediate 
changes to initial strategy. The logical extension of this finding is to ask two 
questions.  First, in a longer experiment will this behavior continue to the point of 
resource exhaustion?  And second, are the increasing requests part of a response 
by cooperative subjects to the aggressive requests of non-cooperative subjects?
 While this research uses an experimental methodology because there 
are many challenges facing empirical research, it is clear that experimental 
work is not without its limitations. As the experimenter, my own anecdotal and 
observational evidence of subject confusion during this research leads me to 
question the accuracy of the results. The evidence presented here supports this 
natural skepticism, most notably the failure of most sole owners to fully exhaust 
the resource in the final period. Given that subjects were informed that the 
experiment would end, this is in violation of the usual assumptions made when 
invoking the self-interested rationality defined by homo economicus. Similarly, 
while a small portion of subjects appeared to fit within the homo economicus 
framework, the majority of subjects exhibited cooperative behavior or negative 
reciprocal response to aggressive subjects. If subjects are neither fully utilizing 
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the information they are giving nor acting in purely self-interested ways, perhaps 
another definition of rationality may be more applicable to experimental research.
 This research has presented new avenues of inquiry for experimentalists 
interested in renewable resource extraction. I recommend that future experimental 
research focus exclusively on sole ownership policy, take measures to address 
subject understanding, and examine more social definitions of rationality. Key to 
this will be a design that will examine the long-term effects of dispersal on sole 
ownership behavior and analyze behavior at the individual level. Based on the 
evidence presented here, it is my belief that such research will find behavioral 
response to dispersal and add to the understanding of renewable resource 
management policy.
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Appendix A: Figures & Tables 
 
 
Treatment n Theoretical  Efficiency 
Observed 
Efficiency 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean Length 
(periods) 
Std. 
Deviation 
OAND 27 0.50 0.569 0.218 2.6 1.601 
OAD 27 0.50 0.558 0.278 3.1 1.121 
SOND 29 1.00 0.764 0.147 4.9 0.557 
SOD 30 0.50 0.764 0.283 5.0 0.000 
Table 1. Summary of experimental results 
Figure 1: The Gordon Schaefer model. 
Total Revenue (also representing population 
growth) increases when effort allows larger 
harvests, but decreases when too much 
effort reduces the resource stock beyond 
its maximum growth level. The model 
predicts over-allocation of effort in open 
access because individual firms receive the 
market’s average revenue rather than their 
own marginal revenue (EQA). This essentially 
occurs because part of the harvest earned by 
a new firm entering the industry would have 
been harvested by other firms.
Schaefer’s Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(EMSY) creates profit and maintains resource 
stock by harvesting such that the growth-
maximizing stock level is maintained.
Gordon’s Maximum Economic Yield is the 
optimal outcome (EMEY) that maximizes 
profit by producing where MR=MC. This 
corresponds with the lowest level of effort 
and highest resource stock.
Figure 2: Standard population model 
depicting logistic growth. The population 
grows very slowly when the population 
density is very low or very high, and much 
faster when the population density is near 
half the carrying capacity.
 
 
Figure 2: Standard population model depicting 
logistic growth. The population grows very slowly 
when the population density is very low or very 
high, and much faster when the population density 
is near half the carrying capacity. 
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Figure 3: Logistic growth function used in this experiment with K=100 and r=1(left). 
Example of equalizing dispersal where Zones A and B grow no tokens while Zone C grows 
25 tokens (right).
Figure 4: The maximization strategy 
(MAX) brings stock to MSY in the 
first period, harvests only growth in 
intermediate periods, and harvests all 
tokens in the final period.
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Figure 5: Mean efficiency by treatment. Differences between policies are significant at the 
5% level while differences between dispersal conditions are not.
Figure 6: Mean game length by treatment. Differences between policies are significant at 
the 5% level while differences between dispersal conditions are not.
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Figure 7: Histograms displaying frequency distribution of first period requests.
Figure 8: First period individual requests by treatment. Requests are shown per zone (left) 
and combined from all zones (right) to highlight the impact of multiple zones in open 
access treatments.
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Figure 9: Extraction pattern by period: absolute token requests.
Figure 10: Extraction pattern by period: token requests as a percentage of available 
endowment.
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Figure 11: Tokens not extracted during final period (top left) and the resulting efficiency 
loss (top right). Graph depicting number of tokens remaining in final period with individual 
subjects on x axis (bottom).
Figure 12: Deviation from the optimal stock of 50 tokens in periods 1 through 4 and 0 
tokens in period 5.
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Figure 13: Extraction patterns from first session of SOND that show no general strategy.
Figure 14: Calculation tool used in Hey et al (2008) to give subjects stock & growth 
information.
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Appendix B: Recruitment Email
Subjects’ names were gathered using the freely available information in the 
college’s email system. The order of the subjects’ names were randomized and 
any ineligible students were removed (those who assisted the experimenter, had 
prior knowledge of the experiment, or had previously participated). Recruitment 
emails were then sent to these students. An announcement was also placed in the 
“Student Digest,” a collection of announcements sent to students in email form. 
The general wording was as follows:
You are invited to participate in an experiment on [date]. By participating 
in the experiment you will earn $5. You can also earn additional 
money based on your performance, up to $20. The experiment should 
take at most 45 minutes. The sessions are as follows:
•	 [Date, time, location]
To sign-up, please email [author email] which session you would like 
to participate in.
 
Spots will be filled on a first-come, first-served basis. The experiment 
is being conducted by Kevin Lugo, a senior Economics major, 
in conjunction with Professor John Cadigan. If you have already 
participated in one of my experiments last semester you may not 
participate again.
 
Questions should be addressed to Kevin Lugo [author email].
Each treatment was designed to have 30 participants for a total of 120 subjects. 
Extra participants were recruited in the event subjects did not show up and, if 
sent home, were given the show-up payment of $5. Despite extra recruitment 
some sessions were short of the desired 15 subjects. For this reason 27 subjects 
participated in open access no dispersal, 27 in open access dispersal, 29 in sole 
ownership no dispersal, and 30 in sole ownership dispersal.
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Appendix C: Experimental Materials
Instructions OAND
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. At this time please turn 
off any cell phones or other electronic devices.
 
You will earn $5 by participating in the experiment and may earn additional cash 
based on your performance. You get to keep any money that you earn over the 
course of the experiment. The experiment may take as long as 45 minutes.
 
When you are done with each screen, press “OK” to continue.
In this experiment you will be randomly and anonymously placed in a group with 
two other subjects. 
You and the two other subjects will play through a series of periods in which 
you will make decisions that will earn you experimental tokens. These tokens 
will remain in your account for the duration of the experiment. At the end of the 
experiment these tokens will be exchanged for dollars at a rate of 1 token to $0.05.
Experiment Design
There will be five periods. At the beginning of each period, subjects will choose 
a number of tokens to withdraw from three ‘zones’ labeled Zone A, Zone B, and 
Zone C. Your individual requests may not exceed the amount available in each 
zone. Each zone will begin the first period with 100 tokens.
In any period, if the group requests a total number of tokens that is less than the 
amount available in that zone, each player will receive the amount she requested 
from that zone. 
If the total number of tokens requested from a zone by the group exceeds the 
amount available in that zone, each player will receive a number of tokens 
proportional to her share of the total group request. In other words, if you request 
R tokens, the group requests a total of X tokens, and T tokens are available, 
then if X > T you will receive a number of tokens from that zone according to: 
At the end of each period, the number of tokens in a zone will grow based on 
the number of tokens remaining in that zone (T). Growth will follow the growth 
function: 
!"#$  !"#$%& =
!
!
∗ ! 
 
 
 
 
 
!"#$%ℎ =   ! ∗ 1−
!
100
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The number of tokens that grow will be added to the number of tokens remaining 
in the zone. This new total will be the number of tokens available in the next 
period. Each of the 5 periods will proceed in the same manner. Note that if, in any 
period, all remaining tokens are taken then there no growth occurs and there are 0 
tokens available from that zone in all subsequent periods. 
You have been given a reference sheet with a table displaying the growth 
associated with every integer token amount. This table also shows the number 
of tokens that will be available in the next period in each of those circumstances.
After each period, subjects will view a summary of the results from that period. 
This will include your personal performance as well as the group request from 
each zone, the actual group withdraw from each zone, and the total group 
withdraw that period. You will also see how many tokens remain in each zone at 
the end of the period. Finally, you will see the cash value of the tokens you earned 
that period.
You may find it helpful to record the results of each period. You have been 
provided with a paper record sheet to assist you in this process. 
Summary  
•	 In each period you will choose how many tokens you wish to withdraw 
from zones A, B, and C.
•	  If the group request is less than the tokens available, you will receive 
your request.
•	 If the group request is greater than the tokens available, you will receive 
tokens proportional to your share of the group request.
•	 Based on the number of tokens available in each zone, the growth 
function described above will be used to determine the number of tokens 
available in the next period.
•	 The game will last 5 periods.
After the final period, please record your earnings on you receipt form and wait 
for further instructions.
Throughout this experiment you are not to communicate with other players in 
any way. You must keep your eyes on your own screens at all times and may 
not use any electronic devices. Breeching these rules will result in a forfeit of all 
compensation.
If you have any questions, please ask them now.
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Reference Sheet 
Growth	  Table	   	   	   	   	   	   !"#$%& = ! ∗ !−
!
!""
	  
Toke
ns	  
Grow
th	  
New	  
Tokens	   	  	  
Toke
ns	  
Grow
th	  
New	  
Tokens	   	  	  
Toke
ns	  
Grow
th	  
New	  
Tokens	   	  	  
Toke
ns	  
Grow
th	  
New	  
Tokens	  
0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   	  	   25.00	   18.75	   43.75	   	  	   50.00	   25.00	   75.00	   	  	   75.00	   18.75	   93.75	  
1.00	   0.99	   1.99	  
	  
26.00	   19.24	   45.24	  
	  
51.00	   24.99	   75.99	  
	  
76.00	   18.24	   94.24	  
2.00	   1.96	   3.96	   	  	   27.00	   19.71	   46.71	   	  	   52.00	   24.96	   76.96	   	  	   77.00	   17.71	   94.71	  
3.00	   2.91	   5.91	  
	  
28.00	   20.16	   48.16	  
	  
53.00	   24.91	   77.91	  
	  
78.00	   17.16	   95.16	  
4.00	   3.84	   7.84	   	  	   29.00	   20.59	   49.59	   	  	   54.00	   24.84	   78.84	   	  	   79.00	   16.59	   95.59	  
5.00	   4.75	   9.75	  
	  
30.00	   21.00	   51.00	  
	  
55.00	   24.75	   79.75	  
	  
80.00	   16.00	   96.00	  
6.00	   5.64	   11.64	   	  	   31.00	   21.39	   52.39	   	  	   56.00	   24.64	   80.64	   	  	   81.00	   15.39	   96.39	  
7.00	   6.51	   13.51	  
	  
32.00	   21.76	   53.76	  
	  
57.00	   24.51	   81.51	  
	  
82.00	   14.76	   96.76	  
8.00	   7.36	   15.36	   	  	   33.00	   22.11	   55.11	   	  	   58.00	   24.36	   82.36	   	  	   83.00	   14.11	   97.11	  
9.00	   8.19	   17.19	  
	  
34.00	   22.44	   56.44	  
	  
59.00	   24.19	   83.19	  
	  
84.00	   13.44	   97.44	  
10.00	   9.00	   19.00	   	  	   35.00	   22.75	   57.75	   	  	   60.00	   24.00	   84.00	   	  	   85.00	   12.75	   97.75	  
11.00	   9.79	   20.79	  
	  
36.00	   23.04	   59.04	  
	  
61.00	   23.79	   84.79	  
	  
86.00	   12.04	   98.04	  
12.00	   10.56	   22.56	   	  	   37.00	   23.31	   60.31	   	  	   62.00	   23.56	   85.56	   	  	   87.00	   11.31	   98.31	  
13.00	   11.31	   24.31	  
	  
38.00	   23.56	   61.56	  
	  
63.00	   23.31	   86.31	  
	  
88.00	   10.56	   98.56	  
14.00	   12.04	   26.04	   	  	   39.00	   23.79	   62.79	   	  	   64.00	   23.04	   87.04	   	  	   89.00	   9.79	   98.79	  
15.00	   12.75	   27.75	  
	  
40.00	   24.00	   64.00	  
	  
65.00	   22.75	   87.75	  
	  
90.00	   9.00	   99.00	  
16.00	   13.44	   29.44	   	  	   41.00	   24.19	   65.19	   	  	   66.00	   22.44	   88.44	   	  	   91.00	   8.19	   99.19	  
17.00	   14.11	   31.11	  
	  
42.00	   24.36	   66.36	  
	  
67.00	   22.11	   89.11	  
	  
92.00	   7.36	   99.36	  
18.00	   14.76	   32.76	   	  	   43.00	   24.51	   67.51	   	  	   68.00	   21.76	   89.76	   	  	   93.00	   6.51	   99.51	  
19.00	   15.39	   34.39	  
	  
44.00	   24.64	   68.64	  
	  
69.00	   21.39	   90.39	  
	  
94.00	   5.64	   99.64	  
20.00	   16.00	   36.00	   	  	   45.00	   24.75	   69.75	   	  	   70.00	   21.00	   91.00	   	  	   95.00	   4.75	   99.75	  
21.00	   16.59	   37.59	  
	  
46.00	   24.84	   70.84	  
	  
71.00	   20.59	   91.59	  
	  
96.00	   3.84	   99.84	  
22.00	   17.16	   39.16	   	  	   47.00	   24.91	   71.91	   	  	   72.00	   20.16	   92.16	   	  	   97.00	   2.91	   99.91	  
23.00	   17.71	   40.71	  
	  
48.00	   24.96	   72.96	  
	  
73.00	   19.71	   92.71	  
	  
98.00	   1.96	   99.96	  
24.00	   18.24	   42.24	   	  	   49.00	   24.99	   73.99	   	  	   74.00	   19.24	   93.24	   	  	   99.00	   0.99	   99.99	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
100.0
0	   0.00	   100.00	  
 
 
